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Abstract 
 
This thesis extends a view of human reasoning which emphasises a theory of 
interpretation in conditional reasoning.  It extends work on Wason’s (1968) ‘selection 
task’, using novel rules and contexts to explore the factors that control subject 
interpretations, which in turn is reflected in their performance.  After reviewing the work 
on conditional reasoning and particularly the interpretative framework of Stenning & van 
Lambalgen (2004), the thesis explores subjects’ reasoning with rules that describe 
processes extended in time in two experiments. The most striking finding is that many 
subjects exhibit an unusual constant anaphor reading, even though the anaphors involved 
are tenses rather than pronouns.  Results are explained in terms of the temporal 
constraints involved in the situation described.   
The thesis then uses novel ‘information packaging’ manipulations which use colour to 
emphasise different distinctions in Wason’s original task.  This manipulation provides 
evidence of where subjects’ attention already rests.  This is combined with a task that 
gathers data of subjects’ interpretation of negation.  Results are consistent with the idea 
that although subjects in the standard task are focussed on the distinction between cases 
that fit the rule and ones that do not, there is evidence that emphasising the mapping of 
the antecedent/consequent onto back/front of the cards is sensitive to these manipulations.  
The negation interpretation task reveals striking divergences between subjects’ 
interpretations and the classical model assumed in the literature, and these differences are 
interpretable in terms of default logic.  A few conditions were originally designed as 
controls only to end up generating striking results of their own.  Colour is used in the 
truth conditional semantics of the rules (black/white replaces number/letter or 
vowel/consonant) instead of being used as mere information packaging.  Sizable 
increases in ‘classical competence’ responses are observed and this is interpreted in terms 
of the non-hierarchical structure of the properties used.  Studies using LSA and a novel 
tensor network operating on a database of rules gathered from selection task literature 
show conclusively that higher frequencies of function words appear in descriptive rules 
than they do in deontic rules.   
This thesis concludes that it is possible to direct subjects towards various interpretations 
on the task through the use of semantic manipulations that include but are not restricted 
to the ones observed in this work.  Issues that include resolving the anaphora in the 
problem, the hierarchy of the structure of properties and the negation of clauses clearly 
influence the interpretation subjects arrive at which in turn affects their reasoning and 
responses.  Results indicate that subject assumptions concerning negatives are different 
from those made by experimenters which inform all major theories including Mental 
Models, Information Gain and those based on mental logic.  In particular, subjects’ most 
frequent selections indicate that they are selecting an implicit negative which is the 
opposite of what is expected by the principle of truth of Mental Models. 
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“Pure mathematics is the subject in which we can be perfectly certain 
of the truth of what we say at the expense of not knowing what we are 
talking about” (Bertrand Russell) 
A central concern of the psychology of reasoning is to ascertain to what extent a person 
can draw conclusions that follow through logic alone if given a set of assumptions 
(Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972).  The crucial point that commands your attention is 
that the claim is that subjects start their reasoning given a set of assumptions whereas in 
fact they are reasoning from a textual question from which they are expected to extract 
their set of assumptions.   
This thesis is concerned with analysing the relation between the interpretations that 
subjects make of the textual question and their reasoning which is based upon these 
interpretations in addition to the way the two interact.  Several researchers have 
recognised in the context of the selection task as an example (Manktelow and Over, 
1978; Stenning and van Lambalgen, 1999) that subject interpretations of textual 
questions diverge from what is expected by classical models.  Natural language texts 
given in the questions may offer multiple possible semantic implications if subjects 
assume different contexts or make erroneous assumptions.  By contrast, classical logic 
models presume that the same set of assumptions will always be made independent of the 
semantic implications made.  Evidently, this is not the case. 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) offered an interpretive account where subjects 
impose interpretations onto the task, and semantic concepts such as anaphora and 
contingency can help explain their responses.  This thesis therefore, takes the selection 
task as a representative as was done by Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) and extends 
the view they proposed. 
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The experiments exhibited here impose different semantic structures onto the task to 
yield different response distributions among possible choices.  None of the existing 
theories offer any explanation of subject behaviour in the task, as the manipulations are 
semantic as those in the work of Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004).  The semantic 
structures imposed onto the task include the use of rules about processes that imply a 
temporal order between the events described in the antecedent and the event described in 
the consequent.  “Information packaging” was also utilised as a tool of analysis to 
identify the role that the background rule plays in reasoning and where subjects place 
distinctions to group the information they are given.  This thesis also challenges a basic 
assumption by questioning what subjects regard as negatives of each other.  
The main claim is that novel manipulations of content influence subject distributions 
among the different responses possible.  The effect-response pattern is not at all trivial 
but it fills a part of the puzzle of how interpretation and reasoning interact.  This in turn, 
has broad implications for reasoning and cognition in general. 
The thesis will start with a review of prior work and then move on to the interpretive 
perspective offered by Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004).  It builds on that by 
introducing manipulations that impose temporal sequencing and follows that with 
information packaging to impose semantic distinctions onto the task.  Then it analyses 
the surface structure of the rules, through a tensor based neural network. 
1.1   Background 
The quest for the target defined by Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) has diversified into 
many paths of research depending on the type of tasks chosen as a medium of analysis.  
These tasks include, amongst others, construction tasks, evaluation tasks, as well as the 
selection task.  Construction tasks provide a subject with an incomplete sentence like “… 
is an even number” and the subject is asked to complete the sentence such that it is true or 
false.  For example, if asked to answer it such that it is true a possible answer will be “2 is 
an even number”.  Evaluation tasks on the other hand, present a subject with a completed 
sentence in a context, and ask subjects to indicate whether the sentence is true or false in 
that context.  The selection task, similar to both, yet unlike them, presents subjects with a 
rule, and four possible test cases from which they must select the minimum number they 
can in order to ensure that the rule holds.    The difference that is clearly evident is that 
the Construction task asks subjects to insert a value from a range that has two sets, while 
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the Evaluation task asks subjects to evaluate the sentence to identify if the two values it 
contains are aligned.  On the other hand, the selection task asks subjects to evaluate a 
relationship between two sets and whether or not it exists within a four card domain.  
This is clearly a more complex task when compared to the other two, due to the larger 
range of possibilities and misunderstandings that may arise.  It involves verification and 
falsification which are two mental processes that are still ill understood. 
The selection task as proposed by Wason (1966) has results that seemed shocking at 
first sight.  Four cards are presented to students who were told that the cards had a 
number on one side and a letter on the other.  The cards show an “A”, a “B”, a “4” and a 
“7”.  They are told to check whether or not a rule holds: If a vowel appears on one side 
then an even number is on the other side of the card.  Subjects have to show which cards 
they wish to turn over to check the rule.  The correct responses according to classical 
logic would thus be A and 7, or in other words to choose the true antecedent and the false 
consequent cards.  Oddly enough, only between 4% and just over 20% of students 
selected these two cards in empirical studies (Manktelow & Evans, 1979).  This is odd 
because the given rule is a straightforward If P then Q rule of the sort that is understood 
even by young children that are told of rewards for specific behaviour or punishment if 
they misbehave.  It is quite common for a child to be told: “If you finish your homework 
early, then you can go play on your bike” while assuming that the child will understand 
the rule.  Yet, it is the process of validating this extremely common rule that such a large 
number of subjects get wrong.  This result started nothing short of a gold rush with the 
aims of finding the magical explanation to this behaviour. 
Since subjects’ observed behaviour was regarded as an “error”, initial work was 
determined to find cases that would not lead to this “error”.  This resulted in several 
theories that basically divided materials into two groupings; abstract versus “thematic” 
materials.   
“Thematic” materials were observed to result in a much higher level of accuracy 
(Wason & Shapiro 1971, Wason & Johnson-Laird 1972).  These materials were 
characterised with a “thematic” relationship between the two propositions in the 
conditional.  An example of this type of problem is: “If I go to Manchester, I go by 
train”1 (Wason & Shapiro, 1971).  On the other hand, ‘abstract’ materials included 
                                                 
1 This particular example is an elusive case that failed to replicate and only worked for Wason and Shapiro 
(1971), however it will be discussed later. 
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materials similar to the example given above and were usually characterised by being 
‘concrete’ but lacking in any “thematic” linkage between the propositions.   
The assumption is that while abstract materials do not seem to guide subjects to 
presume that a negative case may exist, “thematic” materials do imply possible negative 
cases that have to be checked.  Since classical logic implies that the correct selections to 
check a rule of the form If P then Q are to select P and NotQ, then a possible false 
instance would make subjects aware that NotQ must be checked as well.  However, the 
dividing line was never clear-cut and almost no linguistic or logical insight was brought 
to illuminate the possible causes of the poor performance in the abstract tasks that are 
also described as arbitrary tasks.  
“Some of these patterns are inconsistent with any logical interpretation 
of the materials.”(Cheng & Holyoak, 1985) 
Unfortunately, researchers quickly jumped to the conclusion that results could not be 
explained through any logical interpretation and were satisfied with the division of 
materials into these two groups claiming that the premise ‘semantics’ played a role by 
raising the  possibility of a falsifying instance. 
“The model theory predicts that any manipulation that emphasizes 
what would falsify the rule should improve performance in the selection 
task.” (Johnson-Laird, 1999) 
Therefore it seems to be a safe assumption to make that according to these 
conclusions, the abstract task questions would result in ‘inaccurate’ reasoning.  They 
would lead subjects astray to a diverse set of interpretations while “thematic” type rules 
would lead subjects to seek falsifying instances that need to be checked to ensure that the 
rule is correct, thereby achieving the classical logic response to the question. 
1.2   A Theory in Logic 
“.. form will interact with content in reasoning, and the goal of the 
theory is to understand how” (Stenning, van Lambalgen, 1999) 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (1999) indicate that one of the main neglected issues in 
prior work is that the form of the rule is not fully understood with respect to how it 
interacts with the content or the semantics of the task.  The form is what dictates the 
“expected” answers with respect to classical logic or Popper’s (1963) theory, while 
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content is the specifics of the “thematic” relations that influences performance in the task.  
In order to investigate this issue further, Stenning and Lambalgen (2002b) introduce a 
new conceptual perspective to this task by showing that logical theory expects the form 
subjects impose on the task is strongly affected by the semantics of the task itself.  This 
means that subjects do not have a unified understanding of the task form.  Instead, they 
have one of several different possible “understandings” and the one they select influences 
how they approach the task and what selections are the “correct” ones to make. 
However, since the “expected” answers are extracted from a classical view of logic, it 
does take into account that the logic subjects use may be using is semantically sensitive 
such as deontic or real world logic.  Stenning and van Lambalgen (2002b) show through 
Socratic dialogue with subjects that indeed interpretations differ greatly from each other 
with respect to how that particular subject understood the form of the abstract task. 
This finding explains the distinction found between the two types of tasks, namely, 
abstract and “thematic”, and allowed Stenning and van Lambalgen (2002b) to redefine 
them as descriptive and deontic tasks.  In a descriptive question the rule can be: “If there 
is an A on one side, then there is a 4 on the other side”.  If a case is found where there is 
an A on one side and a 7 on the other, then it is natural to assume that this rule is false at 
least for this case.  On the other hand, if the rule is: “If a customer is to drink an alcoholic 
beverage, then she must be over 21” and someone under that age drinks alcohol, then the 
case would be considered a violation of the rule.  Its existence does not pose any threat to 
the existence or truth of the rule, making this a deontic rule, while the existence of the 
first case threatens the truth of that rule, making it a descriptive rule.  This clarifies the 
distinction between successful cases and unsuccessful ones which are strongly dependent 
on whether or not the rule is fragile or reliably resistant to the existence of a falsifying 
instance. 
Conversely, descriptive tasks do not lead subjects to follow the path of correct deontic 
reasoning, thereby causing them to arrive at a diverse medley of possible conclusions 
depending on the types of interpretations they adopt.  Stenning and Lambalgen 
(submitted) outline several different possible interpretations that subjects may arrive at in 
the case of the descriptive task that in the simplest terms makes that version confusing.  
These include interpreting the task such that “not false” is not interpreted the same as 
“true”.  Another interpretation subjects assume is when they negate the conditional of the 
form “If P then Q” as “If P then Not Q”.  A third interpretation that is possible is that 
each card has its own domain versus the four being part of the same domain, while the 
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fourth interpretation is that some rules have exceptions.  Other issues include taking the 
cards as a sample of all letters and numbers and dependency issues between card choices, 
such as if one card is turned and gets some result how this would affect future choices of 
cards. 
However, there still remain many unresolved issues such as why subjects make a 
higher selection percentage of PQ as preferred to other popular subject choices such as 
only P and only Q.  Nor is there strong experimental evidence that shows through a probe 
into subject interpretations that they do indeed have different interpretations of what NotP 
and NotQ are indicating and that they did have a diverse set of interpretations of the form 
of the rule.  The theory has not as yet investigated the relationship between the 
foreground rule and the background rule, nor the semantic implications of the word “not” 
versus giving another possible value as in comparing A, Not A to A, B.  This would be 
especially interesting if the “not” is expressed semantically so as not to strongly affect the 
form of the comparison.  These are the issues that will be under consideration in this 
thesis. 
1.3   Semantic Games 
“Two men went camping overnight in the desert and slept peacefully 
through part of the night.  They woke up, and one asked the other: What 
do you see?  The other answered: A dark sky full of beautiful stars.  The 
first asked again: What can you deduce from that?  The other 
answered: ..that we are only a tiny speck in a vast universe.  The first 
responded sharply: You idiot! It means that our tent has been stolen.”2
The task at hand therefore, requires the introduction of novel semantic tools with 
which subject interpretations can be directed towards a different set or different 
distribution.  The aim is to make the experimental setting “invite” different 
interpretations.  Perhaps the ideal starting point is from the division of materials that 
distinguishes materials that yield the P, Not Q responses versus those that do not. 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2002b) introduce Deontic logic as a ‘real life’ logic that 
explains the difference between descriptive/abstract and deontic/”thematic” questions.  
One of the aspects of this type of reasoning is that it compares the status quo with an 
                                                 
2 There are several versions of this joke roaming the world, the most famous claims the two are Sherlock 
Holmes and his aide Watson. 
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ideal, when it discusses what “ought” to be done.  A rule can be represented by the form 
O(α|β) which is “α ought to be done if β is done”.     
A feature exists in ‘deontic logics’ that is especially interesting;  namely, a paradox by 
the name of the Chisholm paradox that is represented whenever the following sequence 
exists (van der Torre & Tan, 1998). 
1a.  α ought to be (done) 
2a.  if α is (done), then β ought to be (done). 
3a.  If α is not (done), then β ought not to be (done). {This is understood from the 
context} 
4a.  α is not (done) 
Now the paradox arises from mapping “ought to be (done)” in line 1a to “is done” in 
line 2a, and in a sense this comes from applying an “ideal” to a real life case and it results 
in a recommendation that β ought to be (done).  Then by mapping 4a to 3a we also arrive 
at the conclusion that β ought not to be (done) which contradicts the conclusion arrived at 
above and consequently is paradoxical.  The first mapping may raise a concern that 1a 
and the first premise of 2a do not match perfectly, however it should be evident that in 
real life when applying ideals to real life situations, this type of mapping is common.  
Now take a look at the same paradox in the present perfect: 
1b.  α ought to be (done) 
2b.  if α has been (done), then β ought to be (done). 
3b.  If α has not been (done), then β ought not to be (done). {This is understood from 
the context} 
4b.  α has not been (done) 
Now the difference here from the above is that the mapping from 1b to 2b is different 
in a sense that 2b does not reflect an action that takes place in accordance with the ideal 
presented in 1b but instead it reflects a conditional made about an incident that took place 
in the past.  Since 4b states that α has not been (done), then no contradiction arises in 
this case. 
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If the alteration of tenses can have this effect on this paradox, then it may also have an 
effect on subject performance.  For example, if the temporal tag between the two 
premises always enforces a specific order that the first for example occurs before the 
second as with the line 3b then subject behaviour in the abstract/descriptive task could be 
altered from the majority selections of PQ. 
Consequently, the work that is done here builds on this sensitivity to temporal distance 
in semantics between the present and past tenses.  An experiment is presented through 
altering the temporal distances between the two premises to show that subjects rather 
than select PQ, select either the P, which comes first, or the Q which follows several 
minutes later.  This separation is then fortified through yet another experiment that shows 
a conveyor rather than a verbal description of the time difference.  
In order to find out other semantic tools through which we can analyse the selection 
task, a short visit to analytical reasoning seems in order.  Stenning (2002) drew a map of 
how analogical reasoning operates at a higher level of abstraction than the events or 
objects described.  He starts off by giving two similar stories that can be seen to map 
analogically, taken from Gentner et. al. (1993) 
Base Story 
Karla, an old hawk, lived at the top of a tall oak tree.  One 
afternoon, she saw a hunter on the ground with a bow and some crude 
arrows that had no feathers.  The hunter took aim and shot at the hawk 
but missed.  Karla knew the hunter wanted her feathers so she glided 
down to the hunter and offered to give him a few.  The hunter was so 
grateful that he pledged never to shoot at a hawk again.  He went off 
and shot deer instead. 
Analogy Match 
Once there was a small country called Zerdia that learned to make 
the world’s smartest computer.  One day Zerdia was attacked by its 
warlike neighbour Gagrach.  But the missiles were badly aimed and the 
attack failed.  The Zerdian government realized that Gagrach wanted 
Zerdian computers so it offered to sell some computers to the country.  
The government of Gagrach was very pleased.  It promised never to 
attack Zerdia again. 
Now if we consider these two stories, we find their analogical similarity clear in the 
relationships that hold between the various players in each.  Karla the hawk is in a sense 
similar to the small country Zerdia that had something that another warlike player 
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desired, and the reactions were the same.  Here, we do not have any one of the two 
expressed in a purely abstract fashion as in the case of the rule relating a letter to a 
number.  Instead, what we have is a description of two scenes in which both stories are in 
context, and the essential features necessary for the analogy to hold consist of the way the 
different players interact with each other. 
Since this interaction is of such crucial important in analogy then why should the same 
not apply to the selection task.  Sure enough in the selection task, rules that are 
descriptive in nature resulted in very poor selection rates of the expected P, Not Q 
responses so the definition of this category was modified from the word abstract to the 
word descriptive because it seems to better describe it.  The “successful” group also 
started with a general term which is “thematic” and that was replaced with “deontic” 
because a relationship that defines what “ought to” be the case seemed to exist in most if 
not all “successful” rules either within the rule itself or implied through the context. 
This qualified the deontic group of rules to have a relationship imposed between the 
antecedent and consequent clauses that in turn resulted in many theories aimed at 
explaining behaviour in this particular group as in Pragmatic Schemas (Cheng and 
Holyoak, 1985;Cheng et. al.,1986) and Social Contracts (Cosmides, 1989).  These 
theories lacked generality and, for that, other theories emerged including Relevance 
Theory (Sperber et al., 1994) and Information Gain (Oaksford and Chater, 1995).  Yet 
again the work presented here does not aim to judge the two theories or to select between 
them. 
Instead, what is done here is an investigation into the relationship between the 
antecedent and consequent for descriptive rules.  In order to achieve that target let us take 
a look at a modified version of the analogy stories given above as presented by Stenning 
(2002). 
Once there was a small country called Zerdia that learned to make 
the world’s smartest computer.  One day the chief minister of its feeble 
neighbour Gagrach challenged Zerdia to a national tournament of 
Trivial Pursuits.  Gagrach lost badly and a gloom descended.  The 
Zerdian government realized that Gagrach needed Zerdian computers 
to help its team’s memory, and so it offered to sell it some.  The 
government of Gagrach was very pleased.  It promised, in the future, to 
only challenge other countries to Trivial Pursuits. 
Now we can consider this story in two ways; the first is to consider it appearing on its 
own.  In this case, one may assume the word “trivial” in “Trivial Pursuits” to imply the 
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game is a simple one that is not at all alarming in nature.  One may also assume that 
Zerdia decided to help Gagrach out of kindness and having the same computers implies 
that the two cannot challenge each other to this game perhaps because of the game rules. 
If, on the other hand this story is compared to the base story, several issues 
immediately arise.  The actions that are performed and intentions map perfectly onto the 
base story.  If then an analogy is drawn, the game of Trivial Pursuits is understood to be a 
game that is not to be desired in spite of what is implied by its name “trivial”.  Another 
issue is that the neighbour here is “feeble” so it is not understood to be threatening except 
perhaps by this mysterious challenge that it promised to never do again.   
Consequently, what happened here is that the intended interpretation of the term 
“Trivial Pursuits” was altered through the analogical mapping process without changing 
a single word in the story.  It was initially assumed to imply a straightforward 
interpretation and was altered to imply an ironic title.  This type of change is purely 
semantic so we can consider applying it to the context of the selection task rule.  In order 
to do that, we must mimic what occurred to the term with minimal changes to the rule. 
The rule “If there is an A on one side, then there is a 4 on the other side” differs from 
the rule “If there is a black A on one side, then there is a white 4 on the other side” by 
virtue of the imposed semantic distinction between what is on the face of the card and 
what is on the back of the card.  Black and white are opposite colours and here they are 
utilised to identify if subjects impose a distinction between the two sides of the cards by 
virtue of applying the background rule.  Other distinctions can be probed in a similar 
fashion. 
If subjects already emphasise a distinction that is emphasised through colour then no 
difference in their behaviour is expected just as the base story seems to map well to its 
analogical match.  However, if the emphasised distinction differs from what is dictated 
by subject interpretations, then a difference in behaviour is expected as is expected when 
mapping the base story to the “Trivial Pursuits” story.   
Consequently, the ideal means to analyse descriptive rule behaviour is through the use 
of “information packaging” in order to emphasise various distinctions that subjects may 
associate importance to or ignore while reasoning.   
Further justification may exist in prior work.  One may wish to ponder a few rules 
along with the percentage selection rate of P, Not Q.   
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19% R17 If a card has an 'A' on one side, then it must have a '4' on the 
other side. 
19% R18 If a bird has a purple spot underneath each wing, then it must 
build nests on the ground. 
34% R19 If a washing label has silk on one side, then it has "dry clean 
only" on the other side. 
34% R20 If two objects carry like electrical charges, then they will 
repel each other. 
Table  1.1: A comparison of four rules that elicit very different response rates of the P, 
Not Q selections 
If one considers the difference between the first two rules and the last two rules all of 
which were attempted by Cheng et al. (1986), the relation between the antecedent and 
consequent is clear.  Letters and numbers have hardly anything in common, while a 
washing label and cleaning instructions do.  It is possible that rules of this sort are what 
prompted Relevance Theory (Sperber et al., 1995) and Information Gain (Oaksford and 
Chater, 1995) to emerge.  These theories, however, do not explain the logical nature of 
the relationship that exists between the two parts of a rule. 
Consider the difference exhibited above between the rules R17, R18 and R19, R20.  
The latter two exhibit a distinction between the antecedent and consequent; in the first, 
cleaning instructions depend on the material being washed, while they both exist on the 
same washing label.  In the second, the actions to repel or attract are associated with 
electrical charges and the objects that carry the charges are the same ones that repel or 
attract.  One may then ask, if R18 also speaks about the same bird, in the antecedent it is 
described to have a spot on its wing and the consequent tells about its nesting habits.  
However, one must not overlook the fact that the spot on the wing does not relate at all to 
nesting so it is by no means similar to the charges that repel nor the material that caused 
the washing instructions to be the way they are. 
An issue that can also arise from the analogical stories displayed above is with the 
surface features of the rules themselves and how they may influence reasoning in the 
task.  A descriptive rule is usually of the form “If there is an A on one side, then there is a 
4 on the other side” while a deontic rule is of the form “If the form says entering on one 
side, then the other side includes cholera on its list of diseases.”  Consequently, the 
division seemed to be between the abstract nature of having letters like A, B, and Z with 
having a description of a specific incident that has a “theme” as in sending a letter.  The 
abstract therefore is represented by a set of symbols that do not relate to the world except 
when they are assigned meaning that would cause them to relate to it.  For example, 
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Cheng and Holyoak (1985) associated the symbols in the rule “If one is to take action 'A' 
then one must satisfy precondition ‘P’” where A is short for Action and P is short for 
Precondition and they achieved a P, Not Q response percentage of 61%.   
This example implies that informing subjects of a relationship between A and 4 may 
simply be representing a relationship at a high level of abstraction, while A may represent 
any of “Action”, “Aptitude”, “Assessment”, “Ace”, etc.  Similarly, the number 4 could 
represent any of “Plan number”, “Mark out of 4”, “value of card”, etc.  In this context, 
their experiment is extremely important, in that it identifies that the relationship imposed 
is of much higher impact on performance than surface words.  However, one may also 
recall that their response percentage is lower than that which would usually be achieved 
by contextual questions which reach up to 92%.  So although the impact does not seem 
high, it does not elude a difference that may exist between the two groups of rules at the 
surface level.  Latent Semantic Analysis or LSA  (Landauer &Dumais, 1997) is a co-
occurrence statistical model that tests how frequently a word appears in the same context 
of other groups.  For example, it would investigate if the number 4 appears next to the 
words given in the contexts listed above and utilises them to represent it.  This analysis, 
however, is not sufficient because the model takes absolutely no account of the location 
of the word in the clause because it assumes the two phrases “one cut” and “cut one” as 
exactly the same. So a novel tensor based neural network is then utilised to raise the rank 
of the high dimensional vector space used in LSA by 1 level.  Results are expected to be 
highly informative on one of the possible distinctions between the two groups of rules. 
1.4   Summary  
Chapter 2 reviews only part of the literature that is concerned with the work done here 
because the amount of work done in this field is truly worthy of respect.  This work 
emphasises a central distinction between thematic tasks that result in a high percentage 
selections of the desired responses and abstract tasks that result in a low percentage of 
these responses.  Chapter 3 introduces a novel perspective that removes misconceptions 
about logic and presents the work done to identify the existence of a deontic/descriptive 
division between the same groups of tasks that result in high percentage selections of 
desired responses and those that result in a low percentage of these choices.   
Chapter 4 introduces the concept of directionality of thought by offering several 
definitions of different types and follows that with several conveyor experiments.  The 
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conveyor setting replaces the anaphora in the task with a unidirectional temporal 
semantic restriction to identify the influence of directionality on subject behaviour.  
Chapter 5 utilizes colour as an extra dimension to emphasise various semantic 
distinctions that subjects may impose onto the task.  It also utilises information packaging 
to alter the hierarchical structure of the sets referenced by the antecedent and consequent.   
Chapter 6 identifies through the use of LSA and a novel neural network model that 
even at that level the order of the words in the rule reflects a basic difference that exists 
between deontic and descriptive tasks.  The latter type exhibits a higher frequency of 
function words that carry little lexical meaning.  Chapter 7 concludes the work done here 
and suggests many new avenues that can be pursued. 
 




Prior Work in the Selection Task 
No tree can grow without a seed, and for the findings made in this work, there were 
numerous seeds, dispersed over a great forest of work.  They come from research made 
within the selection task itself, research done in linguistics related to the if .. then.. 
structure, research done with respect to dynamic reactions, and even philosophical 
investigations into the essence of language.  Last but not least, the most striking finding 
made in this work represents the effects of the properties of colour on rule semantics.  
This chapter, however, will take the reader on a tour through the history of relevant work 
done in this task from the first days of the task through to the current state of affairs.  It 
will start with the shocking results that Wason (1966) found for a seemingly simple task.  
The journey will then continue to review the investigation methods that range from the 
classical test to Socratic tutoring.  Following this, a need arises to adopt a theory that is 
capable of explaining behaviour, examples of which include rule familiarity, matching 
bias, pragmatic schemas and the social contracts.  A review follows of the theories of 
mental representation including Braine’s (1978) mental logic and Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne’s (1991, 1993).  This is followed by a retrospective review of perspectives, 
“egoism” and Descartes (1954) to conclude with relevance theory and information gain as 
attempts to formalise results obtained so far by researchers.  The review will reflect an 
urgent need to start looking at the task from a novel perspective that will be presented in 
the next chapter. 
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2.1   A Logical Shock 
The story begins when Peter Wason (1966) presented subjects with a task that seemed 
logically trivial by giving them the rule “If a vowel is on one side, then an even number is 
on the other side” while presenting them with four cards that have A, B, 4, and 7.  They 
are asked to select the cards they wish to turn over to check the given rule.  To the shock 
of psychologists only between 4% and 20% of subjects made the correct selections of A 
and 7 (Manktelow and Evans, 1979).   
The frantic search for a path towards comprehending why such a simple task caused 
so much confusion led Wason (1969) to test it in reverse by giving subjects the solution 
and then the problem.  All 20 subjects were able to correctly justify the selections made 
after only some hesitation while with the original order even the brightest students were 
not completely convinced of the “correct” answers they are given once they complete the 
task (Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972).  Wason (1969) then tested a variation of the same 
task that is strictly binary, where subjects are only given one of two possible stimuli as in 
“If there is an A on one side, then there is a 4 on the other side” with cards showing A, B, 
4 and 7.  Unfortunately, Wason’s hopes turned to disappointment because this variation 
failed to produce better performance.  This was followed by a variety of different task 
formats with rules like “Every card, which has a red triangle on one side, has a blue 
circle on the other side” (Wason, 1969).  Results showed a higher selection of P with a 
lower selection of Q but that reduction was not replaced with NotQ as one would hope.  
This was followed by another test to identify if subjects were confused by the two sides 
of the cards, in particular whether or not they interpreted “the other side of the card” to 
imply the side meaning the side that faced “downwards” only.  All the information was 
presented on the same side of the card with a part of the information hidden behind a 
mask, but this too was regarded as a big disappointment (Wason and Johnson-Laird, 
1970).  Negation came to mind and instructions that asked subjects to pick the cards that 
‘could break the rule’ were used, hoping to raise the percentage selection of NotQ.  
Another disappointment resulted because it only induced subjects to select NotP and 
NotQ conditions rather than the correct P and NotQ cards. 
“Most of these experimental modifications could be regarded as 
‘failures’ because they did not improve the subjects’ performance 
(Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972).” 
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Researchers regarded the results at that time almost unanimously as a source of 
embarrassment because subjects are not thinking in a logical way.  Stenning and 
Lambalgen (2002) however, now inform us that we are not supposed to jump to such a 
conclusion without looking at what we consider a ‘correct’ answer to the task.  Wason 
and Johnson-Laird (1972) assure the reader that it is a simple task. 
“It may be hard for the reader, guided by our concrete example, to 
appreciate the extreme difficulty of the task. (If he wants a proof of it, 
let him try it out on his own friends.” Time after time our subjects fall 
into error.  Even some professional logicians have been known to err in 
an embarrassing fashion, and only the rare individual takes up by 
surprise and gets it right.  It is impossible to predict who he will be.  
This was all very puzzling and, if anything, made it harder to 
understand the origins of scientific enterprise.  But we wondered 
whether our subjects’ difficulties were due to the very simplicity of the 
problem.  It is really simple.” 
 Stenning and Lambagen (2002) on the other hand, now wonder if the task is as simple 
as we were led to believe and wonder if one is to automatically ‘expect’ subjects to think 
using classical logic, without any regard given to the semantics of the premises in the 
rules.  In other words, are we really asking the right question and is the normative answer 
we are checking answers against, the correct one? 
Wason (1987) shows that he has a strong belief that subjects are guided by old 
prejudices that govern the way they respond to this task where a fact is not sufficient to 
alter one’s beliefs.  It is ironic that Wason is displaying a type of confusion in explaining 
the task that is no different from that which is displayed by subjects.  What subjects fail 
to do is to check the possibility of having a false consequent of the If P then Q rule which 
is NotQ.   To identify the similarity between this and what researchers are doing we will 
examine Popper’s (1963) philosophy of scientific discovery.  
Popper (1963) starts his theory by examining the sources of theories through 
investigating several possibilities.  Assumptions that truth exists and is clear to all those 
who seek it is clearly untrue as we have examples where Einstein corrected Newton’s 
theory even though it produced accurate results for all studies done on earth within our 
limited 3-D world.  Anomalies existed in outer space and the ignorance of scientists at the 
time does not imply that they are not scientifically relevant.  Therefore, existing theories 
may be affected by prejudices that many philosophers seek to purify themselves from 
when seeking true knowledge.  Based on this he defines the conspiracy theory of 
ignorance as the possibility of one to err as a result of the influence of prejudices imposed 
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through tradition, social norms and the like.  He also explains that erroneous theories may 
exist for thousands of years as the belief that related illness to evil forces in a field that is 
currently regarded as medicine.   
Therefore, erroneous theories await refutation and one possible route towards this is to 
question the sources of these theories by questioning the assertions they are based on.  
However, he shows that if this is done, then it is liable to lead to an infinite regress and 
cast doubt on all existing theories as it does not question whether the theory holds any 
“truth”.  All it actually questions is the adequacy of the sources of ideas and these sources 
are obtained through either senses that err or erroneous misinterpretations depending on 
the philosophy adopted to explain human error.  With the possibility that a “true” theory 
can emerge from faulty assumptions, this questioning of sources becomes futile and leads 
only to infinite regress.  He comes to the conclusion that:   
“For if we are doubtful about an assertion, then the normal procedure 
is to test it, rather than to ask for its sources; and if we find independent 
corroboration, then we shall often accept the assertion without 
bothering at all about sources.” (Popper, 1963, p.23) 
This theory clearly allows premises to be considered as true provided one seeks to 
refute the given assumptions.  If it applied to the selection task rule, we find a rule such 
as “If A is on one side, then 4 is on the other side” can be considered as being held 
provided it is not refuted.  The rule is first checked through checking the A card, 
following with a sincere attempt to find a false instance by checking the 7 card.  Several 
researchers including Stenning and van Lambalgen (2002) and Oaksford and Chater 
(1995) have noticed this analogy between this theory and the task.  The basic assumption 
made by Popper (1963) can be written in rule format as “If we are to accept a theory, 
then all findings must support it.”  So to check this rule, scientists need to engage in 
finding new theories and then seeking to falsify these theories allowing a theory to 
continue to exist only if it survives these tests.  No one should object that this is indeed 
the claim made by Popper (1963).  This requirement is perfectly aligned with the 
“expectations” of most psychologists working on the task to check the cases of P = 
“accept a new theory” and NotQ = “Check if findings do NOT support it”.   
So what are scientists actually doing with this task?  Oddly enough it seems that 
scientists are making the same error their own subjects are making because they are not 
attempting to falsify their theories that attempt to explain why subjects do not select the 
NotQ falsifying card.  Wason (1987) indicates that subject responses reflect that they find 
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a great difficulty in getting rid of old prejudices like ‘the earth is flat’ in the face of new 
evidence.  He explains that Kuhn showed that old paradigms continue to reign even if a 
few false instances arise.  Therefore, it is clear that Wason “expects” subjects to check the 
false consequent even though he himself has fallen prey to old prejudices when he claims 
that there are exceptions to theories.  If there are exceptions then to what gain is checking 
the NotQ card?  Others followed closely in his tracks assuming that verifying their 
theories is sufficient for their theories to hold without attempting to falsify them, thereby 
repeating the exact “error” they are investigating. 
Consequently, someone must break the cycle by introducing a new method of analysis 
or approach to the problem.  The first spark originated from the same person who found 
the problem, Peter Wason. 
2.2   Socratic Tutoring 
The Socratic method of inquiry was originally introduced to help discover truth and is 
composed of a series of questions that a skilful teacher utilizes to “guide” a student to 
find the path to “correct” reasoning.  This form is based on allowing a person to indicate 
a belief X, and following a series of question to check if the person also believes Y.  If 
yes, then that person is led through discussion to agree that Y implies not-X and this 
highlights a contradiction that in effect forces the person to decide if he prefers X or Y. 
(Ross, 1996) 
Wason and Johnson-Laird (Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1970) were the first to utilise 
the Socratic method to engage subjects into a dialogue and lead them into a state of 
“conceptual conflict” as described by Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972).  Their aim was 
to identify the “path” of thought and to raise the possibility of conceptual conflict as a 
subject arrives at the state of contradiction to be able to “see” the benefit of selecting the 
NotQ card.  They gave subjects the cards and question and through discussion attempted 
to identify the types of conflict that may arise during the reasoning process.   
As a result, they isolated two types of conflict; hypothetical and concrete 
contradiction.  They defined a hypothetical contradiction as when a subject recognises 
that a possible value of P on the other side of the NotQ card would falsify the rule, yet 
these subjects still refrain from selecting that card.  In this case, subjects seem “aware” 
that a possible falsifying instance may exist, and still have no desire to check that 
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instance for unknown reasons.  However the authors deny that it is possible that subjects 
are actually ‘aware’ and select the wrong answers.   
  A concrete contradiction, on the other hand, occurs when the cards are actually 
flipped and when a card with P is flipped to reveal a Q, and this followed with a card of 
NotQ flipped to reveal a P.  The first fits the rule while the second contradicts the rule 
leaving subjects with a concrete contradiction.  Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) indicate 
that the conceptual clash is obvious and explicit.   
They wonder why subjects seem persistent in their choices in spite of the fact that they 
are sometimes aware that Q for example is useless, and yet they select to turn it.  They 
arrive at the conclusion that in spite of a clear confusion that subjects seem to face, the 
real reason behind this behaviour is that they are compelled to “resolve two seemingly 
irreconcilable thought processes”.  This raises the issue that the two “correct” choices 
according to the classical logic metric may truly be flawed.  In fact, Wason (1987) clearly 
indicates that subjects “will frequently deny the facts, or contradict themselves, rather 
than shift their frame of reference.”  Here we find incredibly strong support for the claims 
made in this thesis to the effect of “directionality of thought”.  There seems to be a strong 
bias that dictates the lines along which the deduction process is able to proceed, evidently 
from the initial days of the emergence of this task. 
Unfortunately, although this method of dialogue was extremely fruitful in the limited 
domain to which it was applied, it was not replicated on a wider scale as a probe into 
subject thought processes.  If we consider the group of tasks classified as successful 
“thematic” tasks, for example, we find no Socratic dialogue studies of student reactions 
to encountering conflict of card contents to the rule.  Perhaps a possible reason is that 
with this approach, subjects were actually performing an evaluation task because they 
would actually turn the cards over and evaluate the other side, while in the original task 
all they have to do is select the cards they wish to turn over.  It is well known that this 
difference in the task is usually sufficient to make the two experimental formats different 
enough to cast doubt on whether results are comparable, and consequently most 
researchers avoided it.  Unfortunately, the path followed displays results of question 
formats while keeping subjects’ reasoning methods ambiguous.   
Therefore, the search was on, for the theory that would offer its creator fame and 
fortune through its ability to explain subject behaviour in the task.  In short, it became a 
guessing game that is not “enlightened” through tools such as Socratic Tutoring. 
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2.3   In Search of a Theory 
As a result of the extreme shock arising from subject behaviour, a frantic search for a 
theory to explain behaviour in the task was immediately underway.  The initial 
motivation was to find what materials would result in better performance and since the 
authors provided no insight as to the possible source of these theories, an attempt will be 
made to explain them while trying to link similar efforts to each other. 
2.3.1    Familiarity of Rule 
The initial tests that showed the effect of “thematic” materials included those by Wason 
and Shapiro (1971) indicating a possible facilitating effect of certain types of materials.  
This led to the possibility that the “familiarity” of the rule is a contributing factor to good 
performance.  In simple terms, a rule is familiar if subjects have prior knowledge of the 
rule and know some possible falsifying instances.  One example of this is when Johnson-
Laird, Legrenzi and Legrenzi (1972) tested a postal rule on British subjects where the 
percentage of correct responses was 81%.  On the other hand, Griggs and Cox (1982) 
failed to observe facilitation by the same rule on American subjects with the rule “If a 
letter is sealed, then it has a 15-cent stamp on it”.  Golding (1981) later found that the 
same postal rule produced better results when attempted by older British subjects who 
were familiar with a regulation that is no longer imposed by the British postal office. It 
seems that subject familiarity with the rule alerts subjects in some way to the possibility 
that a false instance of the rule may occur.  However, Manktelow and Evans (1979) 
indicate that rule ‘familiarity’ interacts with some other factors and is not a 
straightforward issue to isolate for the benefit of predicting better performance.   
Therefore, although ‘familiarity’ seems intuitive, it places an extremely broad range of 
rules into the group and does not highlight what aspect of familiar rules actually 
influences the task.  One example of this is, whether the familiarity must simply involve 
the possibility of cheating on the rule, or whether it must it be a personal experience 
familiarity or other possibilities.  Therefore, all this theory seems to do is to claim that 
when background information intervenes in a “thematic” task, in some cases, subjects 
will do better.  It offers no information as to the specific semantic requirements of the 
background information that is necessary to interact with the task in order to result in 
facilitation.  Consequently this approach did not prove to be extremely beneficial in 
predicting performance because it does not answer the questions that arise as to why 
subjects do not select the “expected” answers and why they seem confused with the 
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abstract task.  It does not even give enough information to help predict what background 
information is necessary to influence subject responses in the task.  In retrospect, the 
description is insufficient to explain subject behaviour when they select P and NotQ or 
any of the other selections subjects make. 
2.3.2    Matching Bias and Negations 
One of the first theories that set out to explain why most subjects select P and Q cards 
is the matching bias theory as introduced by Evans (1973).  It explains behaviour by 
assuming that subjects choose the cards, which “match” the antecedent and consequent 
clauses of the rule, while they ignore the negations that may be present, especially that of 
the consequent.  So, if a subject sees a rule of the form If P then Q, that subject is more 
likely to select P and Q rather than select P and NotQ.  It is self evident that this theory 
describes the phenomenon that a high number of subjects select P and Q.  But with 
matching bias, if a subject has a rule “If the letter is a D, then the number is not a 4”, this 
subject would select D and 4 which are the correct choices for this rule.  In other words, 
they would match the named values, not their truth values (Evans, 1993).  However, this 
theory only explains the behaviour of a group of subjects that actually make the 
selections of P,Q and ignores all others that form the majority and are dispersed amongst 
other possible choices. 
“Theories of reasoning based on formal rules propose that the ability to 
make suppositions is central to deductive reasoning.” (Handley and 
Evans, 2000) 
Evans et al. (1998) then modified the original theory by explaining how subjects 
process the two types of reasoning: Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens.  Modus Ponens is 
when a conditional premise is given with a fact as follows: “If P then Q, P”.  A subject 
utilises fact P and the rule If P then Q to deduce Q.  Modus Tollens is when a conditional 
premise is given with the negative of the consequent as in “If P then Q, NotQ”.  In this 
case, they inform us that a subject must “suppose” that P is true and from that deduce Q, 
following which the subject would arrive at a contradiction with both Q and NotQ as true.  
Once this contradiction arises the subject would use a reductio ad absurdum rule to 
deduce NotP and they indicate that this explanation is the one provided by mental 
logicians.  We are, however, not informed when or why subjects utilize each of these two 
types nor are we informed why we can assume that all subjects follow the same path. 
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Additionally, we are informed that selections inform on the perceived “relevance” of 
the cards, which is determined through an “if-heuristic” and a “not-heuristic”.  The if-
heuristic leads a subject to imagine a hypothetical world where the antecedent of the rule 
is true, and this, we are told, is the reason subjects select P more frequently than Q.  The 
not-heuristic, on the other hand, implies that “a negated statement is a comment on the 
proposition it denies” and because it is a comment, subjects select the named value alone 
without the negation.  Evans et al. (1998) offer additional support for the claim that 
subjects face a serious problem in recognising that Not-Not-P is the same as P, such that 
the double negation effect is suppressed if the conclusion is ahead of the premises or if 
the minor premise is ahead of the conditional. 
In retrospect, this theory is extremely interesting with respect to the information it 
adds through testing negative instances of the premises.  However, it does not offer any 
explanation as to why subjects are distributed amongst various possible choices selecting 
either P alone, or selecting P, Q and Not Q together while others select all the cards.  
Therefore, the theory offers no explanation of all behaviour that is observed to result in 
the task.   
It does, however, raise the issue of the inability of subjects to equate Not-Not-P with 
P.  This places negatives into the limelight, making us wonder what NotP represents to 
our conceptual system.  One may consider, for instance, that while a double negative 
becomes a positive, there is no such thing as a double positive.  Additionally, it is 
obvious that the negation of a premise in the abstract questions does not seem to affect 
the value of the premise as, in matching bias, subjects would select that premise without 
its negation.  In a conditional of the form “If A then Not 7” the “7” is explicitly displayed 
in spite of it being next to a “Not”.  Perhaps the neglect of this “not” is what led Evans 
(1993) to describe negation as a “comment”.  However, this description cannot possibly 
exist in the same conceptual system that has problems with a double negative and gets 
confused.  Wason (1987) offered another explanation as to why subjects fail to select the 
NotQ in the usual order of the task as a difficulty that subjects face when “shifting their 
frame of reference”.  Although nothing was given to indicate if this is supposed to 
include the cases where the rule is If P then NotQ, it does seem appropriate for this case.  
In the given rule a negative of the consequent is given, making it unnecessary for the 
subject to shift their frame of reference to obtain the correct Q selection.  A possible 
reason for this could be that the explicit NotQ according to Sperber et al. (1995) is 
logically more difficult to represent than an implicit value other than Q that reflects 
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NotQ.  An example is like comparing Not Black to White, since while both are contraries 
of Black the first is more difficult to arrive at, so arriving at Black from the first would 
then be cognitively easier than arriving at Black from the second.   
Another way of looking at Wason’s (1987) frame of reference, therefore is to look at 
two mirrors facing each other.  We have a foreground rule of the form “If A is one side 
then 4 is on the other side” where A belongs to the set of letters while 4 belongs to the set 
of numbers.  If we reflect on this rule through a frame of reference that reflects on its 
contents then it is similar to looking at it through a mirror.  The rule therefore is the 
relationship between these two particular values from these sets.  We also have a 
background rule that states that letters are on one side of the card while numbers are on 
the other side of the card.  Additionally, there is an implicit relationship between the two 
letters A and B such that whenever we see B we are to assume that it is a “not A” and 
similarly when we see a 7 we are to assume it is a “not 4”.  This implies a second 
reflection such that each value in the rule has a “not” of its truth.  The implicit rule is that 
“If not 7 then not A” and this has to be true to ensure that the first rule is valid.  In a 
mirror we see our right hand as left and our left hand as right.  In a comparable manner 
this implicit rule reflects the first while exchanging the first and second premises.  
Consequently, it should not be surprising that if subjects regard the rule through Wason’s 
frame of reference (1987) shifting from one to the other is comparable to seeing what is 
in one mirror through another mirror because each would exchange the order of the 
premises leading subjects to infinite regress.  In the following section, social contracts 
will avoid this problem by explicitly giving subjects the ability to follow a single line of 
thought to both selections.  They will also highlight another issue regarding perspectives. 
2.3.3    Pragmatic Schemas Lead to Social Contracts 
Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas is a theory offered by Cheng and Holyoak (1985) based 
on the successes of “thematic” rules.  The theory describes a type of knowledge structure 
that facilitates reasoning in this task.  This type of schema consists of a set of generalized 
context sensitive rules which are defined in terms of pragmatic goals that guide the 
process of inference.  Therefore, each subject is given a goal through the context of the 
question and the means to arrive at that goal through card selection.  These schemas 
include the “permission schema”, the “obligations schema” and “causations”.  Context 
sensitive rules are then defined by the conceptual system in terms of the goals given in 
the question.  These rules include taking desirable actions, making predictions about 
future events as well as defining relationships to these goals as in cause and effect or 
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precondition and allowed action.  Additionally, the framework assumes the role of 
familiarity or prior experience in facilitation of the “correct” answers to the task.   
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) explain that the abstract task does not evoke any schema 
because it is not related to any life experiences, while most of the successful “thematic” 
problems fit a “permission schema” format.  Inference patterns include the concepts of 
possibility, necessity, an action to be taken and a precondition to be satisfied.  We are 
also informed that this is parallel to the deontic concepts of permission and obligation as 
expressed by can and must.  The core of the permission schema is then summarised into 
four production rules as follows: 
“Rule 1: If the action is to be taken, then the precondition must be 
satisfied. 
  Rule 2: If the action is not to be taken, then the precondition need not 
be satisfied. 
  Rule 3: If the precondition is satisfied, then the action may be taken. 
  Rule 4: If the precondition is not satisfied, then the action must not be 
taken.” (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985, p. 397) 
They explain that if a subject is given a permission scenario the whole set of rules is 
invoked.  Rule 1 has the same effect as Modus Ponens, while Rule 2 blocks the fallacy of 
Denying the Antecedent.  This fallacy occurs when a subject is given the rule If P then Q 
and then given NotP.  Subjects erroneously jump to the conclusion that NotQ.  Rule 3 
blocks the fallacy of Affirming the Consequent, which occurs when subjects who are 
given the rule If P then Q and then given Q, erroneously deduce P.  Rule 4 represents the 
contrapositive of the given rule, stating that if the precondition is not satisfied then the 
action must not be taken.   
They also indicate that permission schemas are context sensitive and directly related to 
deontic concepts such as must and may that cannot be expressed in standard propositional 
logic.  However, they point out that the rules are heuristic rather than logically valid 
inferences.  An example is that Rule 3 does not always follow from Rule 1.  The problem 
arises when an action requires more than one precondition.  For example, “if one is to 
rent a car, then he must have a driving licence” could represent Rule 1.  However, there 
may also exist another requirement such as that person must not be under 21 years old.  
Therefore, Rule 3 that results from the above would not hold as it would be “if one has a 
driving licence, then he may rent a car.”   
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They also indicate that a causal schema may invite subjects to support the converse of 
the given conditional.  So a causal conditional of the form If P then Q where P = 
“someone let go of a ball” causes Q = “the ball falls to the ground”, can lead to the 
assumption that If Q = “the ball falls to the ground” then P = “someone let go of the ball” 
because one assumes that the Q consequent results when the P cause is true.  This 
conclusion is not possible through classical logic inferences.   
This claim is supported through several experiments, one of which tests the rule: “If 
one is to take action A, then one must first satisfy precondition P”.  The cards then show 
the possibilities: has taken action A, has not taken action A, has fulfilled precondition P, 
has not fulfilled precondition P.  Subjects are cued into the role that they are an authority 
checking whether or not people are obeying regulations.  Results came in confirming the 
predictions made by the theory when a percentage of 61% of the subjects solved the 
schema version correctly.   
In retrospect, there are clear indications that this theory has strong links to deontic 
logic because permissions and obligations imply the existence of an ideal state, while 
causation can be compared to obligations.  In permissions, an action must not ideally be 
taken unless proper requirements for it have been satisfied.  In obligations, if a particular 
situation exists then one is obliged to perform a duty.   
Additionally, causation is similar to obligations except that it simply describes a 
natural follow up of one state to another showing an expected sequence of events.  The 
heuristic nature of the theory shows that it is not strictly “logical” in the classical logic 
sense and is instead closer to deontic logic which the authors explicitly acknowledge.   
An especially interesting aspect of the experiment described above is that it was one of 
the first to show a sequence effect of one “type” of task on another “type”, namely a 
permission rule and an abstract card question.  They noticed that the card problem was 
solved more correctly 39% when it followed the permission problem, than when it 
preceded it only with 19%.  In converse, the permission problem was solved more 
correctly when it came first 61% than when it followed the abstract problem 48%.  In 
prior tests done by other researchers this effect was not present, which implies that the 
“permission” type question they used has special features that allow it to facilitate 
performance in the abstract task and by converse be adversely affected by it.    This issue 
is further analyzed in this work in Chapter 4. 
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Another theory that exists in close competition with the above was introduced by 
Cosmides (1989) namely; Social Contracts.  She claims that natural selection theory 
forms the basis for this theory because it is regarded as informative of the kind of 
cognitive psychological mechanisms that are likely to be made universal for all 
conceptual systems as with the behaviour exhibited here.  This, we are told, restricts the 
range of possible culprits to the results that are observed.  We are also informed that the 
theory of natural selection is responsible for pinpointing adaptive problems that the 
human mind must be able to solve, as well as suggesting possible new mental design 
mechanisms that may be necessary.  On the other hand, evolutionary biology, we are told, 
gives a high level definition of how processing can actually be achieved and it dictates 
adaptive goals for the brain that must be realised.  The theory is also based on the 
assumption that the innate cognitive architecture is composed of a large array of highly 
specialised adaptive mechanisms.  Evidence for such mechanisms is then reported to be 
that reasoning performance is content dependent and that the performance is altered by 
specific content in the predicted adaptive direction. 
The author links this to the content dependency of the selection task results to date.  
She indicates that although pragmatic schemas as defined by Cheng and Holyoak (1985) 
are content dependent, their rules are created by content independent cognitive processes.  
She indicates that their permission problem that is shown above is not compatible with 
the abstract problem it is compared to.  Evidently the permission question contains the 
paraphrase: “In other words, in order to be permitted to do “A”, one must first have 
fulfilled prerequisite “P”” (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985, p. 403).  No analogous text exists 
in the abstract question which causes Cosmides (1989) to cast doubt on the actual cause 
for the difference in performance.   
She defines a social contract as one that requires subjects to judge between perceived 
benefits and perceived costs.  This presumption is then tested through the comparison of 
two contexts: the first “a social contract”, while the other is a descriptive context.  The 
social contract associates the task to be done with a clear benefit that is to be weighed 
against a clear cost, while the descriptive task does not define terms as costs or benefits 
but does link them by a familiar relation.3  She reported a clear difference in performance 
between the two versions with 75% correct for the social contract and with 21% correct 
for the descriptive problems.   
                                                 
3 The word ‘descriptive context’ here should not be confused with the word ‘descriptive’ used in the 
deontic context because here the definition is given strictly according to the one used by Cosmides while 
there the definition is based on deontic logic. 
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Cosmides (1989) makes an extremely interesting comparison between the standard 
tasks and what she described as a private exchange with the form “If you do X for me, 
then I’ll do Y for you”.  She tested this version in experiment 3 with the standard order of 
the rule as in “If a man eats cassava root, then he must have a tattoo on his face” with 
correct answers P and NotQ, and in experiment 4 with the reverse order of the rule as in 
“If a man has tattoo on his face, then he eats cassava root” with correct answers NotP 
and Q.   
However, before one can go into the analysis of the results of this experiment, an issue 
of a central distinction between cheater detection in social contracts and logic inference 
has been raised by Stenning and van Lambalgen, (2004).  They indicate that Cosmides 
regards the two rules shown above as equivalent and both would lead to the choices of 
“man eats cassava root” and “man does not have a tattoo on his face”.  In the case of the 
first rule, these would represent the choices of P, Not Q while for the second rule they 
would represent the choices of Not P and Q.  
From a logic perspective this is not the case because the premises are regarded such 
that it is necessary for the first to be true so that the second is true, which imposes an 
order on the rule.  Consequently, from a logic point of view, we find that the answers to 
the first rule would be “man eats cassava root” and “man does not have a tattoo on his 
face” which are P, Not Q while for the second rule the answers would be “man has a 
tattoo on his face” and “man does not eat cassava root” which are P, and Not Q for the 
second rule.  
Now to analyse the influence of the private exchange and how it interacts with rule 
order, we find that in the standard order there was no clear difference between the 
standard task and the private exchange.  However, we find a curious emerging behaviour 
when Cosmides tests the reverse order in that subjects make what she regards as a 
“mistake” by selecting P and NotQ when she expects the correct answers to be NotP and 
Q.  It should be clear from the argument above that the first choices are not at all a 
mistake but instead are in line with what logic would lead them to select as opposed to 
what social contracts would dictate. 
Consequently, the effects of having a “private exchange” on these particular selections 
would not only show that subjects are sensitive to private exchanges, but it would also 
relate this sensitivity to how they reason logically.  In fact, we find that the unfamiliar 
descriptive task showed an increase in selections of the two cards of P and NotQ from 
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12% to 25% by the private exchange version.  The really large difference, though, was 
exemplified in the abstract card version where P and NotQ selections rose from 12% in 
the reverse order standard to 33% correct in the abstract reversed private exchange.  With 
N = 24 for both experiments and assuming that the private exchange will have no effect 
on the reverse order of the task, so the standard value of the reverse order is taken as 
expected, we get a chi-square value of 9.524 and p < 0.002.   The private exchange 
exhibited here includes the use of the words “I” and “you”.  This seems to present itself 
as a strong indicator that the direction of the rule interacts with these words such that they 
affect behaviour.   
In an attempt to counter criticisms, Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) provide further support 
through experiments to fortify Cosmides’ stand by clarifying the main differences 
between Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas and Social Contracts.  They explain that while all 
social contracts can be regarded as pragmatic schemas, the converse is not true as some 
pragmatic schema formats can fail to obtain good subject performance.  They emphasise 
the importance of the fact that a subject has to be cued into “the perspective of a party 
that could be cheated” and indicate that this can imply that subjects could be cued into 
two opposite perspectives.  A sample rule of this could be: “If an employee works on the 
weekend, then that person gets a day off during the week”.  Half the subjects are given an 
“employee” version of the problem and informed about an employee who never worked 
on the weekend before but is considering doing that from time to time, since having a day 
off during the week is a benefit that outweighs the cost of working on Saturdays.  There 
are rumours that the rule has been violated before.  Subjects must check whether there is 
a case where an employee worked during the weekend and did not get a day off during 
the week, so their correct selections would be P and NotQ.  The other half of the subjects, 
are given an “employer” version of the problem and given the same rationale above.  
These are cued into the perspective of the employer who must find out if there are 
employees that do not work on the weekend, and still take a day off during the week 
which are NotP and Q. 
Yet again we find evidence to support the claim that the alignment of the expected 
answers namely P, NotQ gives a percentage of 71% which is higher than the reverse 
perspective which expects NotP, Q as answers and has attained a percentage of 61%.  
Differences are also evident in the other two rules that were tested with 71% vs. 64% and 
81% vs. 59%.  The frame of reference a subject assumes and reasons for it seems to have 
a strong effect on all cases of the task, especially the deontic versions of it. What is still 
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unclear, though, is if it has any bearing on the abstract classical task.  However, before 
one could delve into any of this, a very brief review of theories of mental representation 
that have been applied to this problem claims our attention. 
2.4   Braine’s Mental Logic 
At this point in time, it should be interesting to regard the analysis of the results in the 
task from a logician’s standpoint, but this approach just attempts to passively explain 
results in terms of a “mental logic” such that subject behaviour is nothing more than an 
“error”.  Consequently, mental logicians do not make the same arguments made by 
general logicians and cannot be regarded as representing the latter.   
A prominent example of this approach is Braine’s abstract rule theory (Brain, 1978; 
Braine & O’Brian, 1991; Brain and Rumain, 1983; Brain, Reiser & Rumain, 1984; 
O’Brian, Braine & Yang, 1994; Rumain, Connell & Braine, 1983).  The theory starts off 
with an assumption that there are two types of reasoning: formal reasoning and practical 
reasoning.  The latter is the one used by people in their daily lives because they are 
capable of extracting information from experience to aid them in their deductions, while 
in formal reasoning one has to be restricted by what is given.  Additionally, the theory 
identifies three types of errors that can divert the deduction process from its path.  
Comprehension errors occur when the interpretation of premises or assumptions is faulty 
or inaccurate.  Heuristic inadequacy errors occur when the conclusion to a reasoning 
problem cannot be reached because the strategies used to select the rules are inadequate.  
Processing errors result from lapses of attention or failure to take account of all relevant 
information in working memory. 
The practical logical process is initiated when the premises are first encoded by some 
mechanism and the resulting representation is related to abstract reasoning rules.  In a 
way, this is like uncovering the logical form of the sentence except that we are informed 
that If P Then Q is noncommittal about the basis for the inference rule it states.  If a 
speaker uses that phrase, then the speaker is giving the listeners a reason for concluding q 
given p but it provides no reason why that should be so.  A listener may infer that p is the 
cause of q, that p entails q, or that q follows from p together with shared assumptions or 
that there is some correlation of unknown basis between the events.  In other words this is 
subject to the errors described above as well as showing a degree of ambiguity between 
the logical form of the sentence and the sentence it was extracted from. 
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These rules are then used as basic rules from which to draw valid conclusions as per 
the inference rule schemata.  Rules would be selected and applied whenever needed to 
produce a chain of inferences that would form a mental proof of derivation to a 
conclusion.  If this process does not deliver a straightforward conclusion, then a set of 
non-logical rules are utilized to determine the response resulting in biased responses.   
The theory identifies some problems that logic theories suffer from in general, 
describing one as the problem of directionality difference (Braine, 1978).  In a rule of the 
form If P then Q, then we can logically assume that If NotQ then NotP.  However, we are 
informed that due to effects of rule directionality on thought, the two are not cognitively 
equivalent.  This claim is supported through three sentences where each is given in the 
formats  if ..then.., ..only if.., and if not .. then not .. 
“3a  If one pulls out the knob, the television goes on. 
  4a  If the triangles ABC and PQR are congruent, then AB = PQ. 
 5a  If the television goes on, then the knob has been pulled out. 
 
  3b One pulls out the knob only if the television goes on.  
  4b The triangles ABC and PQR are congruent only if AB = PQ 
 5b The television goes on only if the knob has been pulled out. 
  
 3c If the television does not go on, then one does not pull out the knob. 
 4c If AB≠ PQ then the triangles ABC and PQR are incongruent. 
5c If the knob has not been pulled out, then the television does not go 
on.” 
Braine (1978) informs us that the first sentence 3a is a causal relation, the second 4a 
an entailment and the third 5a a relation in which the antecedent is evidence for the 
consequent.  Note that 4b and 4c both make sense, but they differ in meaning when 
aligned with 4a.  In 4a the consequence is a deduction from the antecedent while in the 
other two it is a condition of its truth.  A comparison between 4a and 4c would show a 
direction reversal between the two, yet their truth tables are identical.  He goes on to give 
another example of the importance of directionality in the conditional that exists when if 
and only if is equated with p ≡ q which logically means the same as q ≡ p.  However, the 
sentence “They went to the party if and only if they were invited to it” does not mean the 
same as “They were invited to the party if and only if they went to it”, even though they 
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may have the same truth conditions under some interpretations depending on the 
temporal reference. 
Braine (1978) also reported two experiments to test for the effect of directionality on 
the common errors in reasoning where subjects were presented with four types of 
problems several times.  The four types are: Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, Denying the 
Antecedent, and Affirmation of the consequent. 
 
Modus Ponens:   If P then Q 
     P 
     Therefore, Q 
Modus Tollens:         If P then Q 
     Not Q 
     Therefore, NotP 
Denying the Antecedent:  If P then Q 
     Not P 
     Therefore, Not Q 
Affirmation of the Consequent: If P then Q 
     Q 
     Therefore, P 
 
In one half of the presentations the rule had the form If P then Q, and in the other half 
it had the form Q only if P.  When the rule is in the form If P then Q then Modus Ponens 
is the easiest to apply and the errors of Denying the Antecedent and Affirmation of the 
Consequent disappear.  However, when the fact is something other than P, things get 
more complicated.  If the rule presented is of the form Q only if P and NotP is given then 
the rule format makes it easier to deduce Not Q. 
Results confirmed these predictions by showing that when the first form is used If P 
then Q, Tollens had significantly more errors than Ponens.  By contrast with the second 
form Q only if P Tollens had significantly less errors than Ponens.  Braine (1978) regards 
this result as a clear indication of the directionality of the inference rule. 
Therefore, although this theory may explain low accuracy results in the Wason task 
(1966) by accepting them as errors, it does highlight the importance of directionality to 
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an inference rule.  Understanding this importance is taken forward an extra step in the 
work presented here. 
2.5   Insight from Mental Models  
Although this theory was not designed to resolve the problems of this task, it is 
interesting to consider its input and that of its creators as to the “effective” manipulations 
made to this task.  The Mental Models theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, 1993) 
explains behaviour in the task through an assumption of a representational system that 
generates mental ‘models’ to represent the problem at hand, based upon the “truth” of 
premises as well as general knowledge.  The claim is that it is based on the Principle of 
Truth. 
“A fundamental assumption of the theory is the principle of truth: 
Individuals minimize the load on working memory by tending to 
construct mental models that represent explicitly only what is true, and 
not what is false” (Johnson-Laird, 1999) 
Deductive reasoning is assumed to involve three processes: the comprehension of 
premises to form a model, or set of models, the combining and description of the models 
to produce a conclusion, and the validation of this conclusion by eliminating alternative 
models that do not result in the expected conclusion.  During the comprehension stage, 
the models are formed in a way similar to this example: First a subject is given this rule, 
and that is followed by a fact, from which the student is asked to make a conclusion. 
If it is raining, then Alicia gets wet,  If P then Q, 
Alicia is wet.       Q, 
The principal of truth is applied at two main levels: the first level is where subjects 
represent only true possibilities and the second to represent for each of the possibilities 
the literal propositions that are true whether affirmative or negative. 
Then according to the theory, three models are formed: 
1. It is raining            Alicia gets wet 
2. It is not raining      Alicia gets wet 
3. It is not raining      Alicia does not get wet 
 
 
Chapter 2 -  Prior Work           33
However, Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) suggest that when people understand this 
premise, they start by building the following initial models: 
 [It is raining]       Alicia gets wet 
 … 
The square brackets mean that the premise has been represented “exhaustively” in the 
model so in a model that has this premise there must also be the second premise which is 
“Alicia gets wet”.  The three dots indicate the existence of more models that can be 
obtained from the same premise.  When the sentence “Alicia is wet” is given, it is just 
matched onto the shown model to arrive at the conclusion that “It is raining” without the 
need to flesh out any more models. 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) describe subject behaviour through the Mental Model 
theory as follows: 
1. Subjects only consider the cards that are explicitly represented in their 
models of the rule. 
2. They then select a card for which the hidden value could have a bearing on 
the truth or falsity of the rule. 
 
A rule such as If there is an A then there is a 2 would yield the following models: 
[A] 2 
… 
Subjects will consider both cards but will select only the “A” card because it alone has 
a hidden value that could affect the truth or falsity of the rule.  If on the other hand 
subjects interpret the rule as a bi-conditional the following models would result: 
[A] [2] 
… 
This will make them select both the cards “A” and “2”.  If on the other hand, an 
independent bias exists indicating that the rule may be broken, then the following models 
would result: 
[A] 2 
       ┐2 
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This makes it extremely difficult if not impossible to arrive at the following model 
given the abstract rule unless a clear indication is there to lead subjects to deduce not 2: 
[A]          ┐2 
They claim that this prediction makes sense of the five experimental manipulations 
that have been found to yield the correct selections, which are as follows: 
2.5.1    Changing the form of the rule as in “only if” formulations 
should enhance performance. 
Notice that Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) dismiss the idea of “directionality” and 
justify the results obtained by Braine (1978) by showing the models that result from the 
two rule forms: 
If P then Q P only if Q 
 P          Q [P]         Q 
[P]        [Q] ┐P      [┐Q] 
 … 
 
In the case of P only if Q, the models allow both Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens to 
be made without any further fleshing out, which is not the case with regular form.  
However, this prediction is not supported by the findings of Cheng and Holyoak (1985) 
who found that reasoning with If P then Q is easier than reasoning with P only if Q.  Note 
that the emphasis on the effect of directionality persists because the difference in 
performance continues to exist. 
2.5.2    Changing the content of the rule through utilizing 
contents that trigger memory for times when the rule was 
violated.  
Griggs and Cox (1982) presented subjects with the following “thematic” question: 
“On this task imagine that you are a police officer on duty.  It is your 
job to ensure that people conform to certain rules.  The cards in front of 
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you have information about four people sitting at a table.  On one side 
of the card is a person’s age and on the other side of the card is what 
the person is drinking.  Here is a rule: If a person is drinking beer, then 
the person must be over 19 years of age.  Select the card or cards that 
you definitely need to turn over to determine whether or not the people 
are violating the rule.”(p. 415) 
Four cards were presented to subjects containing the following: “Drinking a beer”, 
“Drinking coke”, “16 years of age” and “22 years of age”.  This is a clear example of a 
deontic rule where a falsifying instance does not cause one to doubt the existence of the 
rule. Additionally, consider this rule: “If a person is over 19 years of age, then that 
person must be drinking beer.”  The first thing that comes to mind is a violation of that 
rule, because the implications it has simply by changing the order of the premises are 
enough to show that even if a person is old enough, this does not mean that the person is 
“drinking beer”, either not drinking at all, or not drinking at this moment.  Notice the 
effect of tenses in this order and the strong effect of order.  In a sense, it shows how 
strong this actual rule is with respect to the directional bias it imposes on subjects and its 
sensitivity to verb tenses. 
2.5.3    Changing the context of the rule as in the pragmatic 
reasoning schemas and social contract theories leading to the 
explicit representation of negative instances.  
If the context implies a “role” as in pragmatic reasoning schemas or presents a social 
contract when one has to weigh benefits against costs, negative instances or NotQ cases 
are explicitly highlighted raising the possibility that they may be true.  An example of 
such a rule along with the models that represent it follows: 
The rule is: If a man has a tattoo on his face then he eats cassava root. 
Subjects are given the following information: 
“You are an anthropologist studying the Kaluame, a Polynesian 
people who live in small warring bands on Maku Island in the Pacific.  
You are interested in how Kaluame “big men” – chieftans – wield 
power. 
Big Kiku is a Kaluame big man who is known for his ruthlessness.  
As a sign of loyalty, he makes his own subjects put a tattoo on their 
face.  Members of other Kaluame bands never have facial tattoos.  Big 
Kiku has made so many enemies in other Kaluame bands, that being 
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caught in another village with a facial tattoo is, quite literally, the kiss 
of death. 
Four men from different bands stumble into Big Kiku’s village, 
starving and desperate.  They have been kicked out of their respective 
villages for various misdeeds, and have come to Big Kiku because they 
need food badly.  Big Kiku offers each of them the following deal: 
“If you get a tattoo on your face, then I’ll give you cassava root.” 
Cassava root is a very sustaining food which Big Kiku’s people 
cultivate.  The four men are very hungry, so they agree to Big Kiku’s 
deal.  Big Kiku says that the tattoos must be in place tonight, but the 
cassava root will not be available until the following morning. 
You learn that Big Kiku hates some of these men for betraying him to 
his enemies.  You suspect that he will cheat and betray some of them.  
Thus this is the perfect opportunity for you to see first hand how Big 
Kiku wields his power.  The cards below have information about the 
fates of the four men.  Each card represents one man.  One side of the 
card tells whether or not the man went through with the facial tattoo 
that evening and the other side of the card tells whether or not Big Kiku 
gave that man Cassava root the next day.” (Cosmides, 1989) 
The models that are presented as representing this problem are therefore as follows: 
[eating cassava]  tattoo 
┐eating Cassava  [┐tattoo] 
   …  (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991) 
2.5.4    Theorists can Change the content of the cards by 
labelling them with negations.  
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) ran an experiment and presented subjects with the following 
materials that included negations.   
“Suppose you are an authority checking whether or not people are 
obeying certain regulations.  The regulations have the general form ‘If 
one is to take action A then one must first satisfy precondition P.’  In 
other words, in order to be permitted to do A one must first have 
fulfilled prerequisite P.  The cards below contain information on four 
people: one side of the card indicates whether or not a person has taken 
action A, the other indicates whether or not the same individual has 
fulfilled precondition P.  In order to check that a certain regulation is 
being followed, which of the cards below would you turn over? Turn 
over only those you need to check to be sure.”  This is followed by four 
cards, each stating one of the four possible cases: “has taken action 
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A”, “has not taken action A”, “has fulfilled precondition P” and “has 
not fulfilled precondition P”. (p. 403) 
Here we find a different type of directionality that compares the meaning of two sets 
the first is “A versus Not A” and the second “A versus B” where B is to denote the second 
possibility thereby negating the first.  In the given experiment we have the Not A 
explicitly stated so it does not have to be inferred from the text as is usually the case in 
the classical task.  If we regard meaning as existing in space we find that the 
orthogonality of opposite meanings is stated with the Not A possibility and not clearly 
implied with the classical task are the second letter could also be C, D, E,..etc.  Therefore, 
the reason for better performance could be the explicit negative as a result of what it 
implies.  If there would be a way to imply opposites that are equally orthogonal, it would 
be interesting to see if the NotQ selections would also rise and this is indeed attempted 
here. 
2.5.5    Theorists can Change the task to allow subjects to 
envisage all the alternatives explicitly.   
An example of this case, is when the four possible cards are: P, Q, NotP and NotQ and 
the subjects are given only two cards, Q and NotQ.  The cards removed as the cards that 
subjects seem to do well with, selecting P and hardly ever selecting NotP.  Oddly enough, 
subjects seem to make the NotQ selection with an extremely high percentage.  This task 
is called the ‘reduced array’ selection task (Wason and Green, 1984) 
Other examples that Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) placed under this category are 
questions that require subjects to verbalise their thought patterns and therefore be led to 
consider all possible alternatives.   
The reduced array task indicates a strong effect of the explicit existence of P on a card 
because when it is present selections of Q are high while when it is absent selections of 
NotQ are higher.  Since the rule subjects consider is If P then Q then it seems intuitive to 
observe that subjects follow it to arrive at Q when P exists and to doubt the existence of 
Q when P does not exist. 
The theory of Mental Models is a truly admirable, powerful theory that unfortunately 
does not add much to what Wason (1966, 1969) showed to be inherent to the original task 
as it simply fortifies the assumptions that if the semantics lead subjects to believe that a 
violation is likely, then they are more likely to select the NotQ card. 
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2.6   Relevance Theory versus Competence Theory 
Now after an avalanche of experiments in the task, of which only a sample has been 
reviewed within this thesis, some theories emerged to explain behaviour in the task.  This 
section will ponder Relevance Theory versus Information Gain as two representatives 
that can be compared to each other. 
First of all, Sperber et al. (1995) introduced Relevance Theory by relating the design 
of sentences to a theory of the pragmatics of natural language.  They started by 
highlighting some of the misunderstandings that are possible within the selection task.  
One is that the rule is general in that it applies to all comparable situations within the 
domain of the cards in front of the subject and subjects are expected to understand it as 
such.  This is opposite to understanding it as a particular rule that applies to a particular 
card, making that one card sufficient to prove the rule.  The second possible 
misunderstanding is the narrow versus wide range interpretation of cards.  A narrow 
range would be just the four possible values on the faces of the cards in the question as in 
just the values A,K, 4,7 while a wide range of possible values may include all vowels, all 
consonants versus all even numbers or all odd numbers.  Another issue that was raised is 
that of implicit versus explicit content that leads subjects to what is the desired outcome 
of the task.  An explicit instruction would be: “Did Big Kiku get away with cheating any 
of these four men? Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if 
Big Kiku has broken his word to any of these four men” (Cosmides, 1989,p.265).  The 
authors indicate that subject overconfidence in pragmatic processes and relevance issues 
is what causes them to fail to select the correct cards.  On the other hand, subjects 
succeed when the pragmatics of the version and relevance result in logically correct 
selections. 
Another extremely important issue that was raised by Sperber et al. (1995) is that of 
how a rule of the form IF P THEN Q can be falsified.  The authors explain that such a 
rule can be falsified in two ways that are logically equivalent but not computationally 
equivalent.  The first method is to follow the rule in the order of the premises so if P is 
true, then a subject has to check whether or not Q is true to check if the rule is false.  The 
second method is to take the implication that P and NotQ will be false if the rule is true.  
Notice that the first method is dynamic in the sense that the rule is “followed” from P to 
Q while the second method is static in assuming a conjunction of the two premises would 
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falsify the rule.  This particular issue will be investigated through several experiments 
that will “direct” subjects towards one or the other interpretations. 
The authors also indicate that there is a large difference with respect to implicit versus 
explicit negatives of each other with respect to semantics.  They explain that judging a 
positive statement to be false appears to be easier than judging an explicit negative as a 
true statement.  This brings up the issue of the difficulty with negatives.  One of the direct 
consequences of this is that saying that a feature is not present is not computationally 
equivalent to giving an example of a feature that implies the negation of another.  In the 
second case, all subjects do is to judge false a positive statement that seems to be 
cognitively easier.  This matter will also be reviewed in detail in this work only to show 
that giving just another example is not sufficient to make mental reasoning any easier. 
Relevance Theory is introduced as being about what information represents to an 
individual.  Relevance is described as being positively correlated with the cognitive effect 
resulting from processing the information and negatively correlated with the processing 
effort required for processing a piece of information.  The first cognitive principle of 
relevance is that human cognitive processes are aimed at processing the most relevant 
information in the most relevant way.  The communicative principle of relevance is that 
every utterance conveys a presumption of its own relevance.   
They indicate that the P-and-NotQ condition is a complex feature while P and Q are 
simple features.  Therefore, in order to make it possible for subjects to select the P-and-
NotQ cards then this complex feature must be easier to reflect on than the feature of P-
and-Q.  Take for example a context where volunteers are required to take care of a large 
number of children.  The rule would be “If a volunteer is male, then he is married”.  The 
subjects would be informed that men don’t want to take care of children.  This 
information would cast a doubt on the presence of present bachelors, therefore they are 
led to test that condition which is the NotQ condition.   
If we consider these claims, we find that the theory claims that the abstract task has no 
relevance relation between the premises and this should explain behaviour in that task.  
However, it should be clear in the recipe of an easy selection task that it builds on 
highlighting the possibility of the rule being broken, except here it is done through 
relevance which is a way of implying the importance of semantics in the task.  
Consequently, it does not seem to offer any new information on the difficulty faced by 
subjects when tackling negatives nor on the influence of the background rule.  It does 
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however, indicate that this relevance is not restricted to being cued into taking roles or 
perspectives. 
It should be clear to the reader that the authors have shown a greater understanding of 
the influence of semantics in the task and represented this through relevance.  The 
difficulties expressed with negatives and the selection of P and NotQ do indeed exist.   
Perhaps an ideal complementing theory to the above is that of Information Gain as 
proposed by Oaksford and Chater (1994).  The critical issue here is that this theory offers 
an ‘inductive’ explanation of a task that has to date been regarded as purely ‘deductive’.  
They suggest that subjects choose cards such that they provide the greatest information 
gain in deciding on what cards to select.  They start by assigning probabilities to the 
various possible selections that are either as part of an independent model or dependent 
model.  The independent model is where selections of q are completely independent of 
the selections of p.  From there the E(Ig) which is the expected information gain is 
calculated as follows.  Their model shows the informative behaviour of all four cards as 
follows: 
1. p card: Is informative insofar as P(q) is low.  It is largely 
independent of P(p). 
2. q card: Is informative when P(p) and P(q) are both small. 
3. not-q card: Is informative to the extent that P(p) is large.  It is 
independent of P(q). 
4. not-p card: Is not informative.(Oaksford & Chater, 1994) 
Additionally, we are informed that the changes in the probabilities P(MI) rescales the 
E(Ig) values but does not change the order of selections of the four cards.  We are also 
informed that E[Ig(not-p)] is always zero as we cannot deduce anything if the antecedent 
is not true.  Additionally, when P(p) and P(q) are small then E[Ig(q)] is greater than 
E[Ig(not-q)].  Another thing is that at all other values of P(p) and P(q), either  E[Ig(not-q)] 
is greater than E[Ig(q)] or these values are undefined.  There is an assumption that by 
default P(p) and P(q) are rare and this implies low probabilities for both resulting in the 
order of card selections as P > Q >  NotQ> NotP for the abstract versions of the task.   
They inform us that for “thematic” questions the task is different because subjects are 
not given the task of rule testing, instead they are given the task of checking rule use.  
With rule testing the model calculates information gain while with rule use the expected 
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utilities are calculated as subjects use the rules to maximise expected utility.  They 
assume a small cost for turning any card, while a utility is gained by the information 
offered by turning that card and seeing the other side.  They also inform us that subjects 
associate particular utilities with the adopted perspective for the rule, so a positive utility 
assigned to rule violations is larger than the cost of turning over the card.  This in effect 
would alter the selections of the cards to the order P > NotQ > Q > NotP. 
If one is to compare the two theories, the first by Sperber et al. (1995) is concerned 
with the semantic implication of the premises and how ‘dependent’ they are on each other 
with respect to what they would imply as part as background knowledge.  However, what 
they do explain is the same issue of raising the possibility of a falsifying instance, except 
that here it is done through semantically relating the premises to each other.  One should 
not jump to the conclusion that this relation is useless as it will be revisited in Chapter 4.  
The second theory comes from a purely statistical starting point to arrive at the same 
conclusions.  Its principles assume by default a ‘rarity’ of probabilities and that the 
abstract task is completely different from the “thematic” version which makes the two 
different tasks result in different orders.   
2.7   Conclusion: Perspectives and Descartes 
Perhaps at this point of time, one should take a philosophical stop to ponder the path of 
research to date.  Ever since researchers first uncovered the initial “error” there has been 
a frantic search for “successful” materials.  Therefore, a clear neglect of the classical task 
is evident in the abstract task while a wealth of tests was conserved for the “thematic” 
versions, which were gradually more specifically described into necessitating pragmatic 
schemas with a goal or rationale and then the necessity of having them as a social 
interchange with the possibility of cheating.  Figure 2.1 shows a meta diagram of the 
research path followed to date. 
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With so little work done to test versions of the original task or abstract versions that 
are similar, it is not surprising that researchers “assume” that they are aware of what is 
going on with that version of the task, to enable them to concentrate on testing the more 
interesting right hand side of that figure.  Just to show how misleading this assumption is 
looking at table 2.1 will show the differences in percentages of correct selections of P and 
NotQ for various abstract task benchmarks used as a measure of comparison with 
“thematic” type problems. 
Sources of Abstract Test Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage selection of P and 
NotQ 
Wason 1968+1969 128 4% 
Wason and Shapiro 1971 16 12.5% 
Cheng and Holyoak 1985 22 19% 
Cosmides 1989 24 25% 
Stenning and van Lambalgen 2004 108 3.7% 
Table  2.1: A comparison of benchmark figures for “correct” selections in the abstract 
task 
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More experienced researchers though will note that with the higher number of 
subjects, as in the first line, the effect becomes more stable.  However, clearly no one has 
ever thought of comparing the rest of the data to identify how it can be ‘informative’.  We 
can probe the size of the difference by taking a Chi test of the data shown above as a 
whole, while assuming no particular set as the expected outcome in order to just estimate 
the degree of difference between them.  A chi test of the whole set of values reveals an 
unsurprising Chi value of 20.713 with p <0.0004.  The most distant studies from Wason’s 
original are those of Cheng and Holyoak with a Chi value of 7.263 with p < 0.007 and 
Cosmides with a Chi value of 13.145 and p < 0.0003.  Since a significant difference is 
informative in general psychological research, it is odd that no one noticed that the 
original task seems to have this problem that it is extremely difficult to replicate to 
statistically acceptable percentages. 
If the benchmark base of the data can differ significantly from one replication to 
another, then this can only mean that there are indeed effects that can vary subject 
behaviour in the basic task.  It is possible, therefore, that these effects have gone 
unnoticed as no one has considered to date the need to formally compare performance in 
the classical or binary form of the classical task across studies.  It is also possible that the 
assumption that nothing can cause improvement to these tasks has also been taken for 
granted without looking at why Cosmides’ (1989) abstract results are so high considering 
the question was within a booklet amongst the other problems, nor look at Cheng and 
Holyoak’s (1985) results where there was a recorded improvement close to significance. 
Another issue that seems to call for attention at this point is that of perspectives where 
a congruent alignment with the direction of the rule seems to produce a higher degree of 
accuracy than a non-congruent alignment as is shown by the work of Gigerenzer and Hug 
(1992).  For example, if a subject is cued into an employee’s perspective and given the 
rule “If an employee works on the weekend, then that person gets a day off during the 
week” then that subject is likely to do better than a subject cued into an employer’s 
perspective and given the same rule.  These results clearly show the influence of 
directionality on the task.  And if that is not enough, Cosmides (1989) attempted a form 
of “private exchange” that brings to mind Descartes’ beliefs.  In his book Rules for the 
Direction of the Mind (Descartes, 1954)4 he indicated a desire for truth that could only be 
satisfied through two mental operations: intuition and deduction.  Intuition represents our 
understanding of self-evident principles such as the axioms of geometry.  Deduction, on 
                                                 
4 Translation copy. 
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the other hand, represents orderly reasoning or inference from self-evident propositions 
as all of geometry is reasoned in strict order through deduction from its self- evident 
axioms and postulates.  This may be the basis of logical deduction as it exists today, to 
start off with a rule and some given premises and to deduce or infer from them what they 
obtain. 
However, this deduction must be in accordance with a specific order of matters. “The 
chief secret of the method is to arrange all facts into a deductive logical system”.  
Whether one agrees with Descartes’ general philosophical views or not, one cannot deny 
that this statement clearly describes the process which subjects of the task are “supposed” 
to follow in order to arrive at a conclusion that is correct and true. 
“I perceive so clearly that there exist no certain marks by which the 
state of waking can ever be distinguished from sleep, that I feel greatly 
astonished; and in amazement I almost persuade myself that I am now 
dreaming.”(Descartes, 1641, Meditation I) 
This is early on during his first day of meditation when dreams become similar to 
reality.  He starts by questioning everything, even reality, and arrives after a long 
deliberation during his second meditation to the famous cogito ergo sum, or I think, 
therefore I exist.  He arrived at this conclusion following from the assumption that he is 
being deceived and so long as that is occurring, he can never be nothing (Descartes, 
1641).  From here, we find a seed that implies that perhaps “egoism” or the influence of 
the “I” may affect subject performance in this task.  This exactly what Cosmides (1989) 
describes as a “private exchange”, even though her theory is evolutionary rather than 
logical. 
Sperber et al. (1995) also show that a rule can be falsified by two methods.  The first is 
through “following” the rule if P is true, then one can go on to check whether or not Q is 
true, if NotQ is true then the rule is false.  The second is to check the negative which is 
that P and NotQ is true and if so then the rule is false.  So the first implies a dynamic 
reasoning approach while the second implies a static reasoning approach.  Additionally, 
they also indicate that another influencing factor could be the implicit versus explicit 
negatives.  An example is that white is an implicit negative of black while not white is an 
explicit negative of white.  They indicate that the implicit negatives should make 
processing easier than explicit negatives. 
Still regarding the issue of negatives, the Oaksford and Chater model (1994) also 
predicts that subjects comprehend the rule with a negative antecedent and positive 
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consequent more slowly than the one with a negative antecedent and negative consequent 
and the one with a positive antecedent and negative consequent. 
To sum up, we have various indicators here to factors that seem to strongly affect 
performance in the task, the most important of which is the difference between the 
abstract and “thematic” versions of the task.  The chapter started by reviewing how the 
problem was found and classified as an “error”.  This was followed by a search of 
“successful” materials which resulted in subjects selecting the competent response.  Then 
an overview of Socratic tutoring showed that this is a neglected avenue that may indeed 
prove itself to be a powerful tool that was initially utilized by Wason and Johnson-Laird 
(1970).  Then the path went on to discover the effects of rule familiarity, matching bias, 
suppositional reasoning, pragmatic schemas and social contracts.  All this work was done 
in the light of a basic assumption that the competent answer is indeed the “correct” one.  
Clearly, the path does not seem to be going towards any solution to the problem with the 
classical abstract format with regards to explaining subject behaviour although there are 
excellent indicators in the work done to date of what might be the culprit. Consequently, 
the following chapter presents a much needed new way of looking at the problem by 
discussing what Stenning and van Lambalgen (2002) contributed to this division. 
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Chapter 3 
A Novel Perspective 
 “As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not 
certain, and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to 
reality.”(Einstein) 
3.1   Introduction 
Einstein shows us that the beautiful world of symbols like P is very far from the reality 
that the words reflect.  There exists a challenge represented in the following two rules: 
 “If there is a tiger in the forest, then there is a hunter in the forest. 
 If there is a tiger in the forest, then there is a worm in the forest.” 
It is easy to notice that the Q value in the first sentence is very different semantically 
from Q’s value in the second.  In the first we are talking about a hunter that means to 
remove the danger posed by the tiger being in the forest, while in the second the worm 
has nothing to do with the tiger and simply co-exists with him. 
Classical logic treats both in the same way, as it is blind to the semantics behind this Q 
value, while in real life things are completely different.  Although logic tempts logicians 
with a beautiful perfection, as Einstein notes above, it does not conform to the world we 
are actually living in.  The solution therefore can only lie in a different type of logic that 
is more sensitive to the semantics of the premises so that it can help us make sense of the 
world.  The logic that seems appropriate for the above example is deontic logic, where in 
the first rule we find that the existence of the hunter in that forest is something that ‘ought 
to’ happen due to the danger that would exist if it does not. 
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Stenning and van Lambalgen (1999, 2001, 2002, 2004) have detected this type of 
anomaly and offered us a new perspective from which we could examine subject 
behaviour in the selection task without being isolated from semantics via a classical logic 
restriction.  However, before going into the details of their contribution, we should first 
look into the indicators that emerged from prior studies that make this conclusion the 
most reasonable to arrive at.  
3.2   Indicators 
The first and most important indicator is that researchers in the task did recognise and 
admit that the “thematic”, “pragmatic” and “social contract” tasks are in effect deontic.  
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) inform us of the following: 
“The permission schema, in contrast, contains no context free symbols 
such as p and q above.  Instead, the inference patterns include as 
components the concepts of possibility, necessity, an action to be taken, 
and a precondition to be satisfied. (The deontic concepts of possibility 
and necessity are typically expressed in English by the modals of can 
and must, respectively, and various synonyms, such as may and is 
required to.)”(p.396) 
From Cosmides (1989) we have: 
“The experiments reported here must have primarily tested for the 
presence of the ‘look for cheaters’ procedure; however, their design 
also involves, and to some extent tests, some features of the interpretive 
component’s implicit inference procedures. 
The most important example of this implicit inference is the subject’s 
interpretation of the deontic relations in the rule itself.  In a situation of 
social exchange, in order to be entitled to receive a benefit, one is 
obligated to provide a benefit, usually at some cost to oneself.  These 
deontic concepts should be inferred by the interpretive component, even 
when they are not explicitly mentioned in the rule.  The deontic 
operator ‘may’, indicating entitlement, should be assigned to the benefit 
clause, and the deontic operator ‘must’, indicating obligation, should 
be assigned to the cost clause, no matter what their position in the 
social contract rule.  Thus, social contract theory predicts that when the 
interpretive component recognizes a term as a cost or benefit, it will 
cause the appropriate deontic operator to be assigned.” 
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These indicators also happen to represent some of the most successful contexts in the 
task and the authors indicate that these theories are linked to deontic reasoning or 
semantics.  Other indicators stem from the lack of a clear distribution conformance of the 
subject selections between the different attempts of the abstract form of the selection task 
as was shown in the conclusion section of Chapter 2.  The study will go into more detail 
in Chapter 5 to compare behaviour in the individual selections of PQ, P, Q, etc., in order 
to isolate similarities from differences.  It is truly odd that no one has delved into this 
type of comparison previously just as a post analysis of the behaviour in the abstract task 
itself.  Perhaps in the midst of all that attention, researchers overlooked this type of 
comparison even though it is highly indicative that the different populations that were 
tested could in fact respond differently according to their background information, level 
of knowledge and the like that may affect performance in the abstract task and not only 
the “thematic” version alone.  If anything, it indicates that the confusion that results from 
the abstract task is far from being predictable.  Although a large percentage of subjects 
select PQ, the other divisions do not seem to directly conform to any particular division 
that is statistically reliable.  This leads one to the conclusion that it should be intuitive 
that when a task is deontic, then subjects and researchers have a clear line of 
communication between them that is not subject to any noise or confusion, while in the 
case of the abstract task, subjects do not conform to specific results because there is only 
confusion in the air. 
The third indicator in the list is to simply raise the question: Is it reasonable to assume 
that selecting P and NotQ are indeed the correct answers to the task? This issue has been 
raised in Chapter Two to show that assuming that these are the correct answers is based 
on Popper’s (1963) philosophy and unfortunately theorists have been falling into the 
same error as their subjects by not seeking falsifying evidence to their theories.  Clearly, 
the case with the “thematic” type questions is that they are easy to solve because they are 
not like the abstract tasks while the theories are more like the abstract tasks in their 
distance from the actual examples of the questions.  This raises a serious question about 
what it is within the “thematic” questions that makes them easier while it is absent from 
all forms of abstract representations. 
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3.3   What is Deontic Logic 
All this talk about the effect of deontic semantics on the task must surely make the reader 
curious as to what is implied by it and what deontic logic is defined as.  Well, as much as 
one may search, it is the most obvious of definitions that are extremely hard to find.  It 
seems that everyone seems to take this type of logic for granted such that everyone forgot 
to define it and presumed that a definition exists somewhere.  The longest definition of 
this logic exists in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.  It states that Mally (1926) 
presented the first formal system of deontic logic and that it was faulty and Menger 
(1939) regarded it as unacceptable.  The Encyclopaedia provides no formal definition of 
what deontic logic is.  Other entries include the one for Mirriam Webster’s dictionary 
(2003) that only states that deontology is “the theory or study of moral obligation”. 
Clearly there is a lack where definitions are concerned, so perhaps we can turn to the 
psychologists who introduce this type of logic for a clearer definition.  This we can take 
from Manktelow and Over (1991) 
“Deontic thinking takes place when we consider what we may (or are 
allowed to) do, or what we ought to (must or should) do, rather than 
what was, is, or will actually be the case.  So basic forms of deontic 
thought are those concerned with permissions and obligations. Cheng 
and Holyoak (1985) are responsible for introducing deontic 
considerations into research on conditional reasoning, a development 
which has invigorated the field.  They propose that there are schemas 
acquired from experience, and stored in long-term memory, for deontic 
reasoning about what they take to be permission rules…”(p.88) 
Manktelow and Over (1987) p.231 
“In this chapter we are interested in one extremely important type of 
deontic reasoning, which takes place when people try to find out which 
actions they ought to perform or may perform.  This type of reasoning 
has traditionally, in philosophy, been called ‘practical reasoning’ and 
is distinguished from ‘theoretical reasoning’, which has the object of 
trying to discover, or to describe correctly, objective matters of fact.  It 
is sometimes said that the difference between these two is that between 
trying to infer what one should (or may) do as opposed to trying to infer 
what one should (or may) believe.  The latter does not have to be 
‘theoretical’ in the scientific sense and could be directed towards 
ordinary facts which are highly relevant to practical questions about 
what one should or should not do.  For example, facts about what is 
healthy or unhealthy.  Practical reasoning depends, in part, on some 
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degree of theoretical reasoning, but goes beyond it to conclusions about 
actions….” 
  Therefore deontic logic came from the moral obligation or wanting to perform an 
obligation and we are also informed that it relates to ‘practical reasoning’.  In spite of 
what seems to be a clear definition, it is not precise and perhaps one reason for this lack 
is that the concept was born in the vague world of philosophy.  However, this lack does 
not render it unusable because it has indeed found itself in the very well defined world of 
logic.  Mally (1926) stumbled in his first attempt to formulate it, but that did not last, as 
the Standard Deontic Logic was defined by Follesdal and Hilpinen (1971) and along with 
it many other types of logic emerged including preference-based, defeasible and temporal 
deontic logics. 
However, it is not advisable at this stage to jump into the logical ocean without 
learning how to swim.  Therefore, we will start with a clear definition as to what would 
constitute a deontic task to us and what would on the other hand constitute a descriptive 
task.  We will follow that with some deductions based on the definition of each. 
Definition 1: Deontic Rule.  A rule shall be considered a deontic rule if the 
existence of a negative instance does not cast any doubt on the existence of the rule 
merely on the conformity of the case.  Instead, a negative instance would be regarded as a 
violation of the rule. 
Example: An example from Bahrain’s roads could be: “If one is to drive, then that 
person must have a valid driving licence.” 
Implications:  Consequently, if one is found driving without a driving licence and that 
is not unheard of, then it does not cast doubt on the rule.   
 
Definition 2: Descriptive Rule.  A rule shall be considered a descriptive rule if 
the existence of a negative instance casts doubt on the truth of the rule. 
Example: An example could be “If there is an A on one side, then there is a 4 on the 
other side.” 
Implications:  It does not associate with any moral “obligations” or “permissions” 
and therefore the mere appearance of an A on one side, and a 7 on the other side is 
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The basic assumptions are that deontic implication can either be expressed through the 
rule itself as shown above, or through the context, or through the background knowledge 
of the question.  The context can express moral obligations or permissions by informing 
subjects that they are “an authority checking…” (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985).  
Background information is assumed in the case of the drinking age rule for example.  
This in fact is generally the case, as the surface form of the sentence out of context is 
frequently ambiguous as to whether it will be interpreted deontically or descriptively. 
Consequently we find a nice clear division between two types of tasks: the descriptive 
tasks and the deontic tasks.  This analysis to the sceptical reader may not seem 
sufficiently strong to adopt this perspective.  To simply state that “deontic” rules are 
those that do not cease to be in force if a negative instance arises does not give any 
explanation of why this particular format succeeds while the descriptive one fails.  Yet 
again we seem to be dividing materials into two parts: “successful” and “unsuccessful” 
types of questions.   
This is why Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) conducted a detailed study of the 
descriptive task, in order to identify the paths of thought that subjects follow and to 
understand why subject behaviour is the way it is. 
3.4   Paths of Thought in the Abstract/Descriptive task 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) carried out an investigation into the various paths of 
thought that subjects could have followed in order to arrive at their different conclusions 
in selecting PQ, PQNotQ, P, etc.  The scheme they followed is that of Socratic tutoring in 
order to guide subjects along the path in a way not much different from that followed by 
Wason and Johnson-Laird (Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1970). 
They did, however use a two rule task of the form shown below: 
Rule 1:  If there is a U on one side, then there is an 8 on the other side. 
Rule 2:  If there is an I on one side, then there is an 8 on the other 
side.(Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2004) 
Subjects are informed that one of these rules is true while the other is false.  This 
makes the competent answer to this question to check the card with 3 because if this card 
has a U on the other side, then Rule 1 is automatically rendered false and Rule 2 is 
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rendered true because one of them must be true.  If, on the other hand, the other side of 
the 3 has an I then Rule 2 is automatically rendered false and Rule 1 rendered true. 
One of the main advantages of this rule format is that it backgrounds concerns about 
exceptions as some subjects, as will be shown in section 3.4.1, presume that some of the 
rules presented may still hold even though an exception may exist for that rule.  The two 
rule task is further discussed in section 3.5.2. 
A careful analysis of the two rules presented showed that the rules are of the 
structures: If P then Q, and If NotP then Q.  This would eliminate the possibility that 
subjects relate judging the truth of the card to their trust of the person performing the 
experiment because there are two options to select from, rather than say the rule is true or 
false. 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) started to draw a map of possibilities based on 
semantic implications and these were then observed in tutorial Socratic dialogue.  
Subjects were asked to verbalise their reasoning to help isolate five distinct problems on 
which we may focus: 
1. The problem of exceptions. 
2. Truth of the rule and ‘truth of the card’ 
3. The logic of “true” 
4. The logic of “false” 
5. The cards as sample 
The problems presented here emerged during Socratic Dialogues with the aim of 
understanding subject reasoning.  Consequently, they are inherent to the task and any 
manipulation that will be attempted in the forthcoming chapters that results in altering 
subject behaviour would probably achieve that purpose through amplifying or resolving 
the problems described here.  It is for this reason that a thorough review is essential to aid 
one in recognising the causes and effects as well recognising if any other problems exist. 
3.4.1    The Problem of Exceptions 
Some subjects seem to accept the possibility of having an exception to the rule while the 
rule still holds.  It could be a coincidence or not that, in English, exceptions are evident 
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with respect to the rules of grammar.  Consequently, the status of the rule being in 
English may influence or cause this type of behaviour by showing that it is natural to 
expect rules to be robust to exceptions. 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) indicate that if a counterexample is not found as 
sufficient evidence that the rule is false, then it would seriously complicate matters.  If 
subjects assume a deontic mental reasoning perspective we find that  
“In this paper we study the violability of norms, and in particular how 
to proceed once a norm has been violated.  Clearly this issue is of great 
practical relevance, because in most applications norms are violated 
frequently.  In the fine print of a contract it is therefore usually 
stipulated what has to be done if a term in the contract is violated.  For 
example, if the delivery time is overdue the responsible agent might be 
obliged to pay the extra transport and warehousing costs that result 
from the delay.  If the violation is not too serious, or was not intended 
by the violating party, the contracting parties usually do not want to 
consider this as a breach of contracts, but simply as a disruption in the 
execution of the contract that has to be repaired.”(van der Torre, 1999) 
I realise that the authors intend their isolation to be of descriptive tasks, so imposing 
this paragraph that shows that this behaviour is evident in deontic contexts may be 
somewhat surprising.  There is no central contradiction because in deontics we find that 
what a person focuses on is what “ought to” happen while in the case of simply assuming 
exceptions, there is no indication of what the existence of an exception means.  For 
example, it may exist because the rule applies to another set of data and this particular 
instance is not part of the domain. 
The issue of subject confusion should be obvious to any researcher in the field and 
will be investigated in detail through the experiments in Chapter 5. 
3.4.2    Truth of the rule and ‘truth of the card’  
Here we find a clear problem with alignment of the mapping between the premises of the 
rule and the sides of the cards.  Such an ambiguity may cause subjects to behave as 
follows: 
“Subject 10: 
E:  If you found an 8 on this card [I], what would it say?  
S:  It would say that rule two is true, and if the two cannot be true then 
rule one is wrong …  
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(subject turns 8).  
E:  OK so it’s got an I on the back, what does that mean?  
S:  It means that rule two is true.  
E:  Are you sure?  
S:  I’m just thinking whether they are exclusive, yes because if there is 
an I then there is an 8. Yes, yes it must be that.” (Stenning and van 
Lambalgen, 2004)  
There is a confusion here either to whether the two rules are “exclusive”, in that if one 
is confirmed then the other cannot be confirmed without risking having both true, or 
whether the four cards are exclusive.  The researchers indicate that here subjects 
‘transfer’ the truth of the rule in the individual case of the card to that of the rule.  They 
are therefore assuming that each card defines a domain of its own.   
However, one may also note that what should be the case is that the two cannot be 
falsified at the same time, and not that the two cannot be confirmed at the same time as 
subjects may assume to be the case.  Therefore, a confusion in reasoning alignment may 
cause subjects to apply the principle, that should be applied to falsification, erroneously 
to confirmation.   
3.4.3    The Logic of “true”  
The logic of “true” occurs when some subjects insist that “not false” is not the same as 
“true”.  A sample dialogue is presented where a subject saw that rule 1 is false and rule 2 
is not false, but that subject could not arrive to the conclusion that rule 2 is true.  The 
reader may recall that if one rule is false then the other must be true by virtue of the 
problem design. 
This behaviour, we are told, may persist in the selection task as turning P and NotQ 
suffices to know that the rule is not false but it does not prove the rule to be true.  By 
contrast in ‘deontic’ cases we are told that subjects can never prove a rule such as the 
following to be true, therefore they just try to ensure it is not violated: “ If you want to 
drink alcohol on these premises, you have to be over 18”.   Perhaps this interpretation 
may cause subjects to select all cards to be extra sure of their conclusions. 
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3.4.4    The Logic of “false”  
The term “strong falsity” was defined when a subject equates a false conditional  “If P 
then NotQ” with the false occurrence of the rule If P then Q”.   Note that this conclusion 
was obtained through a subject that selected P and Q.   An example of this case is 
presented as follows:  
Subject 26 (Standard selection task):  
“E:  So you’re saying that if the statement is true, then the number [on 
the back of A] will be 4 … What would happen if the statement were 
false?  
S:  Then it would a number other than 4.” (Stenning and van 
Lambalgen, 2004)  
Here we are told that subjects may regard counterexamples as governed by a rule and 
in this case the cards P and Q are sufficient to show that the rule is not false, possibly 
because they have a bi-conditional interpretation of the rule in addition to strong falsity.  
Strong falsity alone seems to guide subjects to select “either P or Q”.  Note that this is 
not the only suggestion that will be given to guide subjects to select P alone or Q alone, 
so the paths proposed here are simply a guide of possible explanations not a clear 
mapping from subject choices to interpretations. 
3.4.5    The Cards as Sample 
This we are informed is the more ‘natural’ way of interpreting the rule so that it applies to 
the full domain of letters and numbers rather than just to the four cards involved in the 
question.  This generalisation would either lead subjects to take the cards as a sample 
from cards that can many other values and numbers, or to resort to probabilities to arrive 
at a conclusion.   
In this case, we find the subject trying to judge using some form of probability 
function that does not seem very different from that proposed in the Oaksford and Chater 
(1994) model of information gain. 
3.4.6    A Directionality in the Paths?  
If there is a directional aspect to thought, then it should be present in all seasons and 
interpretations however subtle the effect may seem.  We can start with the problem of 
exceptions, and find that an exception is overlooked when the subject is intent on going 
 
Chapter 3 -  A Novel Perspective           56
on with the reasoning process unhindered by the issue that arose.  Here, what we have is 
a determination by the subject to follow along in the same path of thought in spite of 
possible threats to the assumptions made.  Gebauer and Laming (1997) argue that 
constant anaphora and biconditional interpretations are persistently held.  They presented 
the cards of the selection task six times to each subject and found that subjects chose the 
same cards as each other.  They turned the cards subjects chose in each of the tests.  
However, they did not provide any feedback to students that would alert their attention to 
consequents of choices or causes.  Although this evidence is not sufficient to defend the 
assumption that reasoning in this task is not dynamic, it does seem to show a tendency to 
follow that path if there is no external interference with the path of thought selected.   
The anaphora that requires relating the premises of the rule to the two sides of the 
cards is none other than an alignment problem.  Some Subjects restrict themselves to 
constant anaphora or reading the rule as saying “if A is on the face of the card, then 4 is 
on the back of the card.” This indicates that dealing with the meaning of the words “one 
side” and “other side”, relating that to the precedent and consequent of the rules and in 
turn to what is displayed on the face and back of the cards seem to cause a significant 
alignment problem to subjects.  One should notice that in each of these cases there are 
two options to each of the possibilities.  If one is regarded as a “not” of the other, as is 
expected by logic, then this reasoning should be subject to the problems classically 
encountered when expecting subjects to interpret “not false” into true.  What this means 
is that when subjects assign the face of the card to the letter A and the back of the card to 
a number, then they are checking perhaps 4.  If they then wish to look at the reverse such 
that the side that has the letter is on the back, then the number will appear on the front.  In 
the second case, we have the A not on the face of the card, and at the same time it may 
not be an A.  These possibilities of having negatives in what is unknown seem to be 
caused by the anaphora and explained by the difficulty of handling negatives. 
In the two rule task, the reader may recall that the two rules cannot both be true or 
both be false which places them both at opposite sides of the spectrum of truth/falsity and 
although it backgrounds some issues, it does not resolve this one.   
The logic of false follows where subjects apply the “Not” to the Q part by regarding 
counter examples as governed by a rule, yet again, we find an organised world that has 
both positive and negative examples clearly outlined.  Here subjects do not wonder about 
the falsity of the precedent, thereby keeping it constant while doubting what may emerge 
as a consequent.  This behaviour shows a classic sensitivity to the direction of the rule.  
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Last but not least, we find the last student continuing to talk about verification even when 
that student turns the card with 3, does not seem to have any implications of falsification.  
Here we find a contrast between the tasks themselves that are assumed by students, where 
some may follow the path of verifying a rule, while others follow the path of seeking to 
falsify the rule.  Yet again these two seem to have contrasting pragmatic goals and 
consequently different “ways” of looking at the problem. 
Kirby (1994) ran a number of experiments where he tested the effect of the set size 
giving P for example a value from 1 to 1000 and a rule that says if a card has a number 
from 1 to 1000 on one side, then it has a + on the other side.  He noticed that the 
selections of P,Q and the selections of NotP, NotQ were inversely affected such that the 
former decreased as the set size rose, while the latter increased as the set size rose.  This 
suggests an alignment between the similar values of truth or falsity.  This perhaps can be 
informative in suggesting a form of directionality in the selections.  Note that the Q and 
NotQ values that he used as + and – are implicit negatives of each other. 
These indicators imply that the semantics of the task may be capable of influencing 
subject interpretations and in turn influencing their behaviour in the task.  Although 
directionality will be further discussed in Chapter 4, it is worth mentioning here that 
guiding subjects away from one erroneous assumption does not necessitate that all these 
subjects will arrive at the same conclusion.  Instead, what occurs should be similar to 
highlighting one or more danger zones that they should avoid causing them to continue to 
fluctuate between other problems that continue to exist. 
3.5   Predictions and Experiment 
From the paths of thought isolated we find a main conclusion that the abstract or 
descriptive task is definitely ambiguous.  It is glaringly obvious that this great diversity of 
interpretations could only be possible if there is no clear communication between the 
theorists who put the questions and the subjects who attempt to perform the task. 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) ran an experiment to test if subjects do indeed 
follow the paths of thought that emerged from the Socratic Tutoring sessions.  Since the 
interpretations subjects seem to make are guided by the semantics of the question, then 
manipulations must imply a semantic setting that is different from the baseline.  They 
attempted five different conditions that are as follows: 
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1. The classical task to be used as a benchmark 
2. The two rule task: Expected outcome more accurate responses of NotQ. 
3. Exploring conjunctive rules:  Prediction that subjects will not make 
competence response to not turn any cards and will give it a deontic 
interpretation. 
4. Contingency instructions: Prediction of an increased selection of NotQ. 
5. Judging truthfulness of an independent source: Prediction is that this would 
raise accuracy levels. 
The first condition replicates the distribution reported in Wason (1968) while 
conditions 2 and 3 alter the logical format of the rule with the aim of “backgrounding” 
erroneous assumptions.  Conditions 4 and 5 keep the rule as is, while addition extra 
textual clarification to the questions. 
3.5.1    Investigating Different Logical Formats of the Rule 
The two rule task has the same first paragraph as with the classical task while the second 
paragraph is shown below: 
“..Also below there appear two rules.  One rule is true of all the cards, 
the other isn’t.  Your task is to decide which cards (if any) you must 
turn in order to decide which rule holds.  Don’t turn unnecessary cards.  
Tick the cards you want to turn. 
Rule 1: If there is a vowel on one side, then there is an even number on 
the other side. 
Rule 2: If there is a consonant on one side, then there is an even 
number on the other side.”  (Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2004, p.31) 
This is the only format where the selection of P is not part of the “expected” 
selections, instead the correct response is Not Q.  The authors inform us that this format 
should background concerns about the significance of exceptions as well as other issues. 
The second task that alters the rule format has a conjunctive rather than the classical “if 
then” structure,  and the following rule was tested: 
Rule: There are vowels on one side and even numbers on the other 
side. (Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2004, p.34) 
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This is a statement that for all the cards, there is a vowel on one side and an even 
number on the other.  So the existence of cards with a consonant and an odd number are 
enough to know the fact that the rule is false without turning a single card.  However, the 
authors predict that subjects will turn cards reflecting that the rule does in fact have a 
deontic force that implies that they would check it as a rule as a result of the context it is 
embedded in. 
 
3.5.2    Investigating the Effect of Extra Textual Clarification  
The contingency formulation of the question aims at removing any contingency relations 
as may be understood by subjects.  
“…Also below there appears a rule.  Your task is to decide which of 
these four cards you must turn (if any) in order to decide if the rule is 
true.  Assume that you have to decide whether to turn each card 
before you get any information from any of the turns you choose to 
make.  Don’t turn unnecessary cards. Tick the cards you want to 
turn.”(Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2004, p.32) 
The authors inform us that the prediction is for better performance with this format. 
The second format of this type attempts to avoid confusing subjects into believing that 
they are judging the experimenter’s credibility when testing the rule, and the following 
paragraph is added: 
“…Also below there appears a rule put forward by an unreliable 
source.  Your task is to decide which cards (if any) you must turn in 
order to decide if the unreliable source is lying.  Don’t turn 
unnecessary cards.  Tick the cards you want to turn.” (Stenning and 
van Lambalgen, 2004, p. 33) 
3.5.3    Results from Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) 
The frequencies of subject choices as provided by the authors on p.35 are shown below in 
table 3.1: 
Condition PQ Q P P¬Q ¬Q ¬PQ PQ¬Q ¬P¬Q All None Misc. total
Classical 56 7 8 4 3 7 1 2 9 8 5 108 
Truthfulness 39 6 9 14 0 7 3 6 8 15 5 112 
2-rule 8 8 2 1 9 2 1 0 0 2 4 37 
Contingency 15 0 3 8 1 6 4 8 3 0 3 51 
Conjunctive 21 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 30 
Table  3.1:  Stenning and van Lambalgen’s (2004) results 
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Researchers would be primarily interested in the bold values, which show the correct 
responses according to classical logic are given.  If we set aside the 2-rule task because it 
has a different form, we find that the best performance appeared of course when the 
truthfulness of the source is placed in doubt with Contingency in second place.  It may be 
hard for some to imagine how informing subjects that they must judge all cards without 
thinking they can turn the other side, would result in such a strong positive effect, yet this 
is true.  Perhaps what this instruction does is to point subjects to focus on the “fronts” of 
the cards.  Kirby (1994) noticed an issue regarding the “fronts” of cards where he had a 
higher selection of the P and NotP cards when they came from smaller sets.  One of the 
possible conclusions he raised was that of attention bias.  This suggests that a subject may 
utilize the card’s ability to draw attention as a heuristic device for assessing the relevance 
of the card to the condition (Evans, 1983).   
If we look at the percentage selections of the four cards in the Classical and 
Conjunctive formats as shown in Table 3.2 we find a redistribution of selections.  A 
particularly clear difference exists in the increased selection of negative values of NotP 
and particularly NotQ which goes from 15% to 48%. 
Condition P Not P Q Not Q 
Classical 72% 14% 73% 15% 
Contingency 65% 34% 55% 48% 
Table  3.2: Percentage selections of each card 
We can also go on to ponder around the other results shown above, but before we 
ponder values as they are, we shall convert the table to percentages in table 3.3 as the 
nominal values are confusing for a comparison of this sort. 
Condition PQ Q P P¬Q ¬Q ¬PQ PQ¬Q ¬P¬Q All None Misc. 
Classical 52 6 7 4 3 6 1 2 8 7 5 
Truthfulness 35 5 8 13 0 6 3 5 7 13 4 
2-rule 22 22 5 3 24 5 3 0 0 5 11 
Contingency 29 0 6 16 2 12 8 16 6 0 6 
Conjunctive 45 3 13 10 3 0 0 1 0 13 12 
Table  3.3: Percentage selections out of the totals 
One of the clearest differences in the PQ selection column is the low percentage of 
selections for the 2-rule task.  Perhaps the form of the problem that is represented as two 
rules “If P then Q” and “If NotP then Q” while expecting subjects to find which one of 
the two holds affects performance here.  In the case of this question, we find that both P 
 
Chapter 3 -  A Novel Perspective           61
and NotP are explicitly mentioned, so if we apply a form of pattern matching technique to 
the rules a selection of P, NotP and Q may be more likely.  This is not one of the 
categories displayed above, which is a strong indication that selections of this 
combination are not high.  A more careful look at the 2-rule task shows that while PQ 
selections are low, there are relatively higher selections of Q alone and of Not Q alone.  
The task therefore, seems to guide subjects towards focusing on the consequent of the 
rules because the two possibilities are explicitly displayed in the antecedent of the rule. 
This variation of the task, therefore, seems to implicitly background issues about the 
nature of the relationship between the P and Q premises that appear in the rule.  We find 
that subjects who in other variations place them together to compose their selection of 
PQ, in this task start to regard them as independent entities, such that P can be ignored 
when concentrating on whether to select Q or NotQ.  While this variation guides 46% of 
the students to selecting one of these two alternatives, they do not select both together.  
On the other hand, in other variations up to 52% of subjects actually do select PQ 
together.  Two reasons may cause this separation: either it is the format of the problem 
through giving a selection of one of the two rules because the truth of one proves the 
falsity of the other; or it is the difficulty of processing negatives along with positive 
values, and here again we have the same truth versus falsity comparison. 
3.6   Are Deontic Questions the only ones capable of 
“successful” behaviour? 
If one is to follow Popper’s (1963) philosophy then any theory should be prepared to 
stand up to sincere falsification attempts.  In the case under study here, the assumption 
that deontic questions are those that resulted in successful behaviour is a form of post 
analysis of research data.  One may be tempted to assume that this type of question which 
is currently described as a “thematic” question is the only type capable of eliciting the 
competent responses of P and NotQ. 
To first test the claim, one must check that deontic questions that express an ideal 
actually do succeed in eliciting good performance.  The work of Cheng and Holyoak 
(1985), Cheng et al. (1986), Cosmides (1989) and Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) support the 
claim that the successful questions they used are all deontic.  However, in order to 
“prove” the claim, an exhaustive testing of all possible deontic conditionals has to be 
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tested.  Clearly this is an impossible task to perform at least within the limits of a 
researcher’s lifetime. 
However, one can look at some specific cases that may be regarded by some as 
deontic, and reported to have failed to produce “successful” competent responses.  The 
first and clearest is when a rule has the word “must” or is in a form like “If A is on one 
side, then 4 must be on the other side.”  Here, some may be misled into presuming this is 
sufficient to allow the rule to be regarded as a deontic rule.  However, if the reader refers 
back to the definitions given in section 3.3, it should not be difficult to realise that even 
with the word “must” the rule is still as fragile as other descriptive/abstract rules in its 
category.  Consequently, this form does not pose any threat to the assumption that deontic 
questions are those that to date elicit more of the competent answers. 
Another possible challenge is posed by the transportation rule.  This is a strange case 
because it only succeeded once when tested by Wason and Shapiro (1971) and failed in 
later attempts (Griggs & Cox, 1982; Pollard, 1981; Manktelow & Evans, 1979; Gilhooly 
and Falconer, 1974).  Researchers attempted to find reasons for the failure by finding 
differences in the procedures followed in the replications, like whether or not the four 
days of the week are written on the same cards as the possibilities, written on separate 
cards, or not at all.  Other issues that arose were that the original task was run on a per 
student basis and each was given instructions alone.  Possible other issues that may cause 
the difference may emerge from location differences between the postal rule for example 
“If a letter is sealed then it must carry a 20-cent stamp” when tested by Cheng and 
Holyoak (1985) in Michigan as compared to Hong Kong.  The people of Hong Kong are 
well acquainted with this rule while those in Michigan are not.  Consequently, even in the 
no rationale version of the problem, the subjects of Hong Kong did extremely well in the 
task.  By analogy, one may assume that the subjects that took the transportation problem 
had a form of background knowledge that would in turn influence their behaviour such 
that they would assume there to be an ideal method of transport that should be followed.   
Subjects in that particular experiment are from the University of London which 
perhaps accidentally is the starting point of exactly two railway lines going north and two 
large motorways going north.  Additionally, one may also note that each of the railway 
lines and each of the roads are either to the east or west of the country, therefore making 
it more appropriate for one to take them to go to either Leeds or Manchester.  This 
information, coupled with perhaps some social information of the transport service 
available as well as the availability of cars, may readily impose some form of ideal 
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situation that does not apply when the same test is run elsewhere.  An example could be 
of a tourist someplace in the world asking a hotel concierge about the best way to travel 
to another city.  One possible answer is: “There are two ways to go there: by train or by 
car.  I would personally take the train because traffic in these parts is just horrible and 
would get on your nerves.”  Another possible answer is:  “There are two ways to go 
there: by train or by car.  I would personally drive to it because the road is wonderfully 
scenic and traffic is extremely light.”  Now, if we speed up the clock and increase the 
number of cars on the same scenic road, we find the second situation turning into the 
first.  The point is that the “ideal” that is imposed by background information onto 
transport is dynamic, because the number of cars on the road increases at a high rate and 
train services get better or worse with time depending on management.  Consequently, 
the level of comfort that is sought by the traveller may differ thus affecting the situation.  
If the two means become comparable, then it is expected to find that subjects behave in 
this task as if it is descriptive.  However, if one means of travel is much more interesting 
and comfortable than the other, and the rule contains the uncomfortable one, then it 
should not be surprising to find that subjects make more selections of the competent 
response. 
So there does not seem to be any evidence of the existence of any deontic question 
that failed to elicit adequate competent response behaviour.  Therefore, we can look at the 
other group of tasks which contains the classical task and all the tasks that seem to not 
imply any ideal to find that they elicited very low accuracies as is also replicated in the 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) study.  Now, if there is any descriptive task that is 
capable of eliciting “successful” competent response behaviour, then the deontic type of 
materials would not explain behaviour and instead would only represent part of the 
materials that exhibit the traits of “successful” materials. 
Before we jump to the conclusion that no descriptive task is capable of attaining a high 
degree of accuracy, one may consider a task tested by Kirby (1994) that tests the size of 
the set of P versus the set of NotP.  He found that the rule “If a card has a 0 on one side, 
then it has a + on the other side” elicited around 40% accuracy with 18 subjects out of 45 
selecting the P, NotQ cards.  Subjects were then shown cards with the values 879, 0, +, -.  
However, when Kirby (1994) alters that rule to “If a card has a number from 1 to 1000 
on one side, then it has a + on the other side” while keeping the same card choices, then 
selections of P, NotQ drop to 20%.  However, this did not replicate well with the other 
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experiments attempted as performance was roughly the same with respect to competent 
response selection. 
The experiments did show a trend that links selections of NotQ to the set size of P 
such that the larger the P set is, the more likely subjects are to select the NotQ card.  With 
the 2-rule task we also find a higher selection of NotQ with both the 2-rule task and the 
contingency conditions.   
Altering the set size of P increases the number of cases that have to be tested for 
verification assuming it covers a domain that is larger than the four displayed cards.  If 
subjects are concerned with the whole domain of 1000 numbers, then it would be 
mentally taxing for them to attempt to verify the rule and falsifying it when only two 
values of the consequent exist represented in + and – seems more attractive.  In the 2-rule 
task both P and NotP are part of a rule that may be chosen as the one which is true, 
leaving the NotQ selection being the only unknown that is not displayed.  In this case, it 
seems to be a balance between what is known and what is unknown.  So the sets here 
have attributes of whether they are explicitly displayed or not rather than the size of the 
set being of concern.  In the third case, what is resolved is a dependency between card 
choices and how one selection may influence the other.  When a subject selects a card, 
the subject must know that the other side will remain hidden when having to select the 
next card.  Here the two sets are formed by what is known and what is not known and 
each card is considered individually. 
Clearly, the domains of P, Q and the cards, whether part of a larger domain or each in 
a domain of its own, do affect performance in this task, but how they do is not at all clear.  
One thing is evident though and is of primary concern here, that while the domains do 
affect performance they do not seem to present themselves as candidate features for the 
“successful” abstract/descriptive task that is desired as a falsification attempt to the 
assumption that all “successful” questions are deontic.  Whether or not such a task exists 
still eludes researchers, so the jury is still out until such a task actually shows itself and 
proves to be widely replicable, and the theory stands without any serious falsification 
attempts. 
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3.7   Anaphora and Directionality 
The work of Stenning and van Lambalgen (2001, 2004) highlights the existence of an 
anaphor between what is on the face of the card and what is on the other side.  They show 
us a subject that explicitly changes the direction of the implication in the following 
dialogue: 
Subject 12 [experiments 1a,1b,1c]:  
“E: The first rule says if there is a vowel on the face of the card, so 
what we mean by face is the bit you can see, then there is an even 
number on the back of the card, so that’s the bit you can’t see.  So 
which cards would you turn over to check the rule.  
S:  Well, I just thought 4, but then it doesn’t necessarily say that if there 
is a 4 that there is a vowel underneath, So the A.  
E:  For this one it’s the reverse, so it says if there is a vowel on the 
back, so the bit you can’t see, there is an even number on the face; so in 
this sense which ones would you pick? 
S:  [Subject ticks 4] This one.  
E:  So why wouldn’t you pick any of the other cards?  
S:  Because it says that if there is an even number on the face, then 
there is a vowel, so it would have to be one of those [referring to the 
numbers].  
:  
E:  [This rule] says if there is a vowel on one side of the card, either 
face or back, then there is an even number on the other side, either face 
or back.  
S:  I would pick that one [the A] and that one [the 4].  
E:  So, why?  
S:  Because it would show me that if I turned that [pointing to the 4] 
over and there was an A then the 4 is true, so I would turn it over. Oh, I 
don’t know.  This is confusing me now because I know it goes only 
one way.  
(Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2001) 
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The problem of dealing with the rule that goes one way, while the face and back of the 
cards can be exchanged, keeps coming up again and again through the literature.  
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2001) indicate that there is an interference effect that is 
even evident in subjects that are able to give the normative responses that occurs when 
they look at the cards in both orders, letter up or letter down. 
“So an ‘interference’ explanation for the choice of the p,q card would 
run like this.  Suppose subjects decompose the intended variable 
anaphora reading of ‘one side – other side’ into ‘face/back’ and 
‘back/face’, and then proceed to reverse the direction of the implication 
in the latter case.  This would lead to the transition from  
If there is a vowel on one side, then an even number is on the other side 
via 
If there is a vowel on the face, then an even number is on the back 
and 
If there is a vowel on the back, then an even number is on the face 
to 
If there is a vowel on the face, then an even number is on the back 
and 
If there is an even number on the face, then a vowel is on the back 
What speaks in favour of this analysis is that about one third of our 
subjects consider the K/4 card to be irrelevant, whereas 4/K is taken to 
falsify,.. a surprising fact, which is however entirely consistent with the 
analysis proposed here.  What speaks against it, however, is that some 
subjects who give the normative answer for the intended reading of the 
rule, reverse the arrow in case of the ‘back/face’ anaphora.”(p. 21) 
By contrast, in deontic questions, this anaphora does not seem to exist.  The context of 
the questions seems to make the possibility of a negative instance existing easier to recall.  
For example, in the rule “If the form says entering on one side, then the other side 
includes Cholera on its list of diseases.”  It is clear to anyone reading this rule that to 
ensure that people had their inoculation against Cholera is something to be desired and 
equally clear that those who have not had their inoculation may attempt to enter the 
country without it.  What this implies is that the relationship that is held between entering 
with or without an inoculation is not a random one, as there is an ‘ideal’ to not wish 
people to be ill as a result of allowing someone to break this rule.  Consequently, what 
relates the first premise in the rule to the second is more than just a random relationship 
that has no consequences whether the rule is held or broken. 
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On the other hand, in abstract or descriptive questions, subjects have to recall the 
relationship because it bears no importance to them and while doing so they need to align 
it with the precedent and consequent of the rule as well as the background rule that is 
provided.  This requirement for alignment and the errors shown so clearly by Stenning 
and van Lambalgen (2001, 2004) present a picture of what may be a background effect 
that influences behaviour.  One of the problems of course is the logic of “true” where 
subjects are unable to equate “not false” with “true”.  The problem with processing 
negatives has also to be clarified throughout the review and if this problem is compared 
to the one with anaphora we find the same patterns emerging; namely a problem with 
evaluating what part of the rule maps onto what side of the cards and how to keep the 
background rule in mind during the process.  In short, what some subjects feel is that this 
is similar to a “juggling” game where they are not allowed to let any of the balls fall onto 
the ground. 
So where is the directionality? The problem in anaphora is caused by a lack in subject 
abilities to map the rule onto the front/back of the cards.  When presented by a rule such 
as “If A is on one side, then 4 is on the other side” and cards that show A, K, 4, 7, they 
directly apply the rule to A and search what is behind A, and this indeed is chosen by 
most subjects.  The problem arises when the other cards are under consideration, because 
if subjects wish to verify the rule, they would wonder which card had an A on the back to 
check if 4 is on the front and usually the one to be selected is 4.  If on the other hand, they 
are following a falsification track, they would attempt to select cards that would cause the 
rule to be false and in this case would select the expected A and 7 because they would 
search for the card that has an A on the back and not a 4 on the front.  Clearly the 
competent answer is the one that is guided by a pragmatic falsification goal and to date 
no experiment has managed to guide subjects to think along this path.   
In other words, the deontic/descriptive division, shows that subjects are strongly 
influenced by the method or approach they use to reason about the problem.  If an ideal 
exists, then there is a reason to think of what “ought not” be done and consequently they 
think along the falsification track and make the competent selections of P, NotQ.  If, on 
the other hand, the task is not deontic, then they are unable to diverge from the standard 
verification path that causes them to get confused. 
This is sufficient to indicate a strong effect of “directionality” but rather than stop 
there we can consider the rule: “If there is no water in your radiator, your engine will 
overheat immediately”(p.25).  We are informed that The presence of ‘your’ is what makes 
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the interpretation more likely to be hypothetical; the antecedent need not ever be true for 
‘your’ car”(Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2001,p.25).  What would occur if it is true or 
can be implied as true?  Here we have a difference made between event conditionals that 
describe events that we are told are situated in real time, and hypothetical conditions.  So 
the utilization of these words such as “I” and “you” are capable of taking conditionals 
from those sensitive to real time events to those that live in hypothetical worlds.  These 
hypothetical worlds are ‘ideal’ worlds where there are things that ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ 
happen. 
Chapter 4 will present an introduction to the different types of directionality and then 
impose a temporal sequence that ensures that the event referred to by the antecedent 
always occurs before the event referred to by the consequent through a conveyor setting. 
Chapter 5 will utilise information packaging to identify and attempt to alter subject 
focus and imposed distinctions onto the task.  A negation task which investigate accepted 
assumptions while altering the hierarchical structure of the referents produces striking 
results. 
Chapter 6 will analyse surface co-occurrence features of rules to identify if a 
distinction exists at that level as well as attempt to figure out its justification.
 




Selection Task Reasoning in Time 
Subjects who reason in the selection task are given a question from which they are 
expected to extract assumptions that would in turn be utilised to help them arrive at their 
conclusion which will eventually appear as responses.  This is not a point of controversy 
as such, because all theories of reasoning have the same assumptions but vary in the 
degree to which the process is dynamic.  Explanations of what causes the various 
conclusions subjects arrive at vary widely assuming different types of sequential 
progression.  However, the existence of these types of “order” does not inform us 
whether or not subject reasoning can be influenced by introducing sequences in time.  
Consequently, this chapter will start by considering some of the possible sequences 
that may exist in the reasoning task.  The experiments presented here will then introduce 
a uni-directional temporal restriction and this will be imposed onto the task in order to 
transform the semantic anaphora of “one side/other side” into a sequence with three 
possible locations instead of two. 
4.1   Sequences in Reasoning 
The aim of this section is to identify some of the possible sequences in reasoning that 
may imply a sequence in time.  These offer themselves as indicators of a possible 
interaction between reasoning and a temporal context in the question.  The aim is to 
identify if such a semantic context is a candidate that can influence reasoning by 
“inviting” interpretations that are not likely in other contexts.   
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Several types of sequences will therefore be introduced followed by a section on 
possible interactions with an imposed timeline. 
4.1.1    Logical Directionality 
This is the directionality of logical deduction, which is mainly “ordered” with respect to 
logical deduction.  For example, if we have the rule If A, then B and the premise A is 
given, we can logically deduce B and it is exemplified by the following set of statements: 
A (is true), 
If A, then B 
 B 
This type of directionality is represented by the path of proof followed by mapping the 
true A to the antecedent and then arriving at the consequent.  One of the main 
characteristics of this type of directionality is that B is deduced from A even if the rule is 
of the form B only if A.   
Whenever several possible paths are possible, then the consequences of alternative 
actions are left open to the subject.  Pragmatic reasoning schemas as introduced by Cheng 
and Holyoak (1985) exhibit what is meant by reasoning in order to achieve a “rationale” 
or a goal.  The rationale is not represented by the deduced B as in the simple form shown 
here but is instead shown through a “goal”.  An example is the case of a permission 
context as in the rule “If the form says ‘ENTERING’ on one side, then the other side 
includes Cholera among its list of diseases.”  The authors claim that it qualifies as a 
permission context because of the rationale of “This is to ensure that the entering 
passengers are protected against the disease”(p.401, Cheng & Holyoak, 1985).  The idea 
is that this form of rationale is what causes the permission schema to be invoked and that 
in turn is a set of four production rules that are followed in order to guide subjects to 
make the deductions necessary to arrive at their conclusions.   
It is important to note that this type of rules also presents an example of ‘deontic’ type 
rules where subjects may think in the context of “if this is what ought to happen, it does 
not mean that it must necessarily happen”.  Here we find that logical deduction leads 
subjects to assume the role of falsifying the Cholera rule and consequently arrive at the 
competent logical solution. 
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In order to identify rule features that affect performance such as whether or not they 
are goal driven, a comparative analysis was conducted here of 79 experimental runs.5  
Complete results of this analysis are included in Appendix A as they proved to be a 
valuable source of information as based on several studies (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985; 
Cheng et al., 1986; Wason and Shapiro, 1971; Manktelow and Evans, 1979; and 
Gigerenzer and Hug (1992).  The data are only presented by comparison of performance 
percentages because no sufficient baseline replications existed in the various studies to 
allow any formal meta analysis of the experiments to be conducted.  The variable 
baseline, made it impossible to convert any of the statistical scores like the F score or Chi 
value into a common measure of difference that could be mapped onto a unified scale.  
Consequently, although the data are informal, it may be informative by providing 
indicators of the factors that affect performance.   
The data were first broken up into several groups each dedicated to a different range of 
performance percentages.  The groups of rules that resulted were as follows: 
Group A: Super-performer (percentage correct >= 80%):  This group included 15 
runs and all fell into two main categories, either as social contracts with up to 95% 
accuracy rate or as permission or regulation schemas when a rationale is given.  It may be 
worth mentioning that the social contract rules are descriptions assigned to these tasks by 
the experimenters and this has in some cases been subject to controversy.  Most of these 
tasks involve explicitly informing subjects that they should look for a cheater or that this 
is obviously implied.  In fact a further analysis shows that all of these 15 have a deontic 
context, a deontic rule, or both.   
Group B: Moderate-performers (percentage correct < 80% and >= 56%):  This 
group included 29 runs with only one “abstract” case.  This “abstract” rule is the rule in 
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) “If one is to take action ‘A’ then one must satisfy 
precondition ‘P’”.  This case is deontic because it implies an obligation but it is also 
abstract because it is a general form rather than an example of a situation.  However, it is 
not similar to the abstract forms of the rule that are usually descriptive.  In this case, 22 of 
the 29 runs have a deontic context, a deontic rule or both, while the rest are purely 
descriptive. 
                                                 
5 An experimental run is whenever an experimenter gives subjects a particular question at a particular time 
and elicits responses, so the same rules run by different researchers or at different times qualify to be 
different experimental runs. 
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Group C: Weak-performers (percentage correct < 56% and > 25%):  This group 
included 19 runs of which 8 are contingency training subjects and 8 are obligation 
training subjects of Cheng et al. (1986).  Most of these rules merely describe correlation 
rules that relate seemingly independent antecedents to consequents and arrive at this 
group as a result of the training subjects are exposed to.  Here, 11 of the 19 runs have a 
deontic context, a deontic rule or both. 
Group D: Marginal-performers (percentage correct < 25%):  This group included 16 
runs most of which had no clear relation between the two propositions other than mere 
correlations, and subjects are not exposed to any form of training.  In this group only 2 
runs have a deontic context or a deontic rule. 
First of all, the existence of a deontic setting within these runs and with decreasing 
percentages of 100%, 76%, 58% and 12.5% as one goes from Group A through to Group 
D shows that the competent response selections margin seems to be correlated with the 
frequency of deontic rules in that particular group.  Once a rule is interpreted 
descriptively not deontically, then subjects seem to follow a diverse set of possible 
logical paths as shown by Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004).  This is echoed by the 
data given above to show that deontic runs are much more frequent in the higher group 



































Figure  4.1: The percentage of Deontic questions or contexts shown as per Group6
                                                 
6 The “General” category includes all rules that cannot be easily classified into any of the categories shown.  
Rather than imposing judgement and forcing classification these few rules were placed into this category. 
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However, this order of logical deduction, although it seems to form the basis of 
assessing how “correct” student responses are by comparing them to the competent 
logical response, does ignore the existence of other types of directionality that may 
interfere with subject performance when the problem is not precisely described.  In the 
case of deontic questions, subjects exhibit behaviour that reflects that they fully 
understand the experimenter’s intentions.  By contrast, with the abstract/descriptive task, 
they exhibit a confusion that may be caused by interferences of different possible paths.  
One possible indicator of the existence of different forms of directionality was presented 
by Cheng and Holyoak, (1985) who tested the “If..then” structure versus the “only if” 
structure and found that subjects reason significantly more accurately with the first 
structure than with the second structure.  They also gave subjects a rephrase task and the 
significant difference between the two structures was evident again to a significant level 
when assessing how many subjects produced competent rephrased statements.  The “only 
if” structure differs from the “if then” structure in that the conclusion comes ahead of the 
condition in the former, so subjects are likely to learn what they can deduce before they 
learn what is necessary for that deduction. 
4.1.2    The Directionality of Knowledge Acquisition 
This type of directionality represents the order in which the subject acquires knowledge, 
whether this is dictated by the experimenter or the subject’s logical deduction process.  
Here we find that the knowledge presented to subjects in this task is given in the form of 
two rules; a foreground rule and a background rule so the order of acquisition may differ 
from one subject to the next depending on the order in which they make the associations 
between the cards and the clauses in the rule.  It starts with the task presented to the 
subject and a rule similar to the one shown in Figure 4.2 assuming cards shown contain 
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If an                                    , then there is a   A is on one side 7 on the other side
A 
mapping the A on the face of 
the card to the first premise  
7 is on the other side, rule 
confirmed so what is next?
11 is on the other side, rule 
falsified so what is next?
Figure  4.2: A graphical representation of one of the paths that may be followed.  
 
Subjects may start by considering the first card and utilising it to deduce the influence 
of what is on the other side of the card on the task at hand.  If the other side has a 7, then 
the rule is confirmed and this assumption may be carried forward to influence their 
perspective of the second card as they consider it as a possible answer.  If, on the other 
hand, the other side has an 11, then the rule is falsified by that finding and they may carry 
this assumption while considering the next possible card.  The anaphora exists between 
the syntactic relationship between “one side” and “other side” that affects the semantic 
relations that necessitate a letter to occupy one while a number occupies the other.  
Therefore, the contents of the face of the card can be mapped onto either the antecedent 
or the consequent clauses.  This causes a mapping from the two sides of the cards to the 
antecedent and consequent clauses that is variable according to the card.  This clearly is a 
source of confusion that may lead to two basic different interpretations (Stenning, 2002). 
Since the anaphora is variable, comprehending its full scope of application is complex.  
One possible way of interpretation may be a constant anaphoric interpretation where the 
face of the card is always mapped to the antecedent premise and it should lead subjects to 
only select the A card because then it would be the only one relevant (Stenning, 2002).  
Another possibility is to interpret the rule as a bi-conditional with constant anaphora 
causing the competent solution to be A and 4, which is incidentally the highest selected 
subject solution to this task. 
Perhaps it is worth considering here that there may be interference between the 
different kinds of directionality.  While the first interpretation results from applying the 
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distinction between the antecedent and consequent to the face and back of the card, the 
second interpretation results from applying the reversibility of the cards to the antecedent 
and consequent of the rule, causing it to be bi-conditional.  This difference between the 
two bits of knowledge offered through the question itself, has different directional biases 
that may offer an explanation as to why subjects would attempt to force an alignment 
between them in order to arrive at their selections. 
In the case of constant anaphoric interpretation we find that the “face” of the card is 
mapped to the antecedent perhaps because it captures attention before the “back” of the 
card.  This exhibits a directional interpretation that is restricted by this relationship that is 
introduced by the subject from the first premise to the second, and from the face of the 
card to the back. 
The variable anaphora make the problem more complex so one way of simplifying it 
could be to erroneously interpret it as a bi-conditional.  Perhaps the asymmetry of the 
If/then construct clashes with the front/back inter-changeability of the card so the inter-
changeability is applied to the rule turning it into a bi-conditional.  With a bi-conditional, 
the mental process that takes a subject across the rule from P to Q has to make a round 
trip bringing the subject back from Q to P, causing subjects to select the P and Q cards as 
the optimal choices to check the rule. 
The contingency variant of the task (Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2004), for example, 
resulted in a major change in subject behaviour, increasing selections of NotQ to 48% as 
compared to 15% in the baseline task.  The only difference between this variant and the 
classical task is that subjects are explicitly informed the following; “Assume that you 
have to decide whether to turn each card before you get any information from any of the 
turns you choose to make”.  What this instruction does is eliminate any dependency 
issues between card choices, such that each card should be selected as if it is the first that 
is considered in the group.  What this essentially implies is that the path of reasoning that 
takes a subject through the group of cards under consideration carries with it a number of 
dependencies from one to the other.  When the statement is included subjects become 
aware that this is not desired and are therefore not prone to the interpretations that allow 
these dependences to exist.  This supports the conjecture that the difference in directional 
features may cause dependencies to be carried from the rule to the cards or vice versa. 
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4.1.3    Tensed Directionality 
Tenses impose an event timeline that starts in the past and ends in the future.  The 
standard tense order for the classical selection task is present-present in each of the 
premises.  One can refer again to the analysis shown in Appendix A to investigate 
whether any effect of tense directionality exists and whether or not this would affect 
performance.  A careful comparative partial analysis of this data showed that some of the 
experimenters did not always conform to tense restrictions.  The study covered a careful 
analysis of each time a rule is tested experimentally, and this is what is described by a 
run. This analysis will be referred to at various points in the thesis. 
Results showed that of the 79 runs, 9 have a present-present perfect tense ordering, 9 
present-future ordering and 3 past-present ordering and the rest a simple present-present 















of all other 
rules 
Past-Present 3 1 54.33% 53.3% 
Present-Present Perfect 9 8 65.67% 51.8% 
Present-Future 9 7 62.3% 52.2% 
Present-Present 58 29 50.00% 62.62% 
Table  4.1: A classification of the rules according to different tense combinations 
If these numbers are tested through a Chi Square distribution to see if any variation 
exists between the group that has different tenses in the premises and the group that has a 
strict present-present tense, the results show a Chi value of 4.314 and a p < 0.0378 with a 
Yates corrected p-value of < 0.06 which is bordering on significance.  The effect of the 
deontic/descriptive classification has already been shown to correlate with better 
performance so the tense analysis here may interfere with those results to produce these 
differences. 
 Sometimes a deontic task that has a present/present tense semantically implies that the 
consequent state occurs as a result of an action that took place at an earlier point in time 
than the antecedent as in Cosmides (1989) and Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) as shown in 
the rule: “If a man eats cassava root then he must have a tattoo on his face.”  In this 
example one can easily see that for the tattoo to be present on the face, it must have been 
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obtained at a point in time prior to which the eating process should be occurring, thereby 
implying a temporal distance on the timeline that is not reflected by a change in tenses.7   
Since the task itself is highly sensitive to semantic implications the tensed 
directionality is able to impose an effect of its own on the effectiveness of the rule which 
is difficult to detect, perhaps because as in the cases shown above the timeline differences 
may be implied rather than clearly shown.  A more specific study dedicated to study this 
effect within a single population was run of the Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) experiments.  
A meta form analysis was run of the data provided by the authors and results showed a 
Standardized Mean Difference of –0.1396 which is hardly sufficient to claim a difference 
between rules with ordered tenses and those who have both verbs in the present tense.  
The same set of 24 rules show no differences with respect to the order of the tenses in the 
two premises. 
However, the lack of sufficient information for analysis does not imply that this form 
of tensed directionality does not exist nor can it deny an effect on subject behaviour.  The 
given percentages above do in a sense show a trend where percentage competent 
responses seem to rise whenever different tenses are employed in the same rule. 
Abstract tasks pose a difficulty when one wishes to utilise such tensed ordering or any 
timeline distancing to emerge because they seem to impose a static presentation of the 
question.  One cannot say ‘If there was an A on one side of the card, there will appear a 4 
on the other side of the card’ and expect it to be semantically equivalent to the classical 
abstract question.  It seems therefore safe to assume that current data does not show that 
tenses play a vital role in abstract rule interpretation.  This does not imply that they are 
neutral, rather it implies that it is extremely difficult at this point in time to arrive at solid 
conclusions based on the experiments covered in the analysis. 
4.1.4    Cause and Effect or Symptom and Cause 
These two types of directionality would either be in the form If cause then effect, or if 
symptom then cause.  This type of rule does not exist in abundance in the literature as it 
only seems to exist in the Cheng et al. experiment to test the rule “If two objects carry 
like electrical charges, then they will repel each other.”  It is a lonely rule so it is hard to 
                                                 
7 Another interpretation that may be implied is that if a man eats Cassava root then that man will “have a 
tattoo” placed on his face at a later point in time so here too we have the “order” implied between the two 
events.  However, Cosmides (1989) explains that the process takes place one night before the men are 
offered food so this interpretation is not likely in the case of her experiment. 
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compare it to others with respect to performance issues to identify the effect of causality 
on subject behaviour.  It results in a 34% accuracy or P, NotQ choices which seems high 
when we consider that the baseline for that batch of experiments is a selection task 
replication with 19% competent responses which is itself quite high.  Wason’s results by 
contrast show a percentage selection of 4% that is quite replicable, so the lack of 
replication in this case hinders further analysis. 
Judgement of whether a rule reflects a causal link is based on a clear causal link 
directly displayed between the precedent and consequent as in the case of rules of physics 
as presented in the rule “If two objects carry electrical charges, they will repel each 
other”.8  This classification is extremely strict in the sense that their relationship is not a 
causality implied by the If structure and exists independent of the rule form.  The latter 
type forms almost all If instructions and includes many different classifications which are 
not relevant to this study. 
Due to the lack of proper testing of this semantic relation in the analysed data, it is 
difficult to arrive at any solid conclusions on whether or not it has any effect on 
behaviour. 
4.1.5    Discourse Directionality 
Here the issue of central concern is that of the order in which a subject goes through the 
reasoning process from one conclusion to the next.  This overlaps with logical 
directionality, but because subjects deduce B from A when confronted with a rule of the 
form If A then B, and overlaps with Knowledge Acquisition in that B only if A, it is not 
equivalent to the above.   
An example of this type of directionality in the case of the selection task is when a 
subject examines the rule in order, so if the rule has the form B only if A, and the premise 
A is given, then the subject can follow a path of thought that reads the rule in the order it 
was given, and then map the given A to the rule to deduce B.  The sequence of thought 
here is restricted to the sequence given in the rule as it is first guided by it.  Additionally, 
the sequence of thought is also restricted by that of logical deduction because B is 
deduced even in the given rule order.  There are no assumptions made here that following 
                                                 
8 The type of cause/effect relationship described here is very different from that imposed by the If structure 
as defined by Fillenbaum (1978) because the target is that the relation is part of the semantic relations 
between the premises. 
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the two different orders as part of this directionality is not likely to cause confusion, and 
all that is being said is that it is possible to incorporate the two under a larger umbrella.   
“The consequentialism question needs to be separated into two distinct 
components: (a) do people think through the consequences of choices 
before deciding and (b) does any such analysis determine the choices 
made? On the evidence of the inspection times analysis presented here 
and of protocol analysis reported elsewhere it appears that subjects do 
think about the consequences of choices on the selection task, but think 
far more about the cards they end up choosing than those which they 
reject.” (p. 238, Evans, 1996) 
Evans presents strong evidence that what seems to be happening is that subjects think 
a great deal about the cards they choose which are mostly the P and Q selections, but they 
hardly think at all about the ones they do not choose.  Perhaps the rule, as it sits in front 
of subjects, gets far more attention than the cards, and therefore in a sense “guides” 
subjects along its path which does indeed contain the P and Q cards, especially since the 
classical abstract question hardly contains the word ‘not’ which may be taken to denote 
the NotP and NotQ cards that exist, which is what Evans called “pattern matching” 
behaviour.  Another possibility is that the interpretations that lead to the selections of the 
P and Q cards warrant much more consideration than those of the others because they are 
more readily adopted.  In this case the consequentialism exists in the process of going 
from the basic interpretation to the conclusion that causes card selections such that the 
simplest process is being selected.  Therefore, Evans seems to support the notion of the 
existence of a form of directionality although he does not clarify the sequence implied by 
his work.   
Evans and Newstead (1977) also explain that the reason why selections of P exceed 
those of Q in premises that are temporally related is due to a mapping of P and Q to 
events on a timeline.  In other words, choices of P increase when P event occurs ahead of 
Q event, but perhaps Q event could occur before P.  Unfortunately, the claim was only 
made of tasks that are temporally related to each other, so no effort was made to check if 
the same assumptions extend to the abstract task that only has temporal relations 
represented in the order of reading the rule or in the point of subject focus as it shifts 
from the antecedent to the consequent.   
One should consider for example what happens in deontic/”thematic” tasks.  If one 
runs a careful examination of the tasks, it should not be hard to identify that in many 
cases they lead subjects to a contradiction that highlights the NotQ condition either 
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explicitly or implicitly.  An example of this is the Cosmides (1989) question shown 
below: 
The rule given to subjects is: If a man has a tattoo on his face then he eats Cassava 
root. 
Subjects are given the following information (see section 2.5.3):  
“You are an anthropologist studying the Kaluame people, a 
Polynesian people who live in small, warring bands on Maku Island in 
the Pacific.  You are interested in how Kaluame “big men” – chieftans 
– wield power. 
“Big Kiku” is a Kaluame big man who is known for his ruthlessness.  
As a sign of loyalty, he makes his own “subjects” put a tattoo on their 
face.  Members of other Kaluame bands never have facial tattoos.  Big 
Kiku has made so many enemies in other Kaluame, that being caught in 
another village with a facial tattoo is, quite literally, the kiss of death. 
Four men from different bands stumble onto Big Kiku’s village, 
starving and desperate.  They have been kicked out of their respective 
villages for various misdeeds, and have come to Big Kiku because they 
need food badly.  Big Kiku offers each of them the following deal: 
“If you get a tattoo on your face, then I’ll give you cassava root.” 
Cassava root is a very sustaining food which Big Kiku’s people 
cultivate.  The four men are very hungry, so they agree to Big Kiku’s 
deal.  Big Kiku says that the tattoos must be in place tonight, but that 
the cassava root will not be available until the following morning. 
You learn that Big Kiku hates some of these men for betraying him to 
his enemies.  You suspect that he will cheat and betray some of them.  
Thus, this is a perfect opportunity for you to see first hand how Big 
Kiku wields his power.  The cards below have information about the 
fates of the four men.” 
Here we have what “ought to” happen given in the rule, as a deal has been offered and 
it “ought to” be followed.  However, Cosmides (1989) also explicitly informs subjects 
that there is a possibility and motive for Big Kiku to cheat.  “You learn that Big Kiku 
hates some of these men for betraying him to his enemies” provides a motive for the 
cheating while “You suspect that he will cheat and betray some of them” gives definite 
and explicit information that NotQ is highly likely. 
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This presented example, therefore shows a clear direction that a subject can follow to 
arrive at a Not Q conclusion.  Stenning and van Lambalgen (2001, 2004) have analysed a 
large number of Socratic Dialogues with subjects and isolated major possible 
interpretations that would lead most of the subject pool to arrive at their conclusions.  The 
repeated occurrence of the main types implies that it is possible that the set of possible 
task interpretations seems limited in nature.  They have not as yet run a study of what 
may cause subjects to make one interpretation versus another.  But they have run a 
contingency version where subjects were explicitly informed to judge each card as if it 
was the first they had considered while not assuming any prior information from other 
cards. 
Since explicitly telling subjects to avoid dependencies between card choices made a 
big difference in behaviour, the assumption that the cards under consideration are 
subjected to some sort of “reasoning order” is possible.  What they did in the this version 
of their experiment was in fact “guide” subjects to avoid the sequence of considering 
cards one at a time while recalling dependences and replacing it with another path of 
discourse directionality of assuming each card to be independent of what comes ahead of 
it, as when starting to consider an independent problem.  This implies that dependencies 
may cause interference amongst different possible paths. 
To sum up, several different types of directionalities have been defined as clearly as is 
possible given current research.  The first is logical directionality, which takes a subject 
from the assumptions to the conclusion with rules that may or may not follow those of 
classical logic.  The second is the directionality of knowledge acquisition, as we all learn, 
hear, see things in some type of order and this can be made more complex if the 
presented information includes anaphora as it offers different paths of applying the 
anaphora to the concepts at hand.  Last but not least is the directionality of discourse, 
which includes the direction followed by the cognitive reasoning a subject adopts as well 
as the presentation of information.  Here, we find that the level of ambiguity and possible 
emergent different directions rise well above the other two as the directionality of 
discourse combines them under its umbrella.  These differences may possibly cause 
interference to each of the others driving subjects to apply the restrictions of one part of 
the given information to the other as was explained in the case of anaphora.  However, 
the occurrence of such interference has not yet been fully investigated. 
One may think that all different possible types of directionality have been covered, 
until one is reminded that when asked if 8 is said before 4 while one counts then does it 
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mean that the direction goes from 8 to 4 or that it is normal to assume that 4 should 
appear before 8.   
4.2   Directionality of Thought 
The previous sections covered the different interpretations possible in this task and to 
this point; this one has covered different possible types of directionality, or sequences 
that may be followed during the reasoning process.  However, the sequences or types of 
directionality that have been discussed are all inherent to the task itself. 
Peter Wason (1987) emphasised the view that once subjects follow a path of reasoning 
that leads to a response other than P, Not Q, then they will never arrive at a point of 
complete insight even if subjected to Socratic Tutoring.  In other words, these subjects 
are purposely guided as they reason about the question towards the desired responses but 
they still do not make them. 
This process of Socratic Tutoring imposes onto subject reasoning an “order” of 
reasoning by asking them questions about particular cards that subjects may not consider 
if left to reason on their own.  A second approach that imposes order while reasoning 
about cards is to consider them one at a time in a sequence allowing co-dependencies to 
emerge.  A card therefore is evaluated in terms of all prior information including 
conjectures made about previously considered cards. 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) offered a third path during the contingency 
version of the abstract problem.  All they did was ask subjects to consider feedback from 
each card as independent of that of any other card in the group of four.  Results showed 
an increase in the competent logical response from 3.64% to 15.69% while P, Q choices 
are reduced from 50.91% to 29.41%.  This clear change in behaviour shows that subjects 
did indeed assume dependency information from one card to the next as they planned in a 
sequential format, which is in effect a sequential directed behaviour pattern to thought 
that may be influenced by imposing a temporal context. 
Consequently, this chapter attempts to investigate the effects of imposing a strict 
temporal sequence that ensures that the event referred to by the antecedent always occurs 
directly before the event referred to by the consequent.  In order to comprehend the origin 
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of the imposed sequence and justification for it, one must consider prior work on the 
analysis of timelines and events. 
4.3   Timelines and Events  
Evans and Newstead (1977) were the first to emphasise the high percentage of P 
selections in the selection task and the only explanation it received is that it comes ahead 
of Q in the rule.  However, no solid verification attempts have been made of this 
explanation nor has any light been shed on the importance of this feature, nor its ability to 
affect selections. 
It is almost impossible to study reasoning directly because the conceptual system is 
not open to direct external inspection.  However, since Popper (1963) described the 
method of Conjectures and Refutations as one of scientific discovery, and the competent 
logic response is based on his theory, explanations will be offered as conjectures that 
await refutations and stand until they appear. 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) hypothesise that through Socratic Tutoring 
sessions subjects resisted accepting that not-false is equivalent to true even if they were 
guided along that path, and this resistance displays the “logic of true” which leads them 
to selecting all cards.  They also indicate that when subjects exhibit strong falsity by 
saying that Not (If P then Q) is equivalent to If P then Not Q.  This may lead them to 
selecting the option of “either P or Q” which is not available amongst possible choices, 
so they end up choosing P,Q.  They also show that some subjects assume a constant 
anaphoric view of the rule which is “If A is on the face of the card, then 4 must be on the 
back of the card” and for this interpretation the best response is to select Just P and if the 
constant anaphor is in reverse it would be Just Q.  Current literature also indicates that 
Not Q choices are likely to be low unless there exists a falsifying instance or an 
exception to the rule that does not threaten the rule.9  
  It might be worthwhile to take a little pause to consider what it means to have P and 
Q on a timeline.  Here, rather than study this from a conceptual point of view, one may 
                                                 
9 If a falsifying instance implies that the rule does not hold as in the rule “if A then 7”, then this rule would 
qualify to be a descriptive rule.  A study of the effects of the deontic/descriptive division on the success rate 
of competent response answers has already been described in section 4.1.1. 
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look at the implications of having a timeline on any system of events, so the conclusions 
made are based on general knowledge of sequences in time.   
First of all, every living human knows that all events occur in time so every single 
event has a time tag specifying when it occurred.  When two events occur at the same 
time then they have a simultaneous time tag and this is true when the two events continue 
for some duration of time.  For example, ‘A’ appears on one side of the card and 
continues for some duration of time that is simultaneous with 4 being on the other side of 
the card.  However, if the two events occur in sequence, then A would appear on one side 
of the card, and then disappear followed by 4 appearing on the other side of the card.  A 
directional interpretation of this card could imply considering the A on one side, and then 
going on to consider the 4 on the other side. 
A timeline interpretation perfectly explains the low selection of Not Q because it is not 
an event on the timeline that is followed while reading the rule itself because the events 
explicitly mentioned are P and Q.  Additionally, the strong falsity interpretations require 
consideration of the work of Jennifer Freyd (1983a; 1983b; 1987; Babcock & Freyd, 
1988; Freyd et al., 1988; Freyd and Finke, 1984; Freyd, 1993).  Strong falsity is when 
subjects assume that the Not of the rule is equivalent to the Not of the consequent of the 
rule.  Freyd has shown a phenomenon where subjects are shown one or more still images 
of different objects at various positions during motion.   
Most of these studies showed that subjects “expect” the next position to appear and in 
fact believe it to be the last one they saw.  One of these studies conducted by Freyd and 
Finke (1984) was run by showing subjects three still positions of a rotating rectangle and 
found that a significant number of subjects chose the position that was one step ahead of 




Figure  4.3: A rotating rectangle. 
Freyd did not stop there and showed subjects a single image of a man in the air shortly 
after jumping off a wall, and then showed them two other images that were set temporally 
apart.  One of the two was the same as the one they saw and the other at a slightly 
different position after the passage of some time (Freyd, 1983b).  Results indicated that 
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subjects take longer to identify that the second image is ahead in time which clearly 
shows that our cognitive systems “expect” the next event to occur when we are exposed 
to a dynamic setting.  
Consequently, if we apply the same effect to how subjects consider a rule, then they 
are expected to consider the event referred to by the antecedent as occurring ahead of that 
referred to by the consequent.  They will “expect” the consequent to occur and assume 
the antecedent to be a given fact that is in the past, so in a sense, this expectation would 
move their “present” point to the midpoint in the rule, cause them to just apply the 
negation to the second part of the rule.  Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) indicate that 
some subjects exhibit strong falsity by saying that Not (If P then Q) is equivalent to If P 
then Not Q. 
In this chapter a strict uni-directional temporal sequence will be imposed onto the task 
in order to identify its effects on reasoning.  A new problem format is introduced where 
subjects are shown a conveyor belt setting that is displayed in figure 4.4 and three 
positions are shown for the objects mentioned in the rule instead of two.  The rule is “If 
the striped cube is either on the conveyor belt or in the loading box, then the grey 
cylinder must be either in the conveyor box or on the conveyor belt.”   
The first issue that requires consideration here is that there are three locations, the striped 
object can be either in the loading box where items are stored, or on the conveyor belt, 
while the grey object can be either on the conveyor belt or still in the conveyor box 
waiting to emerge.  Due to the disjunction in the rule, it is important to emphasise that 
each object is restricted to the above locations causing the linguistic anaphora in the 
Abstract task to alter its format.  Here we do not have the words “one side” that can 
correspond to either face or back, while relating it to the words “other side” which would 
be mapped onto a related side which is the one not occupied as yet.  The only location 
where both objects are allowed to exist is the visible part of the system.  Another way of 
looking at this is as partitioning the location set from “face” and “back” to “face”, “back” 
and “temp” as shown in figure 4.4.  Temp here is the third introduced location that is 
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Figure  4.4: A clarification of the anaphora in the Abstract format versus the timeline 
effect in the Conveyor format 
If A is on      ONE SIDE                    then   4 is on the    OTHER SIDE 
If the striped cube is,                         then the grey cylinder must be 
either on the conveyor 
belt or in the loading box 
either in the conveyor box 
or on the conveyor belt 
FACE BACK BACK FACE 
Conveyor Belt Loading Box Conveyor Box Conveyor Belt













The curved lines shown ensure that when the A occupies the one side slot that 
corresponds to the face, then 4 cannot possibly also occupy the face of the card.  These 
lines therefore extract the semantic relations that are carried by the anaphora in the “one 
side/other side” wording.  By contrast, the line ii shows that once a “temp” location is 
added, then the correspondences are reduced to one restriction instead of two.  
Additionally, one could described the “face” and “back” of the cards as “relative reserved 
positions” because once one is occupied by a letter or a number it is reserved and the 
other remains to describe the location of the number or letter on the other side.  By 
contrast, the conveyor task has an “absolute reserved position” because the loading box 
can only hold a striped object or remain empty, and the conveyor box can only hold a 
grey object or remain empty.  It is this specification of a position reserved for that 
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particular that is expected to result in a higher display of behaviour similar to that of 
constant anaphora. 
4.4   Experiments  
4.4.1    Replication  
In order to start off by standing on solid ground, one must start with an experiment that 
replicates not only the results of selecting P, NotQ but also of the distribution Wason 
(1968) obtained. 
4.4.1.1 Design Details 
The card task is similar to the classical card problem with A, 11, B and 7 on the cards.  
The main difference is the use of the word “must” which is similar to the card tasks tested 
by Cheng and Holyoak (1985) and seems to offer no difference in subject choices as the 
results of replications will show.   
4.4.1.2 Subjects 
44 volunteer students from the University of Bahrain who performed a paper and pen task 
were given this task ahead of another task.  Forty four students performed the Abstract 
task.  
4.4.1.3 Materials 
The abstract question is as follows: “Below are four cards with letters on one side and 
numbers on the other side.  Your task is to decide which of the cards you need to turn in 
order to find out whether or not the rule is being followed.  The rule is: If a card has an 
‘A’ on one side then it must have  a ‘7’ on the other side.”  Student are then informed to 
only turn the cards they need to check to be sure.  They are shown four cards with A, 11, 
B and 7.   
4.4.1.4 Results 
The results of this part of the test are shown in table 4.2 below in comparison with 
Wason’s results (1968). 
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Abstract pq q p pךq ךq ךpq pqךq qךpך pךpq qךq pך pךp pךpךq  q all none totךpqך
Wason 1968 10 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 16 
Replication 20 3 7 2 1 0 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 44 
Table  4.2: A comparison of results obtained by Wason and those obtained at the 
University of Bahrain 
It should be clear from the table that the distribution Wason originally obtained in 
1968 is quite replicable, as is evident by the lack of any visible trend or variation from the 
original Wason results even though these tests were conducted in a completely different 
country that has a different mother tongue, which is Arabic.  The test itself was 
conducted in English as are all those that follow and the subject base was primarily 
formed of students who are accustomed to learning almost all their University courses in 
the English language, but they are by no means as fluent as native speakers.  Yet this did 
not imply that their distribution amongst different possible choices was different from 
that obtained by Wason (1968).  In fact, taking each of the columns above in isolation 
through a Fisher Exact test shows no significance for any of the categories displayed 
above without exception. 
This is necessary as a starting point from which shifts from one preferred selection to 
another can be detected as a result of implementing a particular manipulation of the task. 
4.4.2    Static Conveyor Experiment 
Now that a solid foundation has been cast, one can go on to build on it new tasks that 
have different features than all those in prior work.  The aim will be to investigate the 
effects of modifying the anaphora imposed linguistically by “one side/other side” 
reducing the two constraints imposed into a single constraint.  Under this design the card 
side corresponds to the position occupied by the object and the symbol which is either a 
letter or a number corresponds to the object and its features which can either be striped or 
grey.  
4.4.2.1 Design Details 
The conveyor task is somewhat more complex than the abstract task due to the necessary 
inclusion of a temporal sequence as is dictated by the design targets.  This resulted in the 
design of a conveyor belt scenario that is static at the time of the subjects’ examination.  
The rule is more complex than the abstract because it includes the disjunctive connector 
‘or’.   
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“If     then      .” 
 
the striped cube is either 
on the conveyor belt or in 
the loading box 
the grey cylinder must be 
either in the conveyor box 





“If     then      .” 
 
a card has an A on one 
side 
 
it must have a  7 on the 
other side 
 
Figure  4.5: The correspondence between the two rules. 
 
Most students in the Abstract task select P,Q and this behaviour earned a possible 
explanation offered by Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2004) as described under the “logic 
of false”.  Subjects can exhibit strong falsity which would cause them to negate If P then 
Q by making it If P then NotQ.  This would cause them to search for either P or Q as a 
way of validating the resulting rule, and since this option is not available they may resort 
to selecting P,Q which is P and Q.  The “expectation” that can be predicted by Freyd’s 
work (1983b) is that far more selections of Q than those of P are also expected to reduce 
the effect of strong falsity or the “logic of false”.  In a conveyor system the bias is more 
towards accepting that the journey will go from P to Q so the probability of having NotQ 
is reduced.  If this happens subjects are less likely to arrive at this interpretation and 
consequently less likely to make a high percentage of P,Q selections. 
Last but not least, we should not overlook the infamous bi-conditional interpretation 
where subjects interpret the rule “If P then Q” as “If P then Q and If Q then P”.  Since we 
are placing P and Q along a timeline on a conveyor belt this would be interpreted as If P 
comes first then Q follows and If Q follows then P came first.  From the previous 
discussion about the directionality of thought, we notice that this statement contains a 
variety of tense orders that differs from the present-present so common in the task.  The 
difference in the tense of the verb may in fact be a cause to discourage subjects from 
making a bi-conditional reading of the rule. Unfortunately, this too would result in a 
lower P,Q selection percentage but this will have to be untangled from the possibility of 
implying strong falsity within the experiments of this chapter. 
This setting therefore tests the effect of strong falsity or a bi-conditional interpretation 
by suppressing them and predicting a lower selection of P,Q as a result of suppressing 
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them.  Simultaneously, it tests the effects of anaphora by partitioning possible locations 
and making one of them constant.  If the results show a bias towards constant anaphora 
interpretations then indeed this may be the culprit for Just P and Just Q selections.   
4.4.2.2 Subjects 
41 volunteer students from the University of Bahrain performed a paper and pen task and 
were randomly given any one of the experiment versions.  The number of students who 
performed the Abstract first format were 21, while 20 performed the Conveyor first 
format. 
4.4.2.3 Materials 
The materials were composed of two questions given in alternative order to each of the 
groups.  The abstract question is as follows: “Below are four cards with letters on one 
side and numbers on the other side.  Your task is to decide which of the cards you need to 
turn in order to find out whether or not the rule is being followed.  The rule is: If a card 
has an ‘A’ on one side then it must have  a ‘7’ on the other side.”  Students are then 
informed to only turn the cards they need to check to be sure.  They are shown four cards 
with A, 11, B and 7.  This is the exact same question as the one presented above in the 
replication task.  The second question is as follows: “Following are four figures that show 
four conveyor belt systems.  Each transports two objects one at a time.  A striped object 
first exits from within the conveyor box, appears on the belt and then falls into the 
loading box to be stored.  The striped object is followed by a grey object that is either on 
the conveyor belt or still waiting in the conveyor box.   
You are asked to check the following rule by selecting any of the following cases that 
need inspection.  Inspection involves opening the appropriate box and verifying that it 
contains the appropriate object.   
The rule is: If the striped cube is either on the conveyor belt or in the loading box, then 
the grey cylinder must either be in the conveyor box or on the conveyor belt.”   Then they 
are shown four figures as in Figure 4.6 with the four possible cases each with a checkbox 
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Option A. Look inside the conveyor box. 
Option B. Look inside the loading box. 
Option C. Look inside the conveyor box. 





Figure  4.6: Materials for the Static Conveyor Question contrasted 
against the corresponding cards in the abstract task 
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4.4.2.4 Results   
 
It is informative to take a look at the card selections to get an idea of the main 
differences between the two tasks.  Additional information is provided in the tables below 
that show specific card selections when each task is before or after the other task. 
Abstract pq q p pךq ךq ךpq pqךq qךpך pךpq qךq pךp pך pךpךq  q all none totךpqך
Abstract first 10 1 2 2 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 21 
Conveyor first 13 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 
Table  4.3:  Abstract results before and after the static conveyor 
Conveyor pq q p pךq ךq ךpq pqךq qךpך pךpq qךq pך pךp pךpךq  q all none totךpqך
Abstract first 2 4 7 2 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 21 
Conveyor first 5 7 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 20 
Table  4.4:  Static conveyor results before and after the abstract question 
The main differences in subject behaviour seems localised in Table 4.4 to the selections 
of P, Q, Just P and Just Q as per design predictions. However, a Fisher Exact test run on a 
per category basis shows that only P selections approach significance with a probability 
less than 0.076. 
4.4.2.5 Discussion 
There does not seem to exist any effect here due to order and due to the small number 
of subjects who performed the dual task; this phenomenon is purely localised as when the 
same task was run on more subjects as was done by Wason (1966, 1968), replication was 
achieved as was shown in the previous section.   
However, the crucial difference between the two tasks is that the conveyor task has an 
absolute reserved position while the card task has a relative reserved position and the 
latter dictated by the anaphora.  The case of the single restriction implies that conveyor 
belt position is occupied only by one of the two objects.  If a striped cube is on the 
conveyor belt, and the grey cylinder is in the conveyor box, then the rule is not falsified.  
Additionally, if the grey cylinder is on the conveyor belt, and the striped cube in the 
loading box then the rule is not falsified.  So these two conditions correspond to the P,Q 
selection that is so common in the card task.  However, what occurs here is that subjects 
tend to select less P,Q and more of Just Q conditions while keeping the high selections of 
Just P. 
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Conveyor pq q p pךq ךq ךpq pqךq qךpך pךpq qךq pך pךp pךpךq  q all none totךpqך
Wason 1968 10 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 16 
Static Conveyor 5 7 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 20 
Table  4.5:  Conveyor results contrasted with Wason’s results. 
The first three columns yet again bid attention because they show a difference in PQ, 
JustQ but not in JustP selections.  If we run a Fisher Exact test on a per column basis we 
find that the probability of PQ selections occurring as such is less than 0.02, while that of 
Q is less than 0.009.  The largest difference of course is the JustQ selection which is 0 in 
Wason’s (1968) data and 7 which is 35% and in fact larger than both P selections and PQ 
selections.   
A comparison of the data obtained here between the Abstract and the Conveyor tasks 







pq q p p]q ]q ]pq pq]q ]p]q p]pq q]q ]p p]p p]p]q ]pq]q all none
Abstract conveyor Static
Figure  4.7: Conveyor questions compared to Abstract Question selections (percentages) 
 
The difference in tense when a subject tries to verify the rule in both directions may be 
one of the causes of a low subject selection of P, Q because it discourages bi-conditional 
interpretations of the rule.  Another characteristic of this format is that it seems to 
discourage the “strong falsity” assumption where subjects would negate a rule by 
negating only the consequent.  The conveyor question is expected to imply an 
“expectation” of the consequent thereby shifting attention more towards the consequent.  
It is not expected that this type of interpretation should be suppressed as the shift of focus 
should encourage more of it.  The lower P,Q selections therefore, seem to indicate that 
more than one cause contributes to its popularity amongst student choices, and the 
suppression of one of the possible causes does not remove its candidacy as a possible 
choice. 
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In order to also evaluate how the analogy between the constant anaphoric reading in 
the abstract task and the Just P and Just Q selections in the conveyor task works, one may 
look at the correspondence. 
Just P selections: 
If the card has an A on its face, then it must have a 7 on the back. 
If the striped cube is on the conveyor belt, then the grey cylinder must be in the 
conveyor box. 
 Just Q selections: 
If the card has a 7 on its face, then it must have an A on the back. 
If the grey cylinder is on the conveyor belt, then the striped cube must be in the 
loading box. 
Notice that the position corresponding to the “face” position can hold the two possible 
options, while the one corresponding to “back” is well distinguished in the first as 
compared to the second possibilities.  In a sense, the distinguishing factor between the 
two options is what is on the conveyor belt which happens to be always visible.  
Consequently, the only position that may contain one of the two objects is visible and 
constant, while the others are reserved for whatever is not accommodated onto the visible 
position.  If the visibility of a position that may hold either of two objects is constant, in 
the four options shown, then it may induce an interpretation of the Just P or Just Q 
selections shown above, because it will be the focus of subject attention, and other 
choices revolve around it. 
Additionally, if we add to this the likelihood of “expecting” the next event to occur in 
a conveyor setting, then subjects are expected to make more Just Q selections than they 
would make Just P selections as is the case here.   
Notice that the Conveyor question is more susceptible to sequence effects than the 
Abstract question because while the Abstract did not allow the Conveyor question to 
make any serious alterations in behaviour, the Conveyor question did exhibit an almost 
significant difference when the Abstract question comes first. So what makes this 
question form “weaker” (if one may use this word) when it comes to sequence effects?  
The main difference between the two tasks is that the two objects arrive at the central belt 
at different locations in time.  A possible answer to this is that the Conveyor question is 
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displayed graphically so perhaps that graphical depiction of an object on a system 
capable of moving may in fact prompt subjects to expect a change or alteration to occur.  
If this change is expected along the direction of reasoning, then it may cause a readiness 
to alter selections that does not exist when the setting does not imply any motion as in the 
case of the Abstract task.  This is similar when reasoning arrives at a conclusion that is 
considered satisfactory versus when reasoning is still in progress and sensitive to external 
effects.  Possibly implying motion makes the reasoning process more sensitive towards 
effects because it is under the illusion of change. 
However, one cannot be satisfied with these results without further tests for the 
“dynamic” nature of the conveyor question and the disjunction that was necessary for this 
task. 
4.4.3  Implied Dynamics Conveyor Experiment 
The experiment displayed above differs from this one in two main ways: this one 
explicitly informs subjects that the conveyor is in motion while the other implies it is 
static and that this one has no disjunction to restrict locations. 
4.4.3.1 Design Details 
This experiment is an accurate copy of the card task given in the first experiment.  The 
difference here is that motion will be implied verbally both through the rule as well the 
option labels on the four selections.  If we compare this rule with the prior version, the 




“If     then                                              .” 
 
the striped cube is either 
on the conveyor belt or 
in the loading box 
the grey cylinder must be 
either in the conveyor box 





“If     then                    .” 
 
the striped cube is in the 
conveyor belt system  
 
the grey cylinder must be the grey 
object directly following it as the 
conveyor belt moves. 
Figure  4.8: The correspondence between the two rules 
 
There are several main differences between this format and the one used in the prior 
experiment.  The first and clearest is that the disjunction disappears, while still implying 
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the same “absolute reserved position criteria” found in the previous section.  Another 
issue is the change that occurs to the consequent as it is linked to the antecedent through 
an extra description that shows a “direct follow” relationship between the two objects.  
Additionally, the choices that are offered include two choices that include the words: 
“wait for the next object to appear” and two choices that are similar to the previous task 
that state: “look into the loading box”.   
If the cause of the selections of Just P and Just Q made in the static conveyor is 
imposed due to the “reserved absolute position” that is also clearly shown here, because 
of the dynamic scenario they should still be as high as the ones made in the case of the 
static conveyor.  Relating the second object to the first through an added constraint 
should increase subject focus on the consequent, especially since the constraint shows a 
sequencing that it is natural to “expect” given a dynamic conveyor scenario.  By contrast, 
more subject doubt should result because the possible locations for each object are not 
explicit in the rule. 
4.4.3.2 Subjects 
45 volunteer students from the University of Bahrain performed a paper and pen task and 
were randomly given any one of the experiment versions.  The number of students who 
performed the Abstract first format was 23, while 22 performed the Conveyor first 
format. 
4.4.3.3 Materials 
The materials for this task are composed of two questions given in alternative order to 
each of the groups.  The abstract question is the same as the one given in section 4.3.2.3.  
The second question followed the design described in the previous section and has the 
exact wording of the question given in 4.3.2.3 with the exception of the rule, that is as 
follows: 
The rule is: If the striped cube is in the conveyor belt system, then the grey cylinder 
must be the grey object directly following it as the conveyor belt moves.   
 
They are then given the same diagrams of the conveyor system but the sentence to 
check the storage box in two of the cases is replaced with: “Wait for the next object to 
appear.” 
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Option C. Wait for the next object to appear. 
















Figure  4.9: Materials for the Dynamic Conveyor Question 
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4.4.3.4 Results 
Results are shown in tables 4.6 and 4.7. 
Abstract pq q p pךq ךq ךpq pqךq qךpך pךpq qךq pךp pך pךpךq  q all none totךpqך
Abstract first 10 2 5 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 23 
conveyor first 10 0 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 22 
Table  4.6:  Abstract results before and after the static conveyor 
Conveyor pq q p pךq ךq ךpq pqךq qךpך pךpq qךq pך pךp pךpךq  q all none totךpqך
Abstract first 1 8 5 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 23 
conveyor first 3 5 4 2 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 1 0 22 
Table  4.7:  Conveyor Question selections in both conditions 
 
The Implied Dynamic Conveyor results shown here mimic those of the Static 
Conveyor in their distribution between Just P and Just Q choices with a low selection rate 
of PQ in spite of the fact that this rule has no disjunction.  But for added clarity we can 
compare the results directly between the static conveyor first, implied dynamic conveyor 
first and Wason (1968) results in Table 4.8. 
Conveyor pq q p pךq ךq ךpq pqךq qךpך pךpq qךq pךp pך pךpךq  q all none totךpqך
Static Conveyor 5 7 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 20 
Implied Dynamic 
Conveyor 3 5 4 2 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 1 0 22 
Wason (1968) 10 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 16 
Table  4.8:  Conveyor Question selections of both questions compared to Wason’s results 
(1968) 
 
A Fisher Exact test shows no significant differences between the two conveyor formats 
except in the Q, Not Q selections.  While it shows significance in the PQ and Q, and 
Q,Not Q selections from Wason (1968) with a probability of 0.053, 0.052 and 0.052.  
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4.4.3.5 Discussion 
This task shows no serious differences in results from the one presented in the 
previous section as predicted even though it does not have a disjunction and relies on the 
imposed explicit sequence in clarifying the possible positions of objects.  The main 
difference, therefore is the added description that is attached to the consequent of the rule 
which is expected to shift subject focus onto the consequent of the rule. 
Therefore, it is not at all surprising that more subjects select Q, Not Q selections in 
this format than in the previous one.  In a sense, they are selecting all possible choices, 
after “expecting” the conveyor to have moved to the consequent time.  This behaviour is 
similar to those who adopt the “logic of true” for the abstract card task, except here the 
scenario shifts their focus towards the consequent so the only two options that require 
testing are Q and Not Q. 
In spite of the clear results shown so far, one cannot help wondering about the true 
effects of the disjunction in the static format of the conveyor experiment. 
4.4.4  Ambiguities and the issue of “or” 
It may be clear that logical interpretations are fortified or weakened by experimental 
formats of the conveyor task.  This does not imply, however, that a shadow does not 
linger on making one wonder about the effects of removing the disjunctive “or” from the 
static conveyor setting. 
4.4.4.1 Design Details 
It would be nice if one could add a level of ambiguity to the static conveyor such that the 
effects captured in section 4.3.2 are reversed and those categories returned to Wason’s 
(1968) range of values.  Only through this form of reversal can one make solid 
conclusions of the effects captured in the static conveyor experiment. 
Since the effects were elicited through specifying “absolute reserved positions” versus 
the “relative reserved positions” as implied by the variable anaphora that exist in the 
abstract form of the task, doubt must be cast on these positions.  The best way to cast 
doubt is to remove the disjunction that clearly specifies the possibilities; after all, the 
variable anaphora imposes two constraints rather than the one imposed in this problem 
and leaves two positions ambiguous.  When the disjunction is removed, subjects may 
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consider it possible here for each of the two objects to occupy any of the three locations 
available. 
4.4.4.2 Subjects 
31 volunteer students from the University of Bahrain performed a paper and pen task. 
4.4.4.3 Materials 
The materials were composed of the conveyor question given in the following format: 
“Following are four figures that show four conveyor belt systems.  Each transports two 
objects, one at a time.  A striped object first exits from within the conveyor box, appears 
on the belt and then falls into the loading box to be stored.  The striped object is followed 
by a grey object that is either on the conveyor belt or still waiting in the conveyor box.   
You are asked to check the following rule by selecting any of the following cases that 
need inspection.  Inspection involves opening the appropriate box and verifying that it 
contains the appropriate object.   
The rule is: If the striped cube is in the conveyor belt system, then the grey cylinder 
must be the grey object also in the system.  Then they are shown four figures with the 
four possible cases each with a checkbox ahead of it and a sentence such as: “Look inside 
the loading box.” 
Students were then shown what is depicted in Figure 4.6.  The corresponding card task 
selections are shown next to each conveyor. 
 
4.4.4.4 Results 
A clearer analysis of subject selections is shown in Table 4.10. 
Conveyor pq q p pךq ךq ךpq pqךq qךpך pךpq qךq pך pךp pךpךq  q all none totךpqך
Wason 1968 10 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 16 
Static Conveyor 5 7 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 20 
Without “or” 11 4 1 0 1 0 0 1 7 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 31 
Table  4.9: Wason’s (1968) results and both Conveyor Questions 
First of all a comparison between the two static conveyor questions reveals that they 
do not differ from each other significantly when using the Fisher Exact test on a per 
category basis except with choices of P, Not P, Q and it appears that these are more likely 
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when the level of ambiguity is high enough to introduce the possibility of brittleness and 
exceptions to the rule.  This is expected because the lack of the disjunction makes it 
possible for subjects to erroneously assume that the striped object could be in either of 
the three locations and the same for the grey object, thereby losing the restriction 
explicitly imposed on the static version of the task. 
Additionally, there are no significant differences between this version of the task and 
Wason’s (1968) using a Fisher Exact test in any of the categories shown except with 
respect to choices of P, NotP, Q.  
For the sake of thoroughness we look at card choices.  
 P Not P Q Not Q 
Static Conveyor Question 11(55%) 3(15%) 13(65%) 3(15%) 
Static Question without OR 23(74%) 14(45%) 26(84%) 6(19.3%) 
Table  4.10:  Abstract Question selections in both conditions 
 
The overall distribution shown in table 4.11 shows some variations in subject 
behaviour between the task version that contains the disjunction versus the one that does 
not contain the disjunction.  A Fisher’s Exact test to measure the probability of selecting 
Not P shows a significance of 0.019 in difference between the two tasks. As predicted the 
percentage of selecting Not P is significantly higher when the disjunction is not part of 
the rule. 
4.4.4.5 Discussion 
Sure enough, once the “absolute reserved position” is not clearly reserved for the 
appropriate object, and the striped object could appear in any of the three locations and 
the same goes for the grey object, performance in the first three categories goes back to 
conform with the abstract form. 
The other difference which is a high selection of P, NotP, Q reflects that this rule 
differs from the abstract in the number of possible locations, namely three instead of two.  
This may increase subjects’ perception of the brittleness of the rule which is the cause 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) suggested for such a choice. 
The lack of clarity of the positions is further exhibited by the high selection rate of the 
Not P card at 45% when compared to the static conveyor task 15%, or the implied 
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dynamic conveyor task at 4.54%.  This shows a clear association between the probability 
of selecting this card and the level of the ambiguity exhibited by the task. 
4.5   Discussion 
There are two main issues that require attention in the experiments presented in this 
chapter that stem from the results obtained.  The first is a comparison between the two 
tasks and the second is an interpretation of the findings.   
A comparison between the two tasks yields a number of differences that may or may 
not have direct implications on subject card choices.  One of these is the use of the 
indefinite article “a” in the abstract/descriptive task while using the definite article “the” 
in the conveyor setting.  Manktelow and Evans (1979) tested the rule “If the letter is N, 
then the number is 3” and if their results are compared to Wason’s (1968) distribution no 
significant difference results in subject distributions using a Fisher Exact test on a column 
by column basis.  Evidently, on its own this difference does not play a major role in 
influencing results, however, from a semantic point of view the word “the” limits the 
world of possibilities to “the cube described in the rule” rather than any other.  By 
contrast “an A” only describes an instance of the letter A without specifying which 
particular instance that is, so any A on that card would do even if it is different from the 
one specified in the rule. 
The use of the definite article, therefore, may possibly be interpreted by subjects to 
imply the visible striped cube.  This, in a sense, is comparable to the rule “If you turn the 
A, then you will find a 4”.  If this rule is given to subjects along with the cards A, K, 4, 7 
then it may be interpreted to imply that turning the card with “A” on the face is sufficient 
to check the rule.  In this case, subjects would interpret the words “the A” as describing 
“the visible A” on the face of the card. 
However, one should recall that the context of the conveyor setting describes a 
relationship between a striped object and a grey object using indefinite articles.  
Consequently, when the definite article is used in the rule, the aim is to reinforce that this 
striped cube is a member of the set restricted by that relationship and sure enough P 
selections in the conveyor task are no higher than those made in the abstract/descriptive 
task. 
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Another issue of comparison is that in the static conveyor question the possible 
positions of the objects are explicitly stated while in others implicitly restricted.  The 
loading box, for example, can only hold either the striped cube or remain empty which 
qualifies it to be described as an “absolute reserved position”.  Another perspective on 
the same setting or comparison can be considered from a semantic point of view. 
In the abstract task, the reference of “one side” affects the reference of “other side”, 
which qualifies the restriction to be anaphoric.  The “one side” quantifier has a domain 
set that may include either the set (A, K) or the complement sets (7, 11).  This in turn 
affects what the quantifier “other side” refers to, such that it would represent the set other 
than the one referred to by “one side”. 
By contrast, the conveyor question has different referential features.  A strongly 
imposed restriction is the one represented in the sequence of having one object precede 
the other temporally in a conveyor setting.  Consequently, it imposes a unidirectional 
relationship such that the relationship is always striped followed by grey.  Semantic 
sequence is represented in constructs that assume presuppositions, as in the following 
example: 
We suppose that Max has children  
“If Max has childen, Max’s children are American.” (Fauconnier, 1994).   
 
 “Max’s children” in this context is an explicit presupposition and S has to be 
established in the domain M before P is established in it.  The conveyor task describes 
four conveyor systems, where a striped object is always followed by a grey object.  
Another way of looking at this is that if there is a grey object, then there is no doubt that 
it was preceded by a striped object, as we only doubt what the striped object was.  In 
other words, the existence of a grey object on the belt carries a “presupposition” that a 
striped object already passed. 
The consequent, “Max’s children are American” presupposes that Max has children, 
whether the precedent is read or not.  If we apply the same reading to the conveyor 
question, we find that “the visible grey pyramid” will presuppose that a striped object 
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To sum up, the experiments presented in this chapter attempted to replace the 
anaphoric “one side/other side” where the referential link of one restricts the referential 
link of the second, with a unidirectional restriction, where one object always precedes the 
other.  So the comparison is between two referential links that each affect the other in a 
specific way, to a unidirectional link where one reference is always ahead of the other.  If 
subject behaviour is affected by that anaphoric link, then results should reflect the 
difference in the semantic implications of the conveyor task.  Sure enough, results show a 
high selection of Just Q which is predicted through “presupposing” that the P object has 
already passed through the conveyor if Q is encountered. 
This chapter, therefore, studied the semantic restrictions imposed within the anaphora 
in the abstract/descriptive question through altering it and comparing results to what is 
predicted through semantics.  The task links values obtained from a set of letters (A, K) 
to a set of numbers (7,11) and now that the relation established between them has been 
explored, it would be wise to consider the effects of placing the set partition between the 
antecedent and consequent.  If two colours are added, then two emerging groups of those 
that are white and those that are black, result.  Partitioning, then becomes possible for the 
two above sets in various ways in order to identify the effects of the number of sets as 
well as partitioning on subject behaviour.  This will be done in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 
Contrasting Sets, Complement Sets and 
Logical Negations 
The study of a problem as large and complex as this, can only be achieved through 
partitioning and sub-partitioning of the problem’s components.  The existing difference 
that has been discussed in Chapter 3 is solely between deontic materials that have 
achieved high percentages of the competent response and descriptive materials that result 
in low percentages of competent response choices.  Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) 
recently offered insight on some of the interpretations subjects may be assuming when 
making these choices.  Chapter 4 studies the relationship imposed by the pronouns of 
anaphora “one side/other side” onto what they reference from the set of letters and 
complement set of numbers.  This is done through an alternative quantifier/referential 
relationship imposing a time sequence where the member of the set is always assigned 
directly ahead of the member of the complement set.  This chapter by contrast, leaves the 
quantifier/reference restrictions constant while studying the relationship between the set 
of letters and its complement set of numbers. 
In the abstract task, one is told that the letter set once referenced by the quantifier “one 
side” would lead the anaphor “other side” to reference the number set.  This is the logical 
negative of supposing a member of the set of letters references the other member of the 
same set which is composed here of only two members.  For example, if S is a 
proposition that there is an A is on one side then the expected Not S is that there is a K on 
one side.   
However, to date, no study has investigated whether subjects’ interpretations of this 
logical negative is as is predicted by researchers.  These interpretations may in turn be 
affected by how subjects react to different foreground/ background rule combinations 
through the use of colour.  Colour can be used to emphasise various distinctions without 
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altering propositional content.  It is argued that contribution to meaning occurs through 
several pragmatic factors including implicature, presupposition and as is the case here 
“Information Packaging”.  This is described as a structuring of sentences by syntactic, 
prosodic or morphological means that arises from the need to meet communicative 
demands of a particular context or discourse.  In particular, information packaging 
indicates how information conveyed by linguistic means fits into the (hearer’s mental 
model of the) context or discourse.  (Vallduvi and Engdahl, 1996)  
Here the addition is implemented by partitioning the set of letters and the set of 
numbers into what is white and what is black.  Various combinations can then be 
constructed so that both the letter and number are of the same colour versus having the 
set and complement set division emphasised through colour.  This has the effect of 
increasing the number of possibilities from 4 to 8 but this is not a central concern as will 
be shown in the discussion section of this chapter. 
The added dimension of variation alters the way letters and numbers are grouped by 
students who respond to the question through making their colour feature dictate which 
group they belong to rather than relying on the differences that exist between letters and 
numbers.  Consequently, the semantic attributes here are emphasised and utilized to 
group the set members while these attributes exist for members of both sets of letters and 
numbers. 
Additional tests are then attempted in order to identify if colour is capable of replacing 
the other set of numbers in a way that would not influence subject behaviour.  The aim 
here is to alter the relationship between what is referred to by the antecedent from what is 
referred to by the consequent. 
One point worth noting at this stage is that the common sets investigated by Wason 
(1968) in this task are primarily letters versus numbers, vowels versus consonants and 
even versus odd.  These sets have a unique hierarchical structure, which is not the case 
when the colours black and white are added.  Colour is a feature that both letters and 
numbers can have and therefore allows multiple hierarchies.  For example, odd letters 
and even numbers can be both white, placing both into the set of white values.  Another 
example is when letters can appear in both white and black and numbers can appear in 
both white and black while another example is when both letters appear in white while 
both numbers appear in black.  The latter colour distribution reinforces the distinction 
between a letter and a number. 
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To sum up, this chapter will explore the effects of emphasising various contrasts 
between the various sets such as the letter set and number set through partitioning them 
through the colours white and black, i.e. information packaging.  As a control, it will 
explore cases where colour is part of the truth conditional semantics. Last but not least, 
the chapter will study subjects’ interpretations of the logical negation of the antecedent 
and the consequent.   
5.1   Colour Partitioning and Information Packaging 
The abstract form of the task will be examined through various means; the first is to 
investigate the assumption made earlier in this work that subjects do indeed impose 
different logical interpretations onto the task as is illustrated by Stenning and van 
Lambalgen (2004).  Fillenbaum (1978) observed that in 30% of conditionals similar to 
the selection task rule, subjects would give “If P then Not Q” as the negative of the rule 
“If P then Q”.  Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) showed that this would lead subjects 
to select “either P or Q” as the optimal answer to the selection task question.  Since this 
is not a possible answer, they may resort to selecting the P, Q cards.   
The work presented here will further investigate this by asking subjects to report what 
they regard as the negation of the antecedent and the consequent in isolation, with the 
goal of eliciting different responses from different subjects and investigating whether 
interpretations correspond in any way to conclusions drawn. 
However, studying how subjects view negatives is hardly sufficient to exhaust the 
semantic relationships between the antecedent and consequent reference, versus the 
semantic relationships between the antecedent and its complement for example.  In order 
to study contrasts between them, it must be possible to alter the groups that the letters and 
numbers belong to such as to ensure they are distinct from each other.  Since there are 
two sets, one of letters and the other of numbers, that are represented in a very specific 
fashion, it is difficult to group a member of the number set with a member of a number 
set without altering their information describing them.  One way around this problem is 
by adding a distinguishing feature that would redefine these as members of two distinct 
groups.  The main characteristic required of such a feature is that it can describe the 
letters and numbers shown on the cards, while carrying a trait of contrast to test these 
relationships within the task. 
 
Chapter 5 -  Contrasts, Complements and Negation    108
The contrast between white and black offers itself as a tool that can be used to 
partition the abstract task materials.  For example, the letter set used in this thesis is 
composed of the letters A and K.  Here they can either both be white, both black or one 
white and the other black as per the requirements of the test.  In a similar fashion, both 
the antecedent and consequent can refer to things that are white while their logical 
negatives are left as black, or the antecedent’s referent can be white while the 
consequent’s is black.  Due to the large number of emerging possibilities only some tests 
were run as part of this thesis while leaving other possible combinations that the reader 
can easily formulate for future work. 
5.1.1   Different Interpretations of Logical Negatives 
As has been previously mentioned, the experiments here contain an additional 
component that probes what subjects regard as the negation of the antecedent and 
consequent.  Each task has a page that follows the main page, containing a question that 
is only attempted after solving the selection task question.  Students were asked to 
complete the task in pen such that any alteration to the first page which contains the 
abstract task would be detected and the results would be disregarded.  They are asked to 
fill in the values of “the negation” of each of the antecedent and consequent.  For 
example, if the rule is of the form If P then Q, then the question would ask subjects; If S 
= “A is on one side” Not S = ______ and expect them to write what value they associated 
with their interpretation of the “logical not” of the premise.  This gives us some evidence 
about how subjects interpret negations in this task.  Of course, it also introduces issues 
about how they interpret this new task, to which we will return. 
Perhaps at this point in time a question may arise as to the rationale behind such a test.  
It has been to date taken for granted that the negative of the case when the antecedent 
referring to the value A appearing in one side, is when a case arises that K is to appear.  
Here, the K is the member of the letter set that does not appear in the rule and is obtained 
through isolating the antecedent clause from the conditional structure and regarding the 
negation independently.  However, given current research in the field including the work 
of Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) things are not always the way they seem.  
Subjects were shown to impose various interpretations onto the selection task that affects 
their reasoning.  If this is the case when reasoning about the task, then it may also be the 
case that in what may be a simple negation task, subjects impose preconceptions that may 
influence the conclusions they arrive at.  Some of the logical preconceptions include the 
assumption that the negation task is not independent of the rule causing subjects to relate 
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the two.  Since this possibility has not been considered to date it seemed worthwhile 
investigating it during this work, as it may illuminate possible causes behind the 
ambiguity in the task. 
5.1.2   Designing the Exploration Path of the Descriptive Task 
In designing the following experiments, one should be able to select some of the different 
partitions from the large number of possibilities marked by colour according to some 
criteria.  First of all, there must be one condition used to replicate, and some to test the 
descriptive letter/number task.   
Starting from Wason’s (1968) original task as a baseline, colour can be added in two 
ways: either by making two of AK47 letters and numbers always black and the other two 
always white, or to use just two letters A and B which can be black or white without any 
numbers.  The first way is through partitioning the sets and complement sets while the 
second is through reducing the number of sets by replacing the set of numbers with that 
of colours.  One may note a difference between the two in that the first approach, while it 
displays the four cards to subjects, is unable to exhibit the full range of possibilities to 
them on just four cards, while the second displays the full range of possibilities as is the 
case on the original task.  The basic difference is whether subjects make a restrictive or 
attributive reading of the clauses.  For example, if a clause is of the form “This is an A 
which is white” then the clause “which is white” may restrict the number of As that are 
described in the clause to those that are white while there also exist in the same world, 
many As that are not white.  On the other hand, the same clause may also be read that the 
colour white is an attribute or trait that is used to describe the letter A.  The assumed 
reading here is the second and results of the negation task will support this assumption by 
showing that an insignificant number of subjects exhibit this restrictive reading. 
  Other issues that come up during the comparison will be discussed in the appropriate 
section below. 
5.1.2.1 Replication 
The first condition of course is a baseline task that aims at replicating Wason’s (1968) 
original results. 
Condition 1: If there is an A on one side of the card, then there is a 7 on the other side of 
the card. 
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Background rule:  On each card, there is a number on one of its sides and a letter on the 
other.   
An association between the interpretations of logical negatives with subject card 
choices may emerge even if data are too sparse to show this in all cases.  In the 
replication task, a comparison of the frequencies of choices in each category is compared 
in order to identify if subject distribution is replicable and consequently stable.  If this is 
the case, then one can go on to test other conditions on the same population in order to 
identify conditions that affect various choices.  Wason assumes a classical interpretation 
of negation, so this chapter will look at other logical interpretations that subjects may 
impose onto the task in order to perform this operation. 
5.1.2.2 Colour Partitioning of the AK47 Rule 
In addition to replication, three conditions of the AK47 rule, with different assignments 
of colour were constructed.  In condition 2, colours impose a division between the true 
values of the clauses of the rule and other values by making both A and 7 which appear in 
the rule white and leaving other possible choices as black.  This keeps the problem the 
same with respect to the truth conditions when compared to the original Wason (1968) 
version.  The difference it has with the baseline is that it imposes a form of information 
packaging onto the data such that one type of letter and one type of number is grouped by 
a colour feature while the other type of each is part of another group in the background 
rule.  The baseline condition has only the letters as a set while the numbers form a 
complement set. 
Condition 3 uses colour to partition the antecedent content versus consequent content 
such that letters are always black and numbers always white.  In this sense colour also 
marks the “face” or “back” of the card.     
We can then compare condition 2 to condition 3 above to find that they are different 
such that in condition 2 colour partitions each of the set and complement sets into what is 
white and what is black, while in condition 3 the colour partitioning is between the set 
and complement set.  Additionally, in condition 2 colour aligns with truth values of the 
conditional while condition 3 has the antecedent refer to a value of one colour while the 
consequent refers to a value of another colour.  Condition 3 also has another feature 
which is that colour marks the “face” or “back” of the card in addition to it being a letter 
or number.   
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Condition 4 can then be compared to conditions 2 and 3.  First of all, it is similar to 
condition 2 in that the background rule partitions each of the letter and number sets such 
that part of each is white while the other part is black.  They are different in that 
condition 2 has the colours aligned with the truth values of the conditional A and 7 while 
condition 4 is misaligned with them.   
Condition 4 is similar to condition 3 in that in both cases the foreground rule has both 
colours.  It differs from it in that the order of the colours is different.  Another difference 
is that in condition 4 the two sets are partitioned into what is black and what is white 
while in condition 3 the distinction is between set and complement set.  Additionally, in 
condition 3 colour marks what can be on the “face” of the card versus what can be on the 
“back”, in addition to whether they are from the set of letters or from the set of numbers.   
As mentioned above, the cards exhibited for conditions 2, 3 and 4 are only 4 out of 8 
possible cards.  Table 5.1 shows the main details of the described conditions. 
Condition  Foreground Rule Cards 
Background 
Rule Colour Distinction 
C. 2 White A→ White 7 





Truth/falsity (this implies that 
both set and complement set are 
partitioned through colour) 
C. 3 Black A→ White 7 
black A, white 7, black K, white 
4 
white 




implies that the set is distinct in 
colour from the complement 
set) 
C. 4 White A→ Black 7 





Colour marks neither truth/ 
falsity nor antecedent/ 
consequent (this implies that 
both set and complement set are 
partitioned through colour) 
Table  5.1: The essential details of the three variations of the task where the type of 
symbol (letter/numbers) is replaced by colour 
The complete background rules for the conditions are as follows: 
C. 2:  On each card, there is a number on one of its sides and a letter 
on the other.  Notice that odd numbers and vowels are white, while even 
numbers and consonants are black. 
C. 3:  On each card, there is a number on one of its sides and a letter 
on the other.  Notice that numbers are white, while letters are black. 
C. 4:  On each card, there is a number on one of its sides and a letter 
on the other.  Notice that even numbers and vowels are white, while odd 
numbers and consonants are black. 
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The reader should notice that the conditions described above all impose an 
“information packaging” grouping to the rules such that it does not alter what causes the 
rules to be true or false.  However, this procedure emphasises various distinctions that 
may or may not be imposed by subjects.  Condition 2 tests if subjects impose a 
distinction on the cases that fit the rule versus those that do not fit the rule, so if the 
distinction is already present, results would show no significant differences in behaviour.  
Condition 3 emphasises the distinction between the values that lie on both sides of the 
cards, which will show the effects of distinguishing the referents of the antecedent and 
consequent through colour. 
These conditions will test various “information packaging” possibilities by adding 
colour and this in itself raises a question of what would happen if colour replaced one of 
the sets. 
5.1.2.3 What Happens When Colour Replaces the Number/Letter Distinction?  
The three conditions described above are similar to the baseline in that the conditional 
relates a member of the letter set to a member of the number set.  It is different because 
colour is added as a feature that members of either of the two sets can have.  In the three 
conditions here, the set of numbers is eliminated to make the conditional relate two 
members of the set of letters, namely A and B in one case and a member to itself in the 
other.  In other words, colour (Black/White) replaces the letter/number distinction made 
to the face versus back of the card.  This implies that the letters referred to by the 
antecedent and consequent could either be different or identical.  It also implies that in 
these cases colour does make a difference in the truth versus falsity of the rule. 
Condition 6 is similar to condition 3 in the previous section with the exception of 
utilising one set of letters from which the letters A and B are taken.  The background rule 
is identical in both cases.  In condition 6 the full range of possible cases is shown to 
subjects while in condition 3 only 4 possibilities out of 8 are included.   
Condition 5, on the other hand, utilises only one letter in the rule, such that it aligns 
the letter identity with truth so A appears in both the antecedent and consequent.  
Therefore, the letter B in both its colour formats is linked to falsity.  Condition 7 is 
comparable to condition 6 with one difference, which is the use of the colour red to 
replace black and the colour orange to replace white.  Red and orange are both easily 
classified as shades from the group of “reds” while black and white are easily accepted as 
opposites.  In conditions 6 and 7, colour does affect the truth/falsity of the rule; 
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consequently, it will test contrasting the value referred to by the antecedent versus that 
referred to by the consequent versus referring to two values that have a common grouping 
as that here of both being shades of the “red” colours. 
Condition  Foreground Rule Cards 
Background 
Rule Information Packaging 
C.  5 Black A→ White A 





Same letter that appears in 
the antecedent appears in the 
consequent. 
C.  6 Black A→ White B 





The letter in the antecedent is 
different from that in the 
consequent. 
C.  7 Red A→ Orange B 
red A, orange B, red B, orange 
A 
Red (letters) / 
orange 
(letters) 
The letter in the antecedent is 
different from that in the 
consequent. 
Table  5.2:  This table shows the essential details of the three variations of the AK47 task 
Table 5.2 shows that the main difference between the previous three conditions and 
conditions 5, 6 and 7 is that the latter three reduce the number of sets into one where a 
member is referenced by the antecedent and another by the consequent. 
These three conditions alter the hierarchical relationship exhibited in the first four 
conditions.  The antecedent in the first four refers to a letter while the consequent refers 
to a number which is a member of a distinct set while in the case of these three both the 
antecedent and consequent refer to members of the letter set.  Condition 5 tests if the rule 
tests two different attributes of the same letter, while condition 6 references the case 
when the rule references two different letters that have different attributes.  The aim here 
is to identify the effects of these semantic similarities or differences on subject behaviour.  
The last condition 7 tests if the colours are obtained from a small subset of possible 
colours where the two chosen colours lie adjacent to each other on the colour circle.  This 
is then compared to the colours of black and white that imply that a contrast exists 
between them. 
Now that all the design issues of the various conditions have been reviewed, one can 
go on to take a look at the actual experiment that was run. 
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5.2   Experiment 
An experiment was run based on the above design with two tasks placed on two pages, 
the first contained the selection task and the second asked subjects to write the “negation” 
of the antecedent and consequent. 
5.2.1  Subjects  
277 volunteer students from a private high school in Bahrain all of whom studied at level 
10 or 11.  33 students performed condition 1, 42 students performed condition 2, 42 
students performed condition 3, 52 students performed condition 4, 27 students 
performed condition 5, 38 students performed condition 6 and 43 students performed 
condition 7.  The task was given to subjects during their homeroom period ahead of the 
start of the school day to avoid any influence they may carry from any courses taken and 
it was done by their own school teachers on the same day so no student could inform the 
others on what selections were made. 
5.2.2  Materials  
There are 7 conditions of this experiment and one of them, namely condition 3, is 
presented in full below: 
Condition 3:  
“Below is depicted a set of four cards, of which you can see only the exposed face but not 
the hidden back.  On each card, there is a number on one of its sides and a letter on the 
other.  Notice that numbers are white, while letters are black. 
Also below there is a rule which applies only to the four cards.  Your task is to decide 
which of these four cards you must turn in order to decide if the rule is true.  Don’t turn 
any unnecessary cards.  Tick the cards you want to turn. 
Rule:  If a card has a black ‘A’ on one side then it must have a white ‘7’ on the other 
side.  
A K 4 7  
 
Figure  5.1: Cards shown to subjects in this task. 
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The second page attempts to identify the values of the negation of premises. 
 
In that experiment: 
 
If you were told that               S = “A card has a black A on one side” 
Then you assumed           Not S = “A card has a ___________________________” 
 
 
If you were told that               S = “A card has a white 7 on the other side” 
Then you assumed           Not S = “A card has a ___________________________” 
The other conditions are all similar to the above with the exceptions shown in sections 
5.1.2.1 through to 5.1.2.4. 
5.2.3  Results  
This section will be composed of three main parts: a section on the replication of the 
original distribution, a section on the results of the selection task, followed by the results 
of the “logical negatives” task.  Finally, there is a section that links the results of the 
“logical negatives” with the selection results.  The order of presentation aims to reduce 
arising complexity by starting with the most straightforward and ending with the most 
complex. 
5.2.3.1 Replication Results 
The main aim of the first condition is to provide a basis with which to compare the 
various other results that are obtained.  The results obtained from condition 1 will, 
therefore, be utilised as a baseline from this point forward and are shown in table 5.3.  
There is not significant statistical difference in any of the categories shown when tested 
with a Fisher Exact test on a per column basis.10  Consequently, it is safe to assume that 
replication has been achieved in this condition that was run simultaneously with the 
others on the same target population. 
 
Abstract pq q p pךq ךq ךpq pqךq qךpך pךpq qךq pךp pך pךpךq q all none totךpqך
Wason 10 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 16
School Data 19 2 12 2 3 1 0 5 0 3 1 4 0 0 0 0 52
Table  5.3: A comparison of the replication condition with Wason’s (1968) data 
                                                 
10 This test will be continually used throughout this chapter because of the sparseness of the results. 
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5.2.3.2 Distribution of Subject Choices  
Thus far, the best possible means of comparing subject responses to the baseline is 
through the comparison of the distribution of subjects’ sets of choices amongst the 
various alternatives.   
Table 5.4 displays subject distribution among the various possible choices in the main 
task for all conditions including the baseline condition 1.  Figure 5.2 follows with the bar 
graph representation of the percentage values of the same data. 
 
Condition pq q  p p]q ]q ]pq pq]q ]p]q p]pq q]q ]p p]p p]p]q all total 
C1 19 2 12 2 3 1 0 5 0 3 1 4 0 0 52 
C2 10 5 12 1 4 0 0 2 0 2 0 6 0 0 42 
C3 10 6 8 0 1 0 0 3 0 3 2 0 0 0 33 
C4 23 4 1 0 2 0 0 7 0 4 0 1 0 0 42 
C5 7 3 4 3 0 0 0 1 0 4 1 3 0 1 27 
C6 10 3 4 7 2 2 0 5 0 3 2 0 0 0 38 
C7 15 3 1 3 0 6 0 9 0 5 0 1 0 0 43 
Table  5.4:  Subject card choices across the different conditions 
Condition 1 is the one that replicates Wason’s (1968) results as was shown in the 
previous section.  Condition 2 replicates11 condition 1 as well as the original Wason 
(1968) data.  This indicates that emphasising the distinction between the values that fit 
the individual clauses of the rule versus those that do not does not result in any difference 
















Figure  5.2: Percentages of combinations of card choices by condition 
                                                 
11 The word replicated is used whenever no significant differences emerge in any of the compared 
categories. 
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Condition 3 does not replicate this baseline, because of a sole significant difference 
existing in Just Q selections, which indicates either that a lack of alignment with truth, or 
that colour marking the face and back of the cards, or both, may contribute to this result.  
Since condition 2 replicates the baseline while colour partitions the set and complement 
sets, one may assume that alignment with truth is a strong factor that may cause or hinder 
replication of the baseline.  So perhaps condition 2 replicates because the factor is present 
and condition 3 does not replicate because the factor is not present.  The effect could 
have been either just in the antecedent or just in the consequent of the rule.  In fact, the 
results show a high selection rate in Just Q choices in condition 3 (p < 0.035) when 
compared to the baseline. 
The main difference between Version 2 and Version 3 is that the foreground rule of 
the latter assigns a different colour feature to the consequent than that assigned to the 
antecedent while the former assigns the same colour to both in the foreground rule.  If 
this colour assignment has an effect, then the location of difference should exist either 
just in the antecedent or just in the consequent of the rule.  In fact, results show a high 
selection rate in Just P choices in this version as tested with a Fisher Exact test with p < 
0.035 when compared to the baseline to indicate that the difference is indeed localised in 
one of the two. 
Condition 4’s results are significantly different from condition 2’s with a lower Just P 
and higher P, Q.  This indicates that the common similarities that both the set and 
complement sets are partitioned through colour, are not sufficient to overcome their 
differences.  The two differ in that condition 2 is aligned with truth and condition 4 is not.  
The differences between the two are low P selections (p < 0.001) and high P,Q selections 
in condition 4 (p < 0.004). 
The same differences emerge when one compares condition 4 with condition 3. In 
condition 4 Just P selections are low (p < 0.005) and P,Q selections are high (p < 0.029).  
Here, the main difference in the conditions is that the order of colours is reversed in the 
antecedent and consequent. 
Condition 4 differs from condition 2 and condition 3 in exactly the same way.  When 
one looks at the colour marks on the cards, condition 2 is aligned with truth, while 
condition 3 always has one colour on one side of the card and the other colour on the 
other side.  However, condition 4 is not aligned with the sides of the card, nor with the 
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antecedent and consequent of the rule.  The colours in this case are cross-cut so it should 
be expected that the differences of this condition from the other two are similar.  
Now before moving onto the second group of conditions, one may recall that the 
baseline P, Not Q selections are at a percentage of 3.85%.  Condition 5 results in a sharp 
rise in P, Not Q selections to a percentage of 11.11% relative to condition 3 which is 0% 
and (p < 0.037).  However, it is not significantly different from the baseline.  Condition 6 
shows an even higher rise in P, Not Q to due the restrictions imposed by the use of 
colour.  P, Not Q is selected with a percentage of 18.42% (p < 0.028) from the baseline 
while Just P selections are lower than the baseline (p < 0.003).  Condition 7 results show 
a shift towards negative choices with a rise in Not P, Q choices with a significance of p < 
0.032.  Not P, Not Q choices are also increased but significant only when compared to 
condition 5 with p < 0.003.  These choices are characteristic of imposing an alternative 
perspective onto the rule and this is discussed in further detail in section 5.3. 
To sum up, Conditions 2, 3 and 4 explore subjects’ reactions to a form of “Information 
Packaging” introduced into the task through different colours.  Subjects seem to impose a 
“grouping” of the cases that make the rule true versus those that make the rule false.  If, 
on the other hand, they are confronted with a grouping that distinguishes what the 
antecedent refers to from what the consequent refers to, then this results in a higher 
selection rate of Just Q.  This is the same behaviour that was detected in the conveyor 
task when a temporal sequence was imposed between what is referenced by the 
antecedent and the consequent.  In that case, it was interpreted to result from a 
presupposition of the event in the antecedent.  Consequently, one explanation that exists 
for the result obtained here is that there may be an inherent semantic “order” to colours 
that implies a “sequence”.  Semantic sequences may exist in different domains such as 
that of numbers where they go from 1 to 2, 3, 4, 5 or letters where A precedes B, C, D, 
etc.   
Figure 5.3 shows condition 4, in which colour groups depicted by the arrows pointing 
upwards do not conform to the hierarchical structure implied by the distribution amongst 
letter and number sets.  Colour cross-cuts the sets at level 3 which may cause erroneous 
groupings, raising the brittleness of this condition and keeping it otherwise similar to the 
baseline. 
This brings us to the second group of experiments that differs from the first in that 
colour distinguishes what is on the face versus what is on the back.  Two of these 
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conditions exhibit higher selection rates of P, Not Q which is the logically competent 
answer according to classical logic.  There are two main features that these conditions 
exhibit in common that are different from the baseline condition.  The first is that only a 
set of letters is referred to and the second is that a set of attributes of those letters is 
utilised to distinguish between what is on the face of the card, versus what is on the back.  
What this does is create an implication of semantic dependency between what is 
referenced by the antecedent versus what is referenced by the consequent.  If the letter A 
appears in the antecedent then the consequent must have a letter other than A and the 
same applies for the colour used to describe A because in this case colour distinguishes 
what is on the face compared to what is on the back of the card.  Consequently, there is a 
restrictive reading here of the conditional where the antecedent restricts the domain of 
possibilities for the consequent.  Consider this example “If the background is black, then 
the font used is white.”  Here, the restriction imposed is purely semantic because if the 
font used is black, then it will not be visible, so the semantic restriction may elicit a 
pattern of response of checking the cards when the background is black and the font is 
also selected as black. 
Condition 7 is not similar to the above in a sense that the contrast between the black 
and white is lost.  Consider the rule offered by Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) in the rule “If 
an employee works on the weekend, then that person gets the day off during the week.”  
They cued the subject into the role of the employer who is checking if employees that 
take the day off during the week really did work during the weekend, making the 
expected competent responses Not P and Q.   The employer’s perspective is that of a 
person enforcing the rule versus the employee who can utilise the rule.  Additionally, the 
consequent implies the employer will give the employee the day off, while the antecedent 
implies the employee will give another day of work.   
Let us now go back to our example but with a variation; “If the background is red, 
then the font used is orange.”  The problem is transformed because now the visual 
problem will persist whether the rule is followed or not.  However, the complementary 
relationship exists because red is close to orange and orange is close to red, so the task 
turns to that of enforcing the rule rather than utilising it.  If subjects utilised it, then they 
would “wish” the font to be orange, and if they enforced it, then they would “enforce” 
that the background is red.  The second is what takes place because subjects select Not P, 
Q and many select Not P, Not Q to confirm the change in perspective without any 
decreasing ambiguity in the task itself. 
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These results are obtained through the classical analysis methods utilised in this task 
and reveal that subjects do seem to impose associations that align with truth/falsity and 
consequently are influenced by divisions that align with antecedent/consequent or 
neither.  However, within this experiment, another interpretive task was introduced in 
order to probe one of the functions that may play a factor in what selections subjects end 
up making in this task and the results are presented in the next section.  This is followed 
with a discussion section that presents possible explanations for the various results. 
5.2.3.3 Negation Interpretation Results 
The previous section analysed the results of subject choices independently of their 
interpretation.  Two possible implications may emerge from this.  The first occurs if the 
resulting distribution of interpretations of negations influences subjects’ card choices.  If 
so, then it is possible that experimenters have to date been misled when they were 
marking subject responses because they did not take into account that subjects have 
assumed different “logical negatives” than those assumed by the experimenter.   
The second possibility is that subjects’ interpretations do not influence subject card 
choices.  This could have two possible causes.  The first is that the interpretation is 
random and consequently has no effect on subject reasoning.     
Results indicate that subjects do indeed make several different choices for the negation 
task and consequently analysis of the results has to follow a series of steps:   
• The first is to define the major interpretations that subjects choose.   
• The second is to analyse this data for significant differences in the distributions 
for particular conditions.  This would help clarify if task conditions affect subject 
interpretations and what possible features may cause this effect.   
• The third is to identify the Interpretation and conditions that are associated with 
the highest competent logical response according to the Interpretation assumed.  
• Then a finer grained analysis of the results can be attempted in order to 
investigate if a relationship exists between the interpretation of the negation task 
and the selections subjects end up choosing, at least for card choices that have 
enough frequency to allow analysis. 
• Last but not least, a consideration of any emerging general insight from the data 
can be undertaken. 
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 First Step:  The first task therefore is to classify student responses as per the major 
classifications that they fall under. 
Competent interpretation: This is the classical logical interpretation expected by 
experimenters.  When S = “A is on one side” and T = “7 is on the other side”, then under 
this interpretation the propositions of negations are given as Not S = “K is on one side” 
and Not T = “4 is on the other side”.  In other words, the logical negative is interpreted as 
the contrasting member from the same set of the member under consideration.  This 
interpretation necessitates that the logically competent card selections as answers are A 
and 4. 
The Classical Logical Rationale:  One may in a sense relate this 
negation to the given clause alone without giving any consideration to 
the rule.  The logical negative of the “A” is the member of the same set 
of letters that is other than “A”.  In classical logic the clauses are 
dissociable from the rule because the conditionals are truth functional. 
Reverse Competent Interpretation:  This occurs when S = “A is on one side” and T = 
“7 is on the other side”, and Not S = “4 is on one side” and Not T = “K is on the other 
side”.  In other words, the logical negative here is a member of the complement set that is 
also a contrasting member to the one that appears in the rule.   
A Default Logical Rationale:  One may assume Stenning and van 
Lambalgen’s (submitted) default logic semantics in order to justify the 
negation within this interpretation.  The program completion algorithm 
offered by Stenning and van Lambalgen, translates the rule P → Q into 
(P ^ Not ab) ↔ Q by taking into account all the cases that would cause 
Q to be false and ensuring their falsity.  These are represented by ab 
and if P is the cause of Q being true then ab must be false.  Here, 
however, what matters is the conclusion.  In other words, when subjects 
see a rule of the form P → Q they also assume that other propositions 
cannot be obtained from this rule as it only concerns the proposition Q.  
So, when they are asked to give the negation of P, they may search for 
the value that cannot be obtained by this rule.  So the completed rule (P 
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^ Not ab) ↔ Q obtains Q and fails to obtain cd, so the negative of P is 
what P fails to obtain which is Not Q.  If one rewrote the rule it would 
appear as  (P ^ Not ab) ↔ (Q ^ Not cd).  By converse, the negative of 
Q refers to what will always fail to obtain Q and that is ab which is the 
other value possible for the antecedent. 
 
Reverse Rule Interpretation:  Under this interpretation the logical negative of the 
member set of letters mentioned in the rule is assumed to be the member of the 
complement set mentioned in the rule.  The “if” instruction is regarded as relating 
“logical negatives” of each other such that S = “A is on one side” and T = “7 is on the 
other side”, and Not S = “7 is on one side” and Not T = “A is on the other side”.   
A Default Logical Rationale:  This may seem the most confusing 
interpretation of all and by all means it is the most popular.  If one may 
recall, that a rule of the form P → Q does not exclude propositions 
other than P possibly E that may also cause Q to be true in a different 
rule that is E → Q.  So if one is to look for a conclusion without having 
P, then the conclusion obtained by E is the negative of P because it is 
obtained through the use of another rule.  Therefore, here Q results.  If, 
however, Q is not obtained, then it is also possible for there to exist 
another premise that implies that P → W that is not explicitly given 
here where W has nothing to do with Q.  Notice that this too is a rule 
that may exist independently of the given rule.  In this case the negative 
of Q is represented by P because it can obtain a value other than Q. 
 P = A    Not P = Q = 7   Not Q = 
Competent Interpretations K 4 
Reverse Competent Interpretation 4 K 
Reverse Rule Interpretation 7 A 
Table  5.5: A summary of subject responses associated with the interpretation made. 
These results indicate that one may question the basis on which the current 
expectations of negatives are made.  They may indeed be logical and reflect the same set 
of interpretations subjects impose on the rule. 
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 Second Step:  The second step therefore is to classify student responses as per the 
definitions given. 
The interpretations that did not fit into these categories were classified as “other 
choices”.  This latter category therefore differs because it spans a number of possible 
choices, which caused some difficulty in untangling due to the sparseness of the data as 
well as the difficulty of defining categories that do not overlap with the main three 
categories or with each other.  For example, the largest category following the above 
three, has far lower frequencies of selection than those given above.  The highest of these 
is when subjects select “the opposite colour of Q” as Not P and “the opposite colour of 
P” as Not Q; the frequencies here are for conditions 1 to 7 as follows: 0,3,3,2,3,1,0.  
Another issue that arises here is that when subjects select the negative, they may end up 
writing a value that is not one of the four cards.  One may wonder if the cause is that a 
restrictive reading is imposed onto the tasks in conditions 2,3 and 4 because subjects are 
only shown 4 out of the 8 possibilities.  First of all, the other conditions such as condition 
5 exhibit similar behaviour even though the suspected cause is not present while 
condition 3 exhibits a low percentage in this category even though the suspected cause is 
present.  This leaves another possible explanation, which is that subjects are relaxing the 
restriction of the background rule, possibly due to the vagueness of the question such that 
they assume a larger domain of possible choices than is present in the task. 
The full set of data is shown in table 5.6 displaying the number of students who made 
that selection next to the percentage of the total number of students who performed that 
condition. 






Condition 1 52 8 (15.4%) 7 (13.5) 24 (46.2%) 13 (25%) 
Condition 2 42 5 (11.9%) 4 (9.5%) 16(38.1%) 17 (40.5%) 
Condition 3 33 8 (24.2%) 5 (15.2%) 12(36.4%) 8 (24.2%) 
Condition 4 42 7 (16.6%) 11 (26.2%) 15 (35.7%) 9 (21.4%) 
Condition 5 27 1 (3.7%) 1 (3.7%) 13 (48.1) 12 (44.4%) 
Condition 6 38 6 (15.8%) 7 (18.4) 19 (50%) 6 (15.8%) 
Condition 7 43 5 (11.6%) 4 (9.3%) 26 (60.1%) 8 (18.6%) 
Table  5.6: Subject distribution pattern across the three major interpretations 
We can add the total number of students who make the first three interpretations into a 
group which is made up of the following percentages according to the condition number: 
C1:75%, C2: 59.5%, C3: 75%, C4:78.6%, C5:55.6%, C6:84.2%, C7:81.4%.  It is 
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immediately apparent that the division between the three major interpretations and the 
“other choices” category is uniform across the different conditions.  However, conditions 
2 and 5 in particular stand out with the lowest percentages of 59.5% and 55.6% while all 
others are in their seventies and eighties.  Running a Chi Square test on the difference 
between the major interpretations and “other choices” reveals a significance level of p < 
0.042 that indicates that conditions 2 and 5 both differ in the frequency of the various 
interpretations of negation.  In condition 2, both quantifiers “one side” and “other side” 
reference values that are white, which implies that the division is between what is in the 
rule and what is not in the rule.  Condition 5, on the other hand, referenced the same letter 
by both quantifiers “one side” and “other side” namely letter A. 
Interpretation 
of Negation 
 Selection Task Conditions 
  Condition 2 Condition 5 Condition 7 
Competent 
Interpretation 
    
Reverse 
Competent 
 Less than C4 
p < 0.043 
Less than C4 
p < 0.014 
Less than C4 
p < 0.038 
 More than C4 
p < 0.049 
More than C4 
p < 0.040 
 
 More than C6 
p < 0.013 
More than C6 




 More than C7 
p < 0.024 
More than C7 
p < 0.020 
 
   More than C3 
p < 0.032 
Reverse Rule 
Interpretation 
   More than C4 
p < 0.019 
Table  5.7: Comparison between selection task conditions 2, 5 and 7 on the frequency of 
different interpretations of negation they evoke; only significant differences between 
them and other conditions made per interpretation type are displayed. 
 
Table 5.7 clarifies the similarities between conditions 2 and 5 and differences from 
other conditions.  Their behaviour is identical even though condition 2 has 8 possible 
cases of which only 4 are shown while condition 5 has 4 all of which are shown.  
Additionally, condition 2 has both a set of letters and numbers while condition 5 has only 
a set of letters.  Another difference is that condition 2 implements “information 
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packaging” onto the task, while condition 5 utilises colour to distinguish what is on the 
face of the card versus what is on the back. 
The identical behaviour is obviously not caused by any of the above differences.  
These two conditions have one basic similarity; condition 2 has the same identical 
attribute colour associated with the letter in the antecedent and the number in the 
consequent, while condition 5 has the same letter value which is “A” in both the 
antecedent and consequent.  One may refer to the ID principle here (Fauconnier, 1994) as 
it implies that an attribute could be utilised to refer to whatever this attribute defines.  For 
example, one may say here “The German girl knows how to solve this problem,”  rather 
than say “Anna knows how to solve this problem.”  In the first sentence, the attribute that 
the girl is German is taken as sufficient to identify the girl without necessarily giving her 
name.  Similarly in condition 2 the attribute of a “white colour” is taken as an identifier 
while in condition 5 the same name “A” is utilised to relate the antecedent to the 
consequent. 
Condition 7 also exhibits some traits distinguishing it from the others, as it has two 
colours that lie adjacent to each other on the colour circle.  The same influence of 
perspective change already discussed in section 5.2.4.1 seems to be evident here.  What 
seems to be happening in condition 7 is that one set of “reds” when coupled with one set 
of letters restricts the possible range of “logical negatives” such that 60.1% of subjects 
make the Reverse Rule Interpretation.  Although this condition does not have a unity of 
the letter as in condition 5 or unity of the colour as in condition 2, it does imply proximity 
by introducing a small subset of what may be a large domain of colours.  White and black 
are considered contrasts that have all the other colours in between their intensity levels. 
However, at this stage one should consider the implication or “meaning” of these 
various interpretations of negation and how illuminating they will be when considering 
subject behaviour in the task.  The competent interpretation of negation shows that 
subjects isolate the clauses from the structure of the rule in order to perform the negation. 
The reverse competent and the reverse rule interpretations, imply that subjects are 
utilising the rule as well as the clauses within it as a means to arrive at their negative.  
This highlights a problem that seems inherent to descriptive selection tasks, which is that 
of interpretations. 
First of all, the Reverse Competent interpretation exhibits a constant awareness of 
other factors that may influence the conclusions that are not immediately clear in the 
 
Chapter 5 -  Contrasts, Complements and Negation    126
question.  Taking these “other” possible influences causes them to give this negative.  By 
contrast, the most common interpretation of negation is the Reverse Rule interpretation.  
This results from taking the given rule to be part of a larger world that has many different 
rules of which this is only one.  Perhaps in this case, the rule is taken as one out of a 
sample of possible rules and if one may recall, Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004) 
found that some subjects take the cards to be a sample out of a larger set of cards. 
So far, one can be certain from the above results that the condition can affect subject 
interpretations which makes one wonder if there is any relationship established between 
the interpretation assumed and the choices made.   
5.2.3.4 Considering Subject Selections from the Perspective of their Negation 
Interpretations 
One must take a look at the data in order to identify if it is possible to perform various 
types of analysis.  Although it would be wonderful to run a full analysis on the data for 
all possible interpretations and conditions, this is not possible here due to sparseness.  
Consequently, subject distributions amongst the various choices are reported for the 
Reverse Rule Interpretation.  However, here since Not P and Not Q are not interpreted as 
researchers would expect, the data is only reported in terms of raw data with the letters P, 
Q, R and S which correspond to the value A, 7, K, 4 in the first four conditions and 
analogously for the others. 
   
  PQ Q  P PS S RQ RS SQ R PR all Total 
reverse rule C 1 13 0 5 1     2 3       24 
reverse rule C 2 4 2 4   3   1     2   15 
reverse rule C 3 4 2 2   1   1 1 1     12 
reverse rule C 4 12 2 0 0       1       15 
reverse rule C 5 2 0 3 1     1 3   2   12 
reverse rule C 6 7 0 3   1 2   1 1 4   19 
reverse rule C 7 13 1 0 1   4 6 1       26 
Table  5.8: Frequencies of card choices made by subjects by interpretation and condition 
Yet again the columns are sparse so it would be wise to only consider the Reverse 
Rule Interpretation.  The frequencies will be considered for P, Q selections also because 
of the high frequencies in this category in an attempt to associate interpretations with 
subject card choices.  However, before doing that, it is possible to estimate just how 
influential this task is when it comes to predicting P, Q selections by comparing the 
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frequency of selecting P, Q in comparison to the frequency of selecting P, Q in other 
interpretations.  This is done in table 5.9. 
 Non Reverse Rule Interpretations Reverse Rule Interpretations 
 P,Q selections 











Condition 1 6 25 13 8 
Condition 2 6 21 4 11 
Condition 3 6 20 4 3 
Condition 4 11 8 12 11 
Condition 5 5 10 2 10 
Condition 6 3 16 7 12 
Condition 7 2 15 13 13 
Table  5.9: Frequency of selections as a function of interpretation of negation; P,Q and 
non P,Q selections and RR12 and non RR interpretations by condition. 
Table 5.9 shows this comparison where results show that conditions 1 and 7 show 
significant differences between P, Q selections in the general case versus non P, Q 
selections as compared to P, Q selections in the Reverse Rule Interpretation, versus non 
P, Q selections with p < 0.002 and p < 0.010 when tested with a Fisher Exact Test.  This 
implies that the Reverse Rule Interpretation is a major contributor to the P, Q selections 
made in at least these two conditions which is sufficient to warrant consideration. 
Under this interpretation subjects may be assuming that there is more to the question 
than meets the eye.  Given the rule, “if P then Q”, they seem to assume that P may imply 
consequences other than Q and that antecedents other than P may imply Q.  This reflects 
a concern with what may be semantically acceptable but not necessary directly deduced 
from the rule versus what may never be allowed by any generalisation of the rule.   
5.3   General Conclusion 
The previous chapter offered a question scenario that resolved the semantic anaphora 
imposed in the selection task replacing it with a temporal sequence that is enforced.  
Results showed that a constant anaphoric interpretation is elicited by this scenario with a 
high selection rate of Just Q.  A justification for this was offered based on the temporal 
context of the task. 
                                                 
12 Reverse Rule Interpretation. 
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In this chapter, the conditions tested fell into two main groups.  The first examines the 
AK47 task through the use of “information packaging” techniques.  Distinctions are 
emphasised in order to identify whether they are aligned with or whether they intersect 
with distinctions that are imposed by subjects onto the task.  Results showed that 
emphasising the distinction between what is referred to by the rule and what is not aligns 
with subject distinctions and does not alter behaviour from the baseline.  By contrast, 
distinguishing what is referred to by the antecedent from what is referred to by the 
consequent results in high Just Q selections.     
This indicates that there could be a link between this result and that obtained in 
chapter 4 raises a question of whether they have similar causes, but one should not forget 
that they may also have completely different causes.  The similarities between the two 
rest in the fact that in chapter 4 the distinction between what the antecedent and 
consequent refer to is enforced through time separation as they occur in a preset 
sequence.  In condition 3, here the distinction is imposed through the utilisation of 
different colours for what is referred to by the antecedent and what is referred to by the 
consequent.  
A conditional is a construct that relates the antecedent to the consequent in a precise 
uni-directional fashion which implies that the relationship describes a distinction between 
the antecedent and the consequent that is deduced from it.  On the other hand, cards can 
have “one side” refer to both the “face” and “back” of the cards (Stenning and van 
Lambalgen, 2004).  The relationship the sides of the cards have to each other does not 
map onto that between the antecedent and consequent.  In the rule, there is a distinction, 
while on the cards there is no distinction.  Consequently, it should not be surprising that 
emphasising this particular distinction should result in a constant anaphoric interpretation 
because it imposes onto the cards, the distinction that already exists in the rule.  One may 
wonder why high Just Q choices rather than high Just P choices result if there is a 
constant reading? A possible answer to this is that the distinction emphasised here is 
between what is referred to by the antecedent and consequent, so it reflects the 
“consequence” relation between them as implied by the conditional, which it in fact does, 
as the consequent is what is selected. 
The second group of experiments emphasise the effect of these distinctions because 
the same order of colours in condition 3 is retained.  These were designed as a form of 
control experiment to identify if the 8 possibilities of which only 4 are shown in the first 
group have any effect on subject behaviour.  Reducing the possibilities to 4 meant that 
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the hierarchical structure of the referents was altered.  Colour was no longer imposed as 
an information packaging tool.  In conditions 5 and 6 set membership as well as colour 
attributes ensure that subjects understand that both the antecedent and consequent 
referents come from the same domain.  At the same time, colour distinguishes what is on 
the face from what is on the back.  These resulted in relatively high selections of P, Not 
Q. 
This questions the formulation of the Wason (1968) selection task as the hierarchy of 
referents imposes semantic distinctions that lack a unified domain that relates letters to 
numbers with anything other than the rule placing them on the sides of the same card.  
This context is unable to elicit the desired P, Not Q responses because it does not evoke 
the interpretation that would guide subjects towards these choices.  At least one of the 
possible requirements is a unified domain that contains both what the antecedent and 
consequent refer to. 
It should, therefore, not be surprising that subjects revert to the rule when asked to 
perform the negation task, as this rule exists to relate the letter to the number by placing 
them on two sides of the same card.  It is not surprising either that subjects carry along 
their “assumptions” and impose them onto the negation task.  In this task, they seek to 
negate by searching for what else can be deduced or what cannot be deduced.  The line 
that separates a value from its negative is altered because the rule is what relates the 
referent of the antecedent to that of the consequent.   
Condition 7 tests this by representing two consecutive letters and two similar colours 
in a rule which results in a very high selection rate of the Reverse Rule Interpretation.  
This implies that when the referents are similar to each other or consecutive to each other, 
subjects seek negation by searching for what is not in the rule, as opposed to making a 
more diverse set of responses if there is contrast as with black and white colours. 
This leads us to wonder about the nature of the relationship between these negations 
and subject interpretations.  Unfortunately, due to the sparseness of the data, this could 
only be tested with respect to P, Q selections that seem to correlate well with the Reverse 
Rule Interpretations.  One of the possible logical justifications of this interpretation is 
when subjects ask what P can obtain other than Q.  In other words, “If P then Not Q”, 
which is characteristic of the “logic of false” as defined by Stenning and van Lambalgen 
(2004), is offered as an explanation for high selections of P, Q which correlates well here 
with the Reverse Rule Interpretation. 
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To sum up, the interpretations subjects impose are semantic because they are affected 
by semantic alterations in the task.  In general, there is evidence for a distinction between 
the rule referents and other values not referred to by the rule.  There is also evidence for 
the lack of or the existence of a weak distinction present between what is referred to by 
the antecedent and what is referred to by the consequent, because emphasising it alters 
behaviour in the task.  The hierarchy of the values referred to by the rule also affects 
performance, as subjects are prone to make more P, Not Q selections if there is more 
unity of the domain from which the referents are extracted rather than selecting them 
from completely distinct domains that are not related except by appearing on the sides of 
the same card.  Last but not least, the negation task reveals that experimenter assumptions 
to date have been misguided because even when performing negations, subjects exhibit 
the same interpretations they exhibit in the task.  Here, a strong correlation is shown 
between the Reverse Rule Interpretation and P, Q choices which is explained by a “logic 
of false” assumption that is in turn implied by the Reverse Rule Interpretation. 
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Chapter 6 
In Search of Surface Feature 
Classification Traits 
The last two chapters ran a deep semantic analysis of the relationship between the terms 
and what they reference.  However, one should never overlook that each of these terms 
exists in a context which affects its interpretation.  The word “letter” for example, may 
exist in the context “the letter N” or it may exist in the context “the letter has a stamp on 
it” but is not likely to exist in the context “the letter wrote a book”.  Some may claim that 
the words surrounding the word “letter” play a role in determining its meaning (Landauer 
and Dumais, 1997) while others argue against that (Glenberg and Robertson, 2000).  One 
thing for certain is that words do not live in isolation of their contexts and in the case of 
the word “letter” for example, the words appearing in that context do seem to have an 
effect on the intended interpretation of the word.  Consequently, an analysis of surface 
co-occurrence features seems essential.  In other words, this chapter will seek through co-
occurrence a means to compare rule antecedents to consequents in the various rules listed 
in Appendix A.  This will require the utilization of a computational model that studies co-
occurrence trends of the words with the aim of finding a distinction between deontic and 
descriptive rules; namely Latent Semantic Analysis or LSA (Landaur and Dumais, 1997).  
To date, the distinction between these two types of rules could only be achieved through 
subjecting rules to the criteria described in chapter 3, and consequently it has to be done 
manually.  So finding a distinction computationally should resolve whatever doubts that 
may remain that there are two distinct categories.  However, LSA has a central problem 
that may cause the interpretation of the results to be more complicated.  Basically, it 
ignores the order of the words in context and consequently deals with contexts as bags of 
words.  A novel neural network self organizing map is offered to resolve this problem 
and this network is tested with the same rules.  The network classifies the rules in various 
regions of tensor space while only comparing words to other words in comparable 
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positions.  The results therefore should show how significant the word positions are in 
influencing the classification into the two groups.  This should be more informative in the 
sense that it will give a better description of a descriptive rule’s surface format as 
compared to a deontic rule’s surface format with respect to the co-occurrence and 
positional behaviour of the words they contain. 
6.1   A Little History of LSA 
The data representation utilised here is obtained from an online site that retrieves 
information from a model called Latent Semantic Analysis (Landauer and Dumais, 
1997).  With the immense number of electronic documents in the world, scientists felt the 
need to develop a computational system that is capable of classifying them and auto 
retrieving them in an automatic fashion. 
For example, if a person is running the search keys in the words “letter” and 
“admission” then this person is also likely to be searching for the combination “letter” 
and “acceptance” without necessarily typing the synonym.  Another issue is that the 
sense of the word “letter” here is from a different context than the one in which the 
sentence “the letter is N” may exist.  Our search employee will not like retrieving a 
number of documents with information about the letter N.  This second sense of the word 
letter is called a homograph meaning of the same word. 
These frequently occurring problems led researchers to develop methods to extract 
information from higher order associations in order to make the search more informed 
(Deerwester, et al., 1990).  Latent Semantic Analysis was developed for indexing by 
using these associations to resolve problems with homographs and synonyms.  Following 
its development, comparisons were made with children’s learning rates to find that it 
seems to explain how they learn new words from a context. 
One should not jump to the conclusion that this model reflects meaning as there is still 
doubt about that.  However, one should take the time to ponder what LSA is actually 
doing.  Only through careful speculation can one make sense of what is going on, enough 
to understand what these numbers actually reflect.  A description of the mathematics 
behind the model is given in Appendix B to allow the reader to concentrate on the 
motivations, advantages and disadvantages of the model. 
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A central issue is that LSA takes contextual data from an encyclopaedia in contexts of 
2000 words each, so there is no dispute that the amount of data is immense.  
Additionally, the resources used to build it are based on reading materials that span the 
sciences of the world, so their relationship with the concepts that exist in the world 
cannot be overlooked.  However, what exactly does it do with all that?  LSA does not 
read the words, so the word “ugly” when used as input is the same to LSA as the word 
“beautiful”, just as the word “dead” versus the word “alive”.  Consequently, it is 
extremely important to inspect what LSA is actually doing with words in order to arrive 
at its similarity figures.  
It starts off by calculating how often each word appears in each context.  This is like 
saying that I will analyse a company’s activities by partitioning them into what occurs in 
each project.  A project here represents a context.  The model then tries to find out if 
those same people work in different projects during the same period, so it calculates for 
each person how many projects they are involved in.  Then it tries to approximate the 
employee/project relationship such that it generalises what is going on, into several main 
areas of specialisation for that company.  These areas of specialisation are in fact of a 
lower number than the projects people actually work on. 
It should be clear from the analogy that this system is very far from attaining deep 
meaning.  However, it should also be clear that this generalisation retains key bits of 
information that could be easier to analyse than if all is retained or if there were none at 
all.  For example, it would have an approximate figure of how frequently word X and 
word Y appear in similar contexts.  Table 6.1 exhibits a comparison of some words that 
may appear in selection task rules. 
 Person Overnight A N 
Person 1 0.10 0.36 0.03 
Overnight 0.10 1 0.40 0.10 
A 0.36 0.40 1 0.26 
N 0.03 0.10 0.26 1 
Table  6.1: Selected pair-wise word co-occurrence similarity figures as obtained from 
LSA 
The similarity factor between the letters A and N is 0.26 while that between “Person” 
and “Overnight” is 0.10.  The first two are from a descriptive or abstract rule while the 
second two are from a deontic rule.  Deontic rules have never to date been compared to 
descriptive rules with respect to how they look and the words they actually contain.  It is 
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quite possible that the distinction between the two types of rules could exist on the 
surface level of the rules themselves and not just at the deep semantic level already 
discussed.  In table 6.1, the letter “A” may represent a function word if it appears in the 
form “If there is a ..”.  Function words are words that carry more syntactic that semantic 
meaning and these include prepositions, articles, auxiliary verbs, pronouns and such 
(Smith and Witten, 1993).  This type of word carries little meaning on its own due to the 
large diverse set of words that can follow it like “a” in the examples “a car”, “a game”, 
“a house”, “a letter” which describe both activities as well as objects using the same 
article.  On the other hand, the word “person” is very different because it can only refer 
to a human being so the class it refers to is described as an open lexical class.  This is the 
class of content words whose meaning is more concrete and which includes nouns, 
adjectives, verbs and the like (Smith and Witten, 1993). 
If we now consider the table again then the similarity measure between “A” and 
“person” is 0.36, while between “A” and “overnight” it is 0.40 which implies that 
function words appear close to a large range of lexically open class words that include 
“person” and “overnight”.  Consequently, it is worth considering if this semantic 
distinction between the two types of words which clearly affects their behaviour in 
context may be sufficient to reflect a distinction between the two types of rules. 
6.2   Comparing Rule Surface Features with LSA 
Perhaps the first issue that comes to mind is what should be compared versus what should 
not be compared.  First of all, there are the rules that were used in the various 
experiments listed in Appendix A.  This is a definite candidate that will retain its ground 
for now as we look for others. 
Second, there are the contexts used by researchers when giving students the tasks.  
Unfortunately, not all researchers reported the exact text of the presented materials used 
in their experiments.  Another issue that arose is that the lengths of the materials varied 
from several pages to a sentence or two which made the following stage of formalising it 
for the neural network practically impossible.  For these reasons a comparison of contexts 
became impossible. 
This leaves us with the rules, and how much information co-occurrence statistics can 
tell us about how similar the rules are.  Let us take a look at a few examples to identify 
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the difficulties that may arise.  An example of a descriptive rule is; “If the letter is N, then 
the number is 3” (Manktelow and Evans, 1979) while an example of a deontic rule is “If 
an employee works on the weekend, then that person gets a day off during the week.”  
The similarity factor between these two is 0.56 while the similarity measure between the 
first of the two and the rule “If the tablecloth is brown then the wall is white” is 0.51.  
This evidently is one of LSA’s problems as the similarity of the If .. Then .. construct 
seems so influential as a classifier that it fails to distinguish between deontic and 
descriptive rules.  This also informs us about the type of differences that LSA utilises to 
distinguish sentences, which is simply that the use of the same words is highly influential.  
The repetition of the words “If” and “then” placed almost all rules in the same category.  
A more extensive test of the full list of deontic rules versus descriptive rules was run to 
reveal that LSA, as expected, finds them all highly similar. 
This does not imply that LSA is unable to help in analysing rule surface structure 
because all it was doing was to classify them as rules, which they all are.  It is not as 
much an error as it is the wrong level of analysis.  The previous two chapters should be 
sufficient to point out that even while the conditional structure remains the same, subject 
behaviour is influenced by differences between the antecedent and consequent clauses.  
So this raises another possible avenue to follow where one can actually compare the 
antecedent to consequent in each of the deontic and descriptive rules to see if there are 
any obvious trends. 
6.2.1  Co-occurrence Distances Between Antecedents and 
Consequents  
The target of this study is to search for surface co-occurrence distances between 
antecedents and consequents and to utilise results to further understand the data provided 
by LSA.  In order to do this the full list of rules shown in Appendix A was first 
categorised to be either deontic or descriptive.  This categorisation was performed strictly 
in accordance with the definitions given in Chapter 3 and all rules that were difficult to 
categorise or seemed controversial were excluded.   
Then the antecedents and consequents of each rule were extracted by only removing 
the words that construct the conditional which are “if”, “then” and “only if”.  Following 
this each rule was tested individually on the LSA site in order to obtain a co-occurrence 
figure for the distance it gives between the antecedent and consequent.  Results are 
shown in table 6.2. 
 












R2 0.58 R1 0.33
R4 0.58 R3 0.33
R5 0.58 R7 0.66
R6 0.59 R9 0.47
R13 0.58 R10 0.47
R14 0.58 R11 0.72
R15 0.24 R12 0.72
R16 0.24 R17 0.66
R21 0.51 R18 0.58
R22 0.26 R19 0.84
R38 0.33 R20 0.64
R42 0.33 R25 0.72
R46 0.33 R26 0.58
R56 0.5 R27 0.64
R57 0.63 R28 0.72
R58 0.5 R29 0.58
R59 0.63 R30 0.64
R60 0.64 R31 0.72
R61 0.57 R32 0.58
R62 0.63 R33 0.64
R63 0.57 R34 0.58
R66 0.38 R35 0.58
R67 0.38 R36 0.58
R68 0.49 R74 0.61
R69 0.49 R75 0.61
R70 0.61   
R71 0.61   
R72 0.39   
R73 0.39   
R76 0.57   
R77 0.57   
R78 0.26   
R79 0.26   
    
Mean 0.4788  0.6073 
St Dev. 0.1355  0.1139 
Table  6.2: LSA co-occurrence similarity results when comparing the antecedent and 
consequent of each rule to each other. 
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The data displayed shows that LSA exhibits a clear distinction between the two groups 
with a mean difference of 0.1285 which is not a slight difference at 21% difference of the 
deontic rules.13   
However, there does seem to be an overlap with respect to some rules including from 
the Deontic side; “If you eat duiker meat, then you have found an ostrich eggshell”, “If 
someone stays overnight in the cabin, then that person must bring along a bundle of 
wood from the valley” and “If a previous employee gets a pension from a firm, then that 
person must have worked for the firm at least ten years”.   
Additionally, there is overlap from the descriptive side in the rule “If a letter is sealed 
then it must carry a 20-cent stamp”.  
6.2.2  Discussion  
The aim of this level of analysis is to identify the causes of the distinctions found by 
LSA.  In order to be able to comprehend what is going on, a word to word comparison 
within one of the rules that caused the overlap is considered in table 6.3. 
 that person must bring along a bundle of wood from the valley 
someone 0.49 0.58 0.25 0.31 0.23 0.49 0.13 0.40 0.10 0.38 0.44 0.04 
stays 0.31 0.12 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.35 0.10 0.31 0.15 0.34 0.34 0.08 
overnight 0.38 0.10 0.14 0.32 0.20 0.40 0.11 0.37 0.05 0.38 0.39 0.11 
in 0.96 0.32 0.55 0.61 0.51 0.98 0.32 0.99 0.26 0.95 0.99 0.24 
the 0.96 0.32 0.56 0.62 0.54 0.99 0.36 0.99 0.27 0.95 1.00 0.25 
cabin 0.28 0.05 0.08 0.24 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.29 0.32 0.22 
Table  6.3: Word to word co-occurrence similarity figures of a deontic rule. 
The words in the column to the left are the ones in the antecedent while those at the 
top of the table are those that form the consequent of the rule.  The highest similarities are 
oddly reported between articles “in”, “a” and “the” so the fact that this rule has so many 




                                                 
13 Deontic rules’ figure – descriptive rules’ figure to give a result that is multiplied by 100 and divided by 
the Deontic rules’ figure 
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Document  it  has  a  \'4\'  on  the  other  side.  
a  0.95  0.68  1.00 0.32 0.95 0.99 0.85  0.39  
card  0.11  0.11  0.13 0.07 0.17 0.12 0.11  0.06  
has  0.65  1.00  0.68 0.26 0.61 0.68 0.68  0.22  
an  0.82  0.69  0.91 0.32 0.83 0.89 0.79  0.32  
\'A\'  0.95  0.68  1.00 0.32 0.95 0.99 0.85  0.39  
on  0.93  0.61  0.95 0.31 1.00 0.96 0.80  0.46  
one  0.91  0.67  0.95 0.30 0.90 0.94 0.86  0.42  
side  0.40  0.22  0.39 0.13 0.46 0.40 0.38  1.00  
Table  6.4: Word to word co-occurrence similarity measure of a descriptive rule. 
The words that appear in many different contexts are usually function words such as 
“the” and “in” while those that are more restricted in the contexts they appear in are 
mostly open lexical class words like “bird” which has a referential semantic function.  
Analysis of the results seems to imply a possibility that it is this distinction that is picked 
up by LSA between the two categories. 
It should be clear at this stage that LSA which investigates the frequency of word use 
seems to categorise the rule according to two main groups of words.  The word “on” is a 
function word that appears in many different contexts so it shows a high similarity 
measure to almost all words in the consequent.  The other group is represented by the 
word “card” which is an open lexical class because it has a semantic value by reference 
to a class of objects which is described by the word “card”.  This word reflects a low 
similarity measure to all words in the consequent. 
Perhaps one way to comprehend what is going on is to go make a word to word 
comparison of all words that appear in the list of rules in Appendix A.  Words were 
collected and compared.  Each word’s similarity measure was obtained from LSA’s 
online site in terms of all other words including itself.  Then the average similarity 
measure of each word was calculated by averaging all these figures.  This number now 
reflects how “general” this word’s occurrence is because the higher it is the more likely it 
is for this word to appear in among most of the other words and the lower it is the more 
likely it is for this word to only appear along with only a few of the others.  The words’ 
“generality” measures had a maximum value of 0.45 so in order to isolate only the most 
general terms, those that scored above 0.25 are listed as follows: A, IF, THE, THEN, ON, IS, 
TO, IT, AN, HAS, ONE, HAVE, OTHER, OF, BE, BY, THAT, HE, ONLY, AT, IN, ANY, FOR, 
YOU, AND, EACH, FROM, LEAST, OR, OVER, BEFORE, BRING, CLUB'S, GET, HAD, HIS, 
LIKE, SMALL-TIME, TAKE, THEY, TWO, WAS, WITH. 
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This list includes 8 adjectives that can be classified as per their use in the rules, 8 
verbs, 2 nouns and 25 function words.  Some of the adjectives can be considered function 
words in other contexts which may have affected LSA’s similarity measure.  LSA is 
utilised to obtain both the generality measure as well as LSA’s similarity measure so if 
there is a generalisation to interpret the words that can take both roles as function words 
then the same applies to both measures causing the conclusion to be valid even if the 
error exists.  In short, the similarity measure given by LSA is relatively high when 
comparing words that carry little lexical meaning and appear in many different contexts 
to other words that appear in the texts. 
Thus, the list of words given shows that the type of word that carries little semantic 
meaning seems to affect the overall similarity measure by raising it and its frequent 
existence in descriptive rules as compared to deontic rules, and may be the cause of a 
distinction at the surface level of analysis.  Rules that are part of the overlap that occurs 
in the categorisation are those that do not conform to this surface distinction as was 
shown in table 6.3 because they contain a number of function words that do not fit their 
own category. 
Although these results show that the distinction that is captured may indeed be a 
distinction in the frequency of function words appearing in one of the two categories 
versus the other, it offers no reason to exclude other possible culprits of the categorisation 
that goes on.  Function words in general exist to provide grammatical relationships with 
other words in the sentence or to express the mood of the speaker.  Consequently, their 
position in the sentence is crucial to the role they play in the sentence.   
Additionally, function words are also acquired late during language learning which led 
to the assumption that they involve more abstract grammatical knowledge. This in turn 
led to the assumption that they play a structural role that in turn aids in categorising open 
class lexical words (Smith and Witten, 1993).  This attention to the location of function 
words with respect to open lexical words imposes a need to identify if the same 
distinction persists if the order of the words is enforced as the same. 
LSA is frequently criticised for neglecting order (Wiemer-Hastings, 2000) such that 
the two following sentences appear identical in meaning representation according to 
LSA. 
Mark killed the tiger    vs    The tiger killed Mark 
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It is accepted without saying that the death of a human is never to be compared with 
the death of an animal so one may wonder if this lack of “order” may affect the 
distinctions it seems to find.  One problem is therefore raised, and it is simply how to add 
order to LSA in order to identify if function words are the primary cause of the 
distinction because they have strong structural roles. 
6.2.3  Ways to Add Order  
This importance of adding word order was recognised by Wiemer-Hastings (2000) 
who investigated the effects of the neglected syntactical information in a sentence and 
attempted to incorporate it into the LSA framework.  He separated the sentences into 
atomic clauses or propositions and then segmented them by hand to break them into 
strings composed of subject noun phrase, verb and object noun phrase.  Antecedents were 
used to resolve pronouns and conjunctions were dealt with by distributing the arguments.  
Then he attempted to evaluate the similarity of this presentation using a variety of 
measures.  Results showed that the best approach to combine the similarities of the 
sentence parts is non-linear and even that was not as close to human judgment as LSA.  
Wiemer-Hastings and Zipitria (2001) then went on to a further test, incorporating syntax 
through two methods.  The first was to tag the words used for the training corpus at 100, 
200, 300 and 400 dimensions and this did not produce any favourable results.  Then they 
tried a structured LSA or SLSA where they broke up sentences into parts as was 
described above and used that as training material to find results that correlate slightly 
better than LSA.   
Their partial success is a stronger indicator that this course should be pursued further, 
except that it may the case that adding part-of-speech tags is not the right way to go about 
it.  Since LSA does not read the words by identifying their syntactic role, nor semantic 
role, it may be the case that the way to add order is not through adding any “role” 
identifying features.  Instead, the addition should treat words the exact same way as LSA 
treats them, which is simply as vacant symbols whose behaviour is analysed when in the 
proximity of other symbols.  Since LSA does this though a vector representation, the only 
solution is to raise the representation one level to a tensor representation. 
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6.3   A Brief Meeting with Tensors  
Unfortunately, the name tensor seems to be constantly linked with Riemann geometry 
and the theory of Relativity.  This strong relationship seems to invoke an impression that 
whatever is linked to this type of mathematics must be incomprehensible.  The truth of 
the matter lies in the fact that any topic that is regarded from the outside, seems to be 
incomprehensible, so the best way to understand tensors is to visit some of the tensor 
representations that we have in our world.  We can begin by visiting a beautiful Swiss 
Alpine mountain, for example, that can be seen from the top of another mountain.  What 
one can see is represented in three dimensions, length, breadth and breathtaking height.  
This is a tensor of the lowest rank. 
Prior work in representing text through tensors was done by Smolensky (1990). He 
described how tensor product algebra of a rank three tensor provides a framework for 
representing recursive structure in particular for language.  However, the background 
work done with neural networks and tensors does not offer the tool necessary to resolve 
the problem faced here which is to add order to LSA. 
There is no reason here to go any higher in rank than 2 because the background 
information LSA provides is limiting in that regard.  One may then start with a 
mathematical description that will hopefully make tensors comprehensible.  In a scalar 
field, a single number describes a point, while in an n-dimensional vector field, n-
numbers are needed to describe a point.  In a tensor field n-squared numbers are used to 
describe a point or n-cubed numbers, etc. 
In other words, our tensor representations would be in the form of matrices because 
they add only one rank to vectors.  This rank is utilized to describe word order in the 
sentence, therefore we have the words below described in 6 dimensional vector space in 















Vector 1 THE 0.99 0.78 1.00 0.80 0.96 0.85 
Vector 2 FLAG 0.29 0.17 0.31 0.27 0.32 0.19 
Vector 3 FLIES 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 
Vector 4 HIGH 0.45 0.33 0.46 0.33 0.45 0.40 
Table  6.5: Four words are shown, each described in 6-dimensional vector space 
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If the four words above are utilised as forming a sentence and we wish to retain the 
information of their order within the sentence, then the representation shown in table 6.6 
is necessary. 
 
Tensor 1: THE FLAG FLIES HIGH 
0.99 0.78 1.00 0.80 0.96 0.85 
0.29 0.17 0.31 0.27 0.32 0.19 
0.26 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 
0.45 0.33 0.46 0.33 0.45 0.40 
Table  6.6: The matrix as a whole describes the sentence maintaining the order of the 
words 
In this representation, there is no division between the rows or columns so none of 
them can be isolated from the group.  Additionally the representations for each word in 
the sentence are shown in the order in which it appeared, so the resulting matrix retains 
the information of where each word appeared in the sentence.  It is this exact information 
that is lacking in LSA so if we refer to the prior example concerning Mark and the tiger, 
we find that if the word “Mark” appears first then the representation will have a different 
matrix from what it will have if the word “tiger” appears first because the order of the 
numbers in the rows is different. 
In order to include tensors into a neural network model to form a novel architecture, 
one must have a solid background in tensor mathematics as well as some background on 
competitive architectures.  Appendix C should provide a reasonable background in the 
mathematics involved in this task.  It is worth mentioning that the functions mentioned 
reflect the specific requirements of this work, so the formulae although correct are not in 
their most general format in order to clarify them to the reader.  Appendix D offers 
background information about how competitive architectures work to make it possible to 
focus here on the novel architecture. 
6.4   A Tensor Based Competitive Architecture  
The idea stems from the architecture of a self-organizing neural network algorithm 
offered by Tuevo Kohonen (1995) that allows inputs to organize themselves into different 
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classifications in high dimensional space based on a competition of how close they are to 
each other.  The complete mathematical basis for the way competitive architectures work 
is presented in Appendix D. 
A central issue here is that once the network is settled after running many times, the 
inputs can be presented again to obtain an output representation.  Let us assume that 
figure 6.1 shows the final positions of the weights.  The three weights isolate three 

















Figure  6.1: Weights isolating vectors in separate parts of the space 
If we then present t the network vector v4, then its numerical representation is 
multiplied by the final weight values and the result is a string of values in terms of the 
weights.  Since v4 and w3 have the same position then the resulting string will give v4’s 
exact position. 
However, if we do the same for v3 then the result will approximate v3’s classification 
position at a value between it and the closest weight.  Classification functions usually use 
a hard limit function to indicate if a vector belongs to that group or not.  It has two values 
of either 1 for the vectors that belong there or 0 for those that do not and through this any 
approximations made are neglected at this stage.  If, however, the function used is altered 
such that it is a continuous one, then the result would reflect that V3 did not end up as an 
exact match to a weight which in our case is a very important bit of information.  This 
will be discussed in more detail in section 6.4.3. 
The study involved several stages of analysis that took place.  The first was to collect 
and assemble co-occurrence vectors to describe all the words that may appear in selection 
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task rules in terms of each other.  This selection task vocabulary was then used as a basic 
input source for the neural network and required necessary formatting into tensor matrix 
format.  The third stage was to run the network to obtain classification results.  The fourth 
was to compare results with LSA’s results which were already reported in section 6.2.1. 
6.4.1  Stage 1: Selection Task Vocabulary  
Although the online site offered for LSA represents a window of opportunity for 
researchers, it does not allow one to extract the numerical representation for each word in 
a 300 dimensional vector form. 
Consequently, it was necessary to manually obtain such a representation of words.  Each 
of the words in the rules in Appendix A was counted to give a total of 218.  A table was 
then formed of the co-occurrence similarity measure between that word and the other 217 
words in the list while taking into account that its similarity with itself is 1.  This was all 
done manually to gradually build a table of size 218x218 where each word can be 
represented in terms of all other words that appeared in the rules. 
6.4.2  Stage 2: Formulation as Tensors  
This second step involves building matrices to represent each antecedent and each 
consequent.  First all rules were processed to remove the words “if”, “then” and “only if” 
and to extract the antecedent and consequent clauses.  Then for each word, the table 
described in section 6.4.1. was consulted to retrieve the word’s vector representation. 
These vector representations were arranged in such an order into the formed matrix to 
reflect the order of the words.  Zeros were then added as fillers to ensure that all formed 
matrices have a size of 21x218 because this is the length of the longest clause in the 
study. 
At the end of this stage, each antecedent and consequent had a matrix representation 
formed while respecting word order within the clauses which made them a total of 74 
inputs. 
6.4.3  Stage 3: Design of the Tensor Based Neural Network  
Several parameters had to be set before starting the program including the function that 
will be used in the network, the number of weights and the number of repetitions of the 
program. 
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In classification type systems, the function that is frequently used is a hard limit 
function.  What it does is compare the result to 0.5, so if the results are above it, the 
response is a 1 and if it is below it then the result is a 0.  This implies that all vectors that 
appear within a particular region around the weight will get a classification factor that 
reflects they are of the same group because they will all get a 1 as a result while others 
will get a 0.  Through this technique, the space is broken into zones and each is a 
classification to which some of the rules belong. 
This type of classification is not desired here because it ignores part of the response 
which is up to 0.49 because of the rounding.  Consequently, this function was omitted 
and the network was allowed to give the actual results obtained.  Only a learning rate was 
utilised to make sure the network proceeds at small steps towards its target and this was 
set at 0.3. 
The number of weights usually determines the number of classification regions.  We 
have 37 rules, each of which is broken into two parts making the total number of inputs 
74.  This particular selection is well known to come through trial and error rather than by 
following any particular formula.  The goal in this work is to have sufficient weights to 
check if rule antecedents and consequents are classified.  At the same time, having too 
many weights would fail to classify because each weight may end up representing one 
input.  Therefore the number of weights was set at 10. 
The third parameter is to specify the number of times all the inputs are to be presented 
to the network.  If the network’s aim is to attain a particular target, then the network 
could be allowed to repeat until all distances between weights and inputs are below a pre-
specified quantity.  This, however, causes a problem if the specified quantity is not a 
practical one, as it will result in keeping the network in an infinite loop.  This is 
especially the case if the input points are on both sides of one weight and at a distance 
larger than the one considered acceptable.  In this case, the first input will bring the 
weight closer towards it and the second will change the same weight in the reverse 
direction to the first because it pulls it towards itself.  The process will be endlessly 
repeated causing an infinite loop. 
Since it is much more complicated to track these problems in the tensor world due to 
the high dimensionality involved, the total number of repetitions was fixed through trial 
and error to 19 total presentations.  This causes all 74 inputs to be presented 19 times and 
each time is compared to 10 weights.  Additionally, each input is represented by a 
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12x218 matrix, making the total number of comparisons involved 36,780,960.  This 
should give the reader an idea of the processing power and high computational load of 
this network. 
Now that all the basic parameters have been set, we can go on to review the different 
parts of the network.  In the presentation step, the input tensor is presented to the 
network.  This is followed by a competitive step where each weight tensor is compared to 
the input tensor and the closest weight is selected.  Following this, the closest weight 
tensor is adjusted to bring it closer to the input such that the adjustment is restricted to a 
small distance.  The idea is that with the repetitions, it will arrive at the optimal location. 
Then, the second input is presented to the network and so on until all have been 
presented.  This is called an epoch and is repeated 19 times as described above.  Once the 
whole process is complete, the full list of inputs is presented one last time to the network 
except this time the results are reported rather than used to adjust weights. 
However, these results are not interpretable as such because of the high dimensionality 
of the data.  Consequently, another short program was written in order to find a similarity 
measure between the different rule parts.  The output of this program is a table of size 
74x74 to show the similarities between the rule clauses. 
6.4.4  Stage 4: Results of Neural Network Compared to LSA  
From the resulting matrix the similarity measure between the antecedent and consequent 
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Consequent 
R2 23.89 7-10 R1 48.45 4-6 
R4 23.89 7-10 R3 48.45 4-6 
R5 105.78 6-5 R7 32.82 8-9 
R6 105.78 6-5 R9 5.58 4-4 
R13 23.89 7-10 R10 5.58 4-4 
R14 49.2 7-11 R11 28.23 8-8 
R15 29.75 8-5 R12 28.23 8-8 
R16 29.75 8-5 R17 32.82 8-9 
R21 48.52 7-10 R18 29.13 9-7 
R22 39.74 8-5 R19 17.72 8-9 
R38 81.24 6-9 R20 22.65 6-5 
R42 81.24 6-9 R25 28.23 8-8 
R46 81.24 6-9 R26 29.13 9-7 
R56 81.7 5-8 R27 25.29 10-7 
R57 99.92 4-6 R28 28.23 8-8 
R58 81.7 5-8 R29 29.13 9-7 
R59 99.92 4-6 R30 25.29 10-7 
R60 51.8 6-12 R31 28.23 8-8 
R61 55.98 10-7 R32 29.13 9-7 
R62 51.8 6-12 R33 25.29 10-7 
R63 55.98 10-7 R34 14.68 6-4 
R66 70.61 5-6 R35 14.68 6-4 
R67 70.61 5-6 R36 14.68 6-4 
R68 24.88 6-9 R74 82.73 4-6 
R69 24.88 6-9 R75 82.73 4-6 
R70 37.93 9-12    
R71 37.93 9-12    
R72 26.83 6-9    
R73 26.83 6-9    
R76 48.59 8-10    
R77 48.59 8-10    
R78 19.5 7-9    
R79 19.5 7-9    
      
Mean 53.31   30.28  
St Dev. 27.49   18.76  
Table  6.7: The results of the neural network while considering antecedent-consequent 
rule lengths 
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The difference between the means for the NN is 43% with respect to Deontic rules 
which are much higher than LSA, which the reader may recall is 21%.  There is no 
correlation between rule length and the results obtained from the neural network as the 
Pearson Product Moment Correlation coefficient is -0.24 which is extremely low.  
Consequently, one can go on to compare the graphs of the two as shown below in figure 
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Figure  6.3: Deontic rule proximity results from the NN compared to LSA 
A visibly clear result is that the neural network did not alter the descriptive 
representations as much as it did for the deontic representation.  The graph shows a 
reflection around the 45% line that simply implies that in most cases the network resorted 
to multiplying the original with a fixed factor in order to obtain its results.  However, the 
same could not be said for the deontic rules as they differ significantly from their original 
positions in a manner that is not organised. 
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6.4.5  Discussion  
A central issue of concern here is the question of what exactly the network is isolating as 
a main difference between descriptive and deontic rules that causes the results reported.  
The results obtained for descriptive rules are almost identical to those obtained from LSA 
which forms the basic input resource to the network with the exception of a factor that 
reflected them around the 45% line.   
This can only occur if the reader may recall when the weights coincide with the 
locations of the vectors or in this case tensors as explained in the introduction section 6.4.  
The network was run more than once and always kept repeating the same type of 
behaviour even though it was started from randomly generated initial weight positions.  
This indicates that the descriptive rule representations lie in positions at the centre of the 
isolated regions of classification which ends up as the position of the weight, while 
deontic rule representations occur around the weights, so they get approximated.  An 













Figure  6.4: A representation in two dimensions of how weights approximate the regions. 
 
Here each of w1 and w2 coincide with v2 and v5 which implies that results will reflect 
those vectors as they are while results will show approximate values for all of v1, v3, v4 
and v6.  The fact that weights will always coincide with descriptive rules, however, does 
isolate them into a group of their own that seems to partition the representation space. 
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6.5   Conclusion  
This chapter has taken a look at the rule surface appearance which is the structure that 
holds the various referents to the values and positions that were analysed in the two prior 
chapters.  The first result was that LSA is capable of correctly classifying rules as deontic 
versus descriptive with a reasonable degree of accuracy by showing that the two classes 
have different similarity means between the antecedent and consequent clauses.  A 
pattern of words that frequently appear in the two categories started to emerge.  
Descriptive rules have a much higher tendency to contain “general” words that may 
appear in different contexts such as “one, on, in, to, the”.  Deontic rules, on the other 
hand, have a higher tendency of containing words such as “cabin, employee, weekend” 
which have a much lower use domain than do the general words.   
Most of the general use words that seem to cause the distinction appeared as function 
words within the group of rules analysed here.  Since LSA only analyses word 
frequencies and ignores their order, the role or significance of the difference may not be 
self evident just through the results exhibited, so a tensor-based NN was designed and 
utilised to classify the antecedents and the consequents by dividing the representational 
space using weights.  The weight positions coincided with the descriptive rule 
antecedents and consequents almost without fail.  This can only occur if these clauses 
represent the middle position of each class and therefore represent the optimal position in 
the centre of the group.  Consequently, the high frequency function words that distinguish 
these rules are such that they occupy particular positions in the clauses they are part of 
that is otherwise occupied by open lexically classed words in their deontic counterparts.   
The significance of this difference is difficult to determine for several reasons.  The 
first is that the number of analysed rules is limited and consequently the phenomenon 
may be characteristic of just this domain of rules under analysis.  The way to determine if 
this is the case, is by searching for a rule that has descriptive results and has enough open 
lexical class words to classify it as a deontic rule.  The reader may be reminded that this 
did occur, in the case of the rule R1 which is “If a letter is sealed, then it must carry a 20-
cent stamp.”  When Johnson-Laird et al. (1972) tested this rule on British subjects, the 
percentage of correct responses was 81%.  On the other hand, Griggs and Cox (1982) 
failed to observe facilitation by the same rule on American subjects.  Golding (1981) later 
found that the postal rule produced better results when attempted by older British subjects 
who were familiar with a regulation that is no longer imposed by the British post office.  
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This implies that the only existing example of a rule that breaks the requirement in the 
form desired here does so because it can be affected by a context that affects subject 
behaviour and indeed the same goes for the rules that are classed as deontic and the 
network’s results show them to be descriptive. 
Of course it is hard to generalize rules that were not included in the study just by 
conjecture, but it should be safe to assume that given the current data, a basic form of 
descriptive rules does seem to exist such that it distinguishes it from deontic rules through 
the use of function words in particular positions. 
An objection that may arise at this point is that LSA does not reflect the semantics of 
the words used in descriptive rules.  Researchers including Smith and Witten (1993) 
identify function words as being closed class words which implies that although 
languages grow on a daily basis, function words are characterised by being both limited 
in number as well as used with high frequency.  This implies that LSA is an ideal tool to 
isolate function words from open lexical words that carry more meaning just by 
identifying the frequency of their appearance which is what they conclude in their paper. 
One of the main conclusions therefore made in this chapter, is that a distinction does 
seem to exist at the surface level of the rule structure that may in fact influence whether 
the rule is classed as deontic or descriptive.  Whether it is real or just a phenomenon of 
the data analysed here remains to be seen as more experiments are run in the task.  
However, it does seem to indicate that the wording of the rules may affect the 
interpretations and to date no analysis has been carried out to identify the effects of the 
different lengths of rules for example, or different types of phrases used on subject 
reasoning. 
 







Every show must eventually come to a close and with it, the memories of all the 
highlights come flashing in front of our eyes.  The main aim of the work done in this 
thesis is to emphasise the importance of focusing on the interpretations subjects make in 
this and other reasoning tasks.  The semantic implications of the questions’ texts have the 
ability to influence the interpretations subjects make that in turn lead to a statistically 
significant difference in distribution among possible responses. 
This thesis offers support to these claims through three main contributions.  The first 
reveals novel interpretations by testing a rule format that describes a sequence of events.  
The second utilises information packaging as a semantic tool that is capable of 
identifying some of the distinctions that subjects impose onto the given information as 
well as identifying the effects of altering the letter/number hierarchy in the baseline 
descriptive task.  Last but not least, part of this contribution reveals a serious 
misconception held by researchers to date by eliciting subject interpretations of logical 
negation to find that they too vary according to the assumptions made.  The third is a 
neural network architecture that is capable of distinguishing deontic rules from 
descriptive rules based on co-occurrence information.  In addition to that, descriptive 
rules are classified according to function words which add little to meaning as well 
appearing in a variety of different contexts. 
This chapter will discuss these contributions in more detail and study their 
implications for research in this task and reasoning in general. 
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7.1   Novel Findings in The Selection Task 
The first main finding is that subjects exhibit an unusual constant anaphor reading that 
is invited by implying a sequence in time through the use of different tenses.  Subjects 
exhibited a suppositional reading of the conditional that is in a sense one of the primary 
semantic goals of the semantic construct.   
“The use of the conditional if requires the listener to make suppositions, 
to entertain hypotheses or to consider once or future possible worlds” 
(p. 29, Evans et al, 1993).   
So the conveyor setting simply invited a particular interpretation and was unable to 
make the same invitation when the task became vague as was caused by the removal of 
the disjunction. 
Information packaging offered a second perspective through which the semantics of 
the question could be contrasted without altering the propositional content of the task.  
Results indicated that subject attention rests on the cases that fit the rule by keeping them 
distinct from the cases that do not fit the rule.  Consequently, altering this focus by 
emphasising a distinction between what the antecedent refers to and what the consequent 
refers to which is also done by emphasising the distinction between what lies on one side 
of the card versus the other side, results in directing subject behaviour towards a different 
distribution of responses.  Cross-cutting the two possible lines of distinction reverts 
results to a distribution with a higher degree of confusion. 
A few conditions that were originally designed as controls exhibited some of the 
necessary requirements for the question to invite interpretations leading to the competent 
responses.  The hierarchy of the relationship between what the antecedent and consequent 
refer to was altered by making them both refer to letters and utilising colour to 
distinguish the face from the back of the cards.  The referents therefore belong to the 
same domain as the distinction between the face and back is a trait that both can have. 
The negation task is a highly insightful novel task that followed each of the conditions 
of the colour task.  Results showed that current literature is erroneous in the assumptions 
of what subjects regard as negatives of P and Q, because responses varied across several 
choices that were explained through default logic.  A central finding made here is that 
many subjects select P, Q while they interpret Q as the negative of P and P and the 
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negative of Q.  This implies that they are seeking to falsify by selecting a negative value 
in their selections which is something that will be picked up later in this chapter. 
Perhaps, the division that lies between deontic and descriptive tasks is more or less 
profound than one might at first assume.  Results of LSA shows that a distinction lies at 
the surface level represented by the distribution of types of words utilised in each of the 
two groups.  The suspected culprit is an extensive use of “function words” in descriptive 
tasks, and this is further investigated through a tensor based neural network that exhibits 
the distribution of descriptive rules in a co-occurrence representation space as centre lines 
identifying the different domains.  The distinction between the surface level of the two is 
therefore further fortified although there is no direct link indicating that this is indeed 
how subjects recognise the difference without any experimental evidence of the direct 
effect of function words. 
7.2   What These Results Add to Existing Theories  
It is essential to consider the informative extent of these findings in view of current 
theories.  Results are not informative concerning the innateness or modularity of cheating 
detectors as suggested by Cosmides (1989) because the only review of deontic tasks that 
was done was through the neural network findings.  However, they do raise questions 
whether a link can be established between function words and the scope of interpretations 
that subjects may arrive at or as to whether the two groups actually differ only in how 
clear each is in communicating what is desired of the subject.  If this is the case, then that 
would question the existence of independent cheating detectors. 
Relevance theory finds renewed support in the work presented here by the conditional 
that causes an increase in the logically competent answer and exhibits a necessity that the 
referents are closely related to each other by being members of the same domain.  There 
is, however, no evidence that the reasoning that is required to arrive at the logically 
competent answers is any different in nature from that required to arrive at any other 
response category, as all seem highly sensitive to the distinctions emphasised in the task. 
The theory of Mental Models is founded on the principle of truth (Johnson-Laird, 
1999) where subjects only represent what is true.  Results indicate that the distinctions 
assumed by researchers between what represents the negatives are not those made by 
most subjects who responded to the negation question.  Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) 
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also claim that subjects who do not turn the Not Q card do not represent it in their Mental 
Model.  The assumption made is that subjects will identify the antecedent as P and the 
consequent as Q in order to place a distinction between them.  However, a large 
proportion of subjects seem to regard Q as the negation of P and emphasise a distinction 
between what appears in the rule and what does not and this implies that they do not 
exhibit any problems with implicit negations.  Additionally, the different conditions of 
the experiment described in chapter 5 produced variations in subject behaviour that 
remain unexplained by the theory of Mental Models. 
The rational analysis model of the selection task associates probabilities of selection of 
each card with information gain.  One of the main insights in the model is that it reflects a 
pragmatic view of reasoning such that subjects have a goal they attempt to achieve and in 
order to arrive at that goal they have to weigh the various possible choices.  This is one of 
the basic assumptions of a theory of interpretation where subjects select the interpretation 
that seems most suited to their purposes and the selection is not always a certain one 
because they might alter it if they are confused one or more times.   
The rational analysis model assumes that P and Q are independent as a basis for the 
model while in the results shown here a dependency does seem to exist with respect to 
contrast.  Subjects place a distinction between the cases that fit the rule versus those that 
do not, and not between the referents of the antecedent and consequent.  Another issue is 
raised by the results of the negation task.  Not P is regarded as the information content of 
the value other than P rather than a symbolic representation of the negative of P.  
Consequently, subjects do indeed seem to wish to cover all possibilities of the antecedent 
by checking the value of P and what it is not which is well aligned with the information 
gain theory. This is not the case, though with deontic tasks as this particular interpretation 
of the consequent as a negative value of the antecedent is not likely to be made by 
subjects in this type of task which causes subjects to interpret the task in a format that is 
well aligned with what the experimenter intends. 
Theories that assume a mental logic are also informed by these results because they 
indicate a strong effect of semantics when subjects interpret the task.  In other words, a 
central problem seems to arise when the task given to subjects is regarded as requiring 
the interpretation of subjects and these do not necessarily conform to the interpretation 
assumed by the experimenter.  Consequently, the selection of P, Not Q as the correct 
answers is based on an assumption of an interpretation that is not adopted by subjects 
according to the results presented here.  Instead, results indicate that the interpretation 
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step is extremely influential in guiding subject responses.  In fact, there is no 
contradiction between the existence of a form of mental logic and the results of this thesis 
once the issue of interpretations is resolved. 
7.3   What This Means to Reasoning 
Perhaps a central issue that persevered throughout the years from the time when Wason 
ran his first selection task experiment to date is that most researchers continued to regard 
the task through a “looking glass” used by Wason.  This looking glass dictated that the 
task has a “logical rule” and consequently its correct responses are those that can be 
deduced by classical logic.  All responses other than P, Not Q were simply classified as 
wrong. 
This restricted the work that followed into attempting to comprehend the cause of the 
widespread errors in subject responses.  While in analogical reasoning researchers 
accepted the impreciseness of semantic implications, which causes subjects to interpret 
the stories to make deduction, this was not the case for selection task reasoning. 
In order to arrive at the root of the problem and clarify the shortcomings of the looking 
glass, we may ponder what may have occurred if Wason had attempted the colour 
versions tested here, early on say around 1968.  It is possible that he would only look at 
the correct/incorrect responses and simply say that they all fail in obtaining a sufficient 
correct ratio to warrant attention, but this is unlikely.  The reason is that in his 1968 
paper, he gave a full description of all responses given which implies that he is more 
likely to ponder subject distributions at least superficially. 
If he did that, then it would be difficult for him to overlook the effects on subject 
behaviour of altering the semantics of the task.  Clearly, the tasks here all fall under the 
same classical logical framework so responses would indicate that the differences warrant 
a more semantic based understanding of subject responses. 
It is this understanding that presents the main thrust of the thesis.  Simply, that it is 
impossible to comprehend the differences in the colour conditions, while assuming a 
classical logic perspective of the problem.  The one approach that allows these results to 
be explained is through considering different subject interpretations that are affected by 
the semantic setting of the task given. 
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7.4   Future Work 
This thesis opens many doors as it closes the door to my graduate study period.  The 
most immediate question that bids attention is how directly linked is the formulation of 
the questions to subject responses.  Can a framework of influencing effects be capable of 
“directing” thought towards particular predicted conclusions?  This can only be achieved 
as a long term goal following many more specific intermediate goals. 
These include running a detailed study of the effects of negative interpretations with a 
smaller number of conditions as well as running a version of the descriptive task to 
investigate the effect of having different tenses or having a causal relationship.  These 
variations may guide work towards establishing a solid link from some of the more 
influential features of the question setting to the responses they invite. 
The work will never be complete!! 
 
 
“We dance around in a ring and suppose, while the secret sits in the 
middle and knows” (Frost, 1971). 
 




Post-Hoc Study of Prior Experiments in 
the Selection Task 
A careful review of a pool of the materials used in many of the papers referenced here 
was conducted.  In order to establish a basis for comparison various variables had to be 
defined and given approximate values that usually ranged between two possibilities yes 
and no.   
A.1   Criteria of Evaluation: 
These assignments were based on very strict criteria as the parameters and how they are 
assigned values is shown below: 
1. Performance Results given as a percentage. 
2. Theme: A rule is “thematic” if there exists an association in “meaning” and 
usually the original researchers reported this.  
3. Goal explicitly given: If a person is told that their goal is to achieve something or 
enforce something.  
4. Social interaction with a person: As per the requirements placed by Cosmides 
(1989).  
5. Assumed Background: Decided based upon the report of researchers and how 
commonly known a theme is. 
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6. Temporal Sequencing: If any form of time is mentioned like days, weeks, etc or 
implication as when something occurs before another thing. 
7. Causal Link: This can either be implied through the rule or through the context. 
8. Obverse possible:  If the rule or context implies that a possibility of cheating 
exists. 
9. Egoistic to subject: Is there a “you…are” or role given to the subject performing 
the task  
A.2   List of Rules in the Review 
The rules themselves were listed according to their RUNs.  A run is an instance of 
attempting this experiment at a particular time and place.  This makes it possible to 
compare results when the same rule is tested more than once by different researchers or 
in different settings.  The list of runs analysed is as follows and the run number will 
appear in table A.1 containing the actual analysis results. 
Materials Cheng and Holyoak (1985) 
R1 Stamp problem: If a letter is sealed then it must carry a 20-cent stamp 
R2 Cholera problem: if the form says entering on one side, then the other side 
includes cholera on its list of diseases 
R3 Stamp problem: If a letter is sealed then it must carry a 20-cent stamp 
R4 Cholera problem: if the form says entering on one side, then the other side 
includes cholera on its list of diseases 
R5 If one is to take action 'A' then one must satisfy precondition 'P'. 
R6 same as above when following abstract problem below 
R7 If a card has an 'A' on one side, then it must have a '4' on the other side. 
R8 when following permission case above 
R9 If the tablecloth is brown then the wall is white. 
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R10 The tablecloth is brown, only if the wall is white. 
R11 If a card has an 'A' on one side, then it has a '4' on the other side. 
R12 A card has an 'A' on one side, only if it has a '4' on the other side. 
R13 Cholera problem: if the form says entering on one side, then the other side 
includes cholera on its list of diseases 
R14 Cholera problem: The form says entering on one side, only if then the other 
side includes cholera on its list of diseases 
Materials Cheng et al. (1986) 
R15 If a customer is to drink an alcoholic beverage, then she is at least 18. 
R16 A customer is to drink an alcoholic beverage, only if she is at least 18. 
R17 If a card has an 'A' on one side, then it must have a '4' on the other side. 
R18 If a bird has a purple spot underneath each wing, then it must build nests on 
the ground. 
R19 If a washing label has silk on one side, then it has "dry clean only" on the 
other side. 
R20 If two objects carry like electrical charges, then they will repel each other. 
R21 If a passenger wishes to enter the country then he or she must have had an 
inoculation against cholera 
R22 If a customer is to drink an alcoholic beverage, then she must be over 21. 
R23 If a card has a circle on one side, then it has the word "red" on the other and 
conversely, if it has the world "red" on one side, then it has a circle on the 
other. 
R24 If a turtle crosses a road, then the flag by the palace flies, and conversely if 
the flag by the palace flies, then a turtle crosses a road. 
R25 If a card has an 'A' on one side, then it has a '4' on the other side 
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R26 If a bird has a purple spot underneath each wing, then it must build nests on 
the ground. 
R27 If a bolt of cloth has any red threads in it, then it must be stamped with a 
triangle.   
R28 If a card has an 'A' on one side, then it has a '4' on the other side 
R29 If a bird has a purple spot underneath each wing, then it must build nests on 
the ground. 
R30 If a bolt of cloth has any red threads in it, then it must be stamped with a 
triangle.   
R31 If a card has an 'A' on one side, then it has a '4' on the other side 
R32 If a bird has a purple spot underneath each wing, then it must build nests on 
the ground. 
R33 If a bolt of cloth has any red threads in it, then it must be stamped with a 
triangle.   
R34 If a house was built before 1979, then it has a fireplace. 
R35 If a house was built before 1979, then it has a fireplace. 
R36 If a house was built before 1979, then it has a fireplace. 
R37 If a steel support is intended for the roof, then it must be rustproof. 
R38 If any urithium miner gets lung cancer, then the company will pay the miner 
a sickness pension. 
R39 If any of you wins an athletic award, then that person will have to treat the 
others to a round of drinks at Sam's 
R40 If one works for the Armed Forces, then one must vote in the elections. 
R41 If a steel support is intended for the roof, then it must be rustproof. 
R42 If any urithium miner gets lung cancer, then the company will pay the miner 
a sickness pension. 
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R43 If any of you wins an athletic award, then that person will have to treat the 
others to a round of drinks at Sam's 
R44 If one works for the Armed Forces, then one must vote in the elections. 
R45 If a steel support is intended for the roof, then it must be rustproof. 
R46 If any urithium miner gets lung cancer, then the company will pay the miner 
a sickness pension. 
R47 If any of you wins an athletic award, then that person will have to treat the 
others to a round of drinks at Sam's 
R48 If one works for the Armed Forces, then one must vote in the elections. 
Materials Wason and Shapiro (1971) 
R49 If I go to Manchester, I travel by car. 
R50 If I go to Manchester, I travel by train. 
R51 If I go to Leeds, I travel by car. 
R52 If I go to Leeds, I travel by train.  
Materials Manketlow and Evans (1979) 
R53 If I eat haddock, then I drink gin (variations) 
R54 If the letter is an N, then the number is a 3.(variations) 
R55 If I go to Manchester, I travel by car. 
Materials  Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) 
R56 If a man eats cassava root, then he must have a tattoo on his face. 
R57 If you eat duiker meat, then you have found an ostrich eggshell. 
R58 If a man eats cassava root, then he must have a tattoo on his face. 
R59 If you eat duiker meat, then you have found an ostrich eggshell. 
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R60 If someone stays overnight in the cabin, then that person must bring along a 
bundle of wood from the valley. 
R61 If a student is to be assigned to Grover High School, then that student must 
live in Grover City. 
R62 If someone stays overnight in the cabin, then that person must bring along a 
bundle of wood from the valley. 
R63 If a student is to be assigned to Grover High School, then that student must 
live in Grover City. 
R64 If a player wins a game then he will have to treat the others to a round of 
drinks at the club's restaurant. 
R65 If a player wins a game then he will have to treat the others to a round of 
drinks at the club's restaurant. 
R66 If a small-time drug dealer confesses, then he will have to be released. 
R67 If a small-time drug dealer confesses, then he will have to be released. 
R68 If an employee works on the weekend, then that person gets a day off 
during the week. 
R69 If an employee works on the weekend, then that person gets a day off 
during the week. 
R70 If a previous employee gets a pension from a firm, then that person must 
have worked for the firm at least ten years. 
R71 If a previous employee gets a pension from a firm, then that person must 
have worked for the firm at least ten years. 
R72 If a home owner gets a subsidy, then that person must have installed a 
modern heating system. 
R73 If a home owner gets a subsidy, then that person must have installed a 
modern heating system. 
R74 If an envelope is sealed, then it must have a 1-mark stamp. 
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R75 If an envelope is sealed, then it must have a 1-mark stamp. 
R76 If a passenger is allowed to enter the country, then he or she must have had 
an inoculation against cholera. 
R77 If a passenger is allowed to enter the country, then he or she must have had 
an inoculation against cholera. 
R78 If a customer is drinking an alcoholic beverage, then he or she must be over 
18 years old. 
R79 If a customer is drinking an alcoholic beverage, then he or she must be over 
18 years old. 
Table  A.1: List of Rules Used in the Study 
A.3   Results of the Analysis 
The result of the analysis is shown in table A.2 with the run number in the first 
column.  Please note that most decisions made were according to the description given 




















































































R1 a86.5%14 yes profit yes yes  yes no yes yes 




disease yes yes  yes no yes yes 
R3 a60% yes no yes no no no yes yes 
R4 f57%t87.5% yes no yes yes  yes no yes yes 
                                                 
14 a = About this amount, f=from, t= to this amount 
 




















































































R5 61% no no yes no yes yes yes yes 
R6 48% no no yes no yes no yes yes 
R7 19% no no no no no no no no 
R8 39% no no no no no no no no 
R9 17% no no no no no no no no 
R10 4% no no no no no no no no 
R11 17% no no no no no no no no 
R12 4% no no no no no no no no 
R13 67% yes no yes yes no no yes yes 
R14 56% yes no yes yes no no yes yes 
R15 67% yes no yes yes yes no yes yes 
R16 56% yes no yes yes yes no yes yes 
R17 19%+/- 6%15 no   no no no no no no 
R18 19%+/- 6% %no no no no no no no no 
R19 34%+/-6% yes no no no no no no no 
R20 34%+/-6% yes no no no yes  Yes no no 
R21 66%+/-6% yes no yes yes yes yes no yes 
R22 66%+/-6% yes no yes yes yes yes no yes 
                                                 
15 With an error margin of + or – the percentage that follows. 
 




















































































R23 20%+/- 9% no no no no no no no no 
R24 20%+/- 9% no no no no yes no no no 
R25 15% no no no no no no no no 
R26 15% no no no no no no no no 
R27 40% no no no no yes no no no 
R28 40% no no no yes yes no no no 
R29 40% no no no yes yes no no no 
R30 50% no no no yes yes no no no 
R31 42% no yes no yes no no no yes 
R32 42% no yes no yes no no no yes 
R33 73% no no no yes yes no no yes 
R34 40% yes no no no yes no no no 
R35 50% yes no no yes yes no no no 
R36 73% yes no no yes yes no no yes 
R37 64% yes no no no no no no no 
R38 64% yes no yes no yes no yes no 
R39 64% yes no yes no yes no no no 
R40 64% yes no yes no yes no no no 
 




















































































R41 57% yes no no yes no no no no 
R42 57% yes no yes yes yes no yes no 
R43 57% yes no yes yes yes no no no 
R44 57% yes no yes yes yes no no no 
R45 92% yes yes no yes yes no no yes 
R46 92% yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes 
R47 92% yes yes yes yes yes no no yes 
R48 92% yes yes yes yes yes no no yes 
R49 62.5% yes no yes yes 
yes four  
trips on 
 four daysno no yes 
R50 62.5% yes no yes yes 
Yes  four 
Trips on 
 four daysno no yes 
R51 62.5% yes no yes yes 
yes four  
trips on  
four days no no yes 
R52 62.5% yes no yes yes 
yes four 
 trips on  
four days no no yes 
R53 18.75% yes no no yes 
yes four  
trips on  
four days no no no 
R54 6.25% yes no no no No no no no 
R55 12.5% yes no yes no 
yes four  
trips on 
 four daysno no no 
R56 96% yes yes yes no Yes no no yes 
 




















































































R57 91% yes yes yes no Yes no no yes 
R58 36% yes no yes no Yes no no yes 
R59 52% yes no yes no Yes no no yes 
R60 89% yes yes yes yes Yes no yes yes 
R61 77% yes yes yes yes Yes no no yes 
R62 53% yes no yes yes Yes no yes yes 
R63 46% yes no yes yes Yes no no yes 
R64 89% yes yes yes yes Yes no yes yes 
R65 41% yes no yes no yes no no yes 
R66 77% yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes 
R67 38% yes no yes no yes no no yes 
R68 P&NotQ 75% yes employee yes yes yes no yes yes 
R69 NotP&Q 61% yes employer yes yes yes no yes yes 
R70 P&NotQ 70% yes employee yes yes yes no yes yes 
R71 NotP&Q 64% yes employer yes yes yes no yes yes 
R72 P&NotQ 81% yes employee yes yes yes no yes yes 
R73 NotP&Q 59% yes employer yes yes yes no yes yes 
R74 P&NotQ 80% yes 
postal  
worker yes yes yes no yes yes 
 




















































































R75 NotP&Q 28% yes sender yes yes yes no yes yes 
R76 P&NotQ 85% yes 
immigration 
officer yes yes yes no yes yes 
R77 NotP&Q 23% yes 
passenger  
that can  
cheat yes yes yes no yes yes 
R78 P&NotQ 92% yes waitress yes yes yes no yes yes 
R79 NotP&Q 11% yes customer yes yes yes no yes yes 
Table  A.2: Results of the Data Analysis 
In order to further clarify the data the yes was converted to a 1, and the no converted 
to a 0.  Then the following groups were formed according to the results column and 
where that rule fits into a particular category.  They were grouped as follows: 
Group A: Super-performer (percentage correct >= 80%):  This group included 15 
runs and all fell into two main categories, either as social contracts with up to 95% 
accuracy rate or as permission or regulation schemas when a rationale is given.  It may be 
worth mentioning that the social contract rules instructed subjects to look for cheaters.   
Group B: Moderate-performers (percentage correct < 80% and >= 56%):  This 
group included 29 runs with only one “abstract” case.  It is the rule in Cheng and 
Holyoak (1985) “If one is to take action ‘A’ then one must satisfy precondition ‘P’”.   
Group C: Weak-performers (percentage correct < 56% and > 25%):  This group 
included 19 runs of which 8 are contingency training subjects and 8 are obligation 
training subjects of Cheng et al. (1986). 
Group D: Marginal-performers (percentage correct < 25%):  This group included 16 
runs most of which had no clear relation between the two propositions. 
 
 























































































Figure  A.1: Results of the Above Analysis Simplified into Four Groups 
 
Some  odd comparisons seems to emerge from this data, as we can clearly see that 
“egoism” and “temporal distancing” seem to correlate just as well with results as having 
“thematic material” or a “social contract”.  The odd thing here is that explicitly giving a 
goal does not seem to be doing that well in mimicking behaviour and only seems to be 
doing well in the case of the super performers.  The Causal link test shows that this pool 
of data although diverse in the scope of results, does not show any influence of causal 
effects.
 




A Brief Description of LSA  
Landauer and Dumais (1997) created a powerful high dimensional semantic model that 
bases its co-occurrent semantic information on the verbal contexts in which a word 
appears.  This model uses contexts of up to 2000 words to describe the “meaning” of that 
word but it does not assign any importance to word order within that context.   
The main basis on which LSA relies is that words, and any sets of words can be 
represented in an extremely high dimensional semantic space.  What this means is that 
each word is represented through a vector which is composed of many numbers that 
describe how close it is to other words in that space.  In a graphical sense, this implies 
that each word occupies a point in this multi-dimensional space that is described in terms 
of a number for each dimension.  Figure B.1 shows how two vectors can be represented 













Figure  B.1: Two vectors
 
 RepreseVector A (3,3)
(Word A) nted in 2-Dimensional Space 
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Vector A (word A) therefore can be described by the values (3,3) in this world, while 
vector B (word B) can be described by the values (2,5).  From here onwards cosine 
similarity is used to estimate distances between different words.  This similarity measures 
the dot product of the two vectors divided by the product of the length of the vectors.  
The dot product of the two vectors above is computed as follows: 
A . B = AxBx + AyBy = 3 * 2 + 3 * 5 = 6 + 15 = 21 
The product of the two lengths is computed as follows: 
|A| = SQRT (x2 +y2) = SQRT( 9 + 9) =  4.24 
|B| = SQRT (x2 +y2) = SQRT(4 + 25) = 5.39 
Cosine similarity then becomes: 21 / (4.24 * 5.39) = 0.92 
A high similarity measure implies that the two words often appear in similar contexts 
or, in other words, they both appear surrounded by the same words, so we expect the 
words “elephant” and “zoo” to have a high similarity measure, which is in fact 0.65, 
while oddly enough it is less likely to talk about “Tiger” and “zoo” in the same context 
with a similarity measure of 0.042.  
This measure ensures that all results are between 0 and 1.  However, this process can 
only take place after the model has been realized, with a process that is in no way trivial. 
First of all, in LSA the world of words is far greater than two-dimensional ranging 
between 50 and 1500 dimensions (Landauer et al, 1998).  The process starts through 
collecting 30,473 articles from Grolier’s Academic American Encyclopaedia.  From each 
article either the whole text was taken or up to 2,000 characters was taken with a mean 
length of 151 words.  This was then used to fill a matrix that had 30,473 columns, each 
representing a piece of text.  The matrix also had 60,768 rows, each representing a word 
that appeared in these texts.  The fields were then filled in according to the function: 
 ln(1 + cell frequency) / entropy of the word over all contexts 
The first part “ln” is a logarithmic function that uses a base of “e” which is 2.718 and 
is called the natural logarithm.  One basic effect of using logarithms in general is to work 
with exponents since log10 100 = 2.  This is then divided by the entropy of the word 
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which is a measure of the “importance” of the word in the texts of that row and this we 
are told is measured with the function of sum of p log p (Landaur, et al. 1998).  One 
possible interpretation of this is the following function: 
 1 
log N Σ f i,j * log f i,jj=1 
N 
εi = -  c i,j
mj
fi,j =   
 
c i,j represents the frequency of the word in that particular text, while mj  represents 
the frequency of the word across the texts.  Applying the logarithmic function to this 
division raises the values to exponents and then applies a subtraction to them.  An 
example in log base 10 is shown below: 
log (100/1000)  = log 102 – log 103 = 1 –3 = -2 
Therefore the log of any division is in fact a method of subtraction of the two 
exponents of the numbers over the same base.  When this number is then multiplied by 
the same fraction we get: -2*0.1 = -0.2 which is larger than the original fraction.  This is 
then summed across the row and divided over the log of the number of entries in that row 
to get a more stable result also dependent on other entries in the same row. 
Notice that if the two logs have equal exponents the result will be zero and when this 
zero is multiplied by the original fraction, which is 1, it will only end up as a zero.  What 
this tells us is that word importance if it appears in only one text is reduced, while word 
importance rises if it appears in more than one text and in this way the “importance” of 
the word is incorporated into the cell entry. 
A more complex process follows this initial stage and is explained through the 
example.  
c1: Human machine interface for ABC computer applications 
c2: A survey of user opinion of computer system response time 
c3: The EPS user interface management system 
c4: System and human system engineering testing of EPS 
c5: Relation of user perceived response time to error measurement 
m1: The generation of random, binary, ordered trees 
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m2: The intersection graph of paths in trees 
m3: Graph minors IV: Widths of trees and well-quasi-ordering 
m4: Graph minors : A Survey 
 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 m1 m2 m3 m4 
human 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
interface 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
computer 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
user 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
system 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
response 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
time 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
EPS 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
survey 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
trees 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
graph 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
minors 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Table  B.1: An Example of LSA/SVD offered by Landauer and Dumais (1997) 
This table is then subject to a pre-processing stage as is described above.  The full 
details of that stage, however, were never completely clarified and therefore it is difficult 
to fully understand the functions involved other than what is reported by authors.  
However, it was possible to reconstruct a table that results from applying the 
transformations as is shown in table B.2. 
 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 m1 m2 m3 m4 
human -0.1273 -0.0329 0.0838 -0.8647 0.5057 0.736 -0.1257 -0.5323 0.3331
interface -0.1969 0.2144 -0.4472 -0.7836 0.7813 0.3777 -0.0521 0.3208 -0.5056
computer -0.5071 0.1624 -0.5677 -1.0822 -0.2932 0.2071 -0.0062 0.0718 0.2251
user 0.2201 0.1628 -0.2059 -1.1774 0.0521 -0.9157 0.5719 0.177 -0.5116
system 0.785 -0.5164 1.0166 -1.8849 0.1125 0.4908 0.4706 -0.0441 -0.0632
response -0.0177 0.1575 -0.2298 -0.8558 -0.3765 -0.9009 0.4314 -0.2995 0.0975
time -0.0177 0.1575 -0.2298 -0.8558 -0.3765 -0.9009 0.4314 -0.2995 0.0975
EPS 0.5498 -0.2359 0.5769 -0.792 0.5904 0.3268 0.2094 0.1029 -0.3949
survey 0.0895 -0.2287 -0.0572 -0.8385 -0.5037 -0.5678 -0.6123 0.4279 0.3379
trees 1.2826 0.0627 -0.998 0.0873 0.0126 0.2465 0.1892 0.0394 0.4954
graph 1.1961 0.0759 -0.6589 -0.1699 -0.1652 -0.093 -1.0088 -0.1268 0.0857
minors 0.7494 0.5671 -0.0793 -0.1733 0.0074 -0.2232 -0.9284 0.199 0.3404
Table  B.2: After applying the transformations as offered by Landauer and Dumais (1997) 
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“We postulate that the power of the model comes from dimensionality 
reduction”(Landauer & Dumais, 1997) 
Following that, a Singular Vector Decomposition (SVD) is then utilized to break up 
the table into three.  It turns the matrix shown above into three, such that when those are 
multiplied with each other the result is the original.  SVD in a sense represents a matrix 
as a transformation from one vector space to another.  The first and third matrices 
represent the vector spaces once in terms of the rows and the other in terms of the 
columns.  The middle matrix represents a transformation matrix such that when it is 
reduced before multiplying the three together, this yields the best possible approximation 
to the original with respect to the selected number of inner dimensions.  When the 
transformed data is broken up into its three components, it yields tables B.3, B.4 and B.5. 
 
0.22 -0.11 0.29 -0.41 -0.11 -0.34 0.52 -0.06 -0.41
0.2 -0.07 0.14 -0.55 0.28 0.5 -0.07 -0.01 -0.11
0.24 0.04 -0.16 -0.59 -0.11 -0.25 -0.3 0.06 0.49
0.4 0.06 -0.34 0.1 0.33 0.38 0 0 0.01
0.64 -0.17 0.36 0.33 -0.16 -0.21 -0.17 0.03 0.27
0.27 0.11 -0.43 0.07 0.08 -0.17 0.28 -0.02 -0.05
0.27 0.11 -0.43 0.07 0.08 -0.17 0.28 -0.02 -0.05
0.3 -0.14 0.33 0.19 0.11 0.27 0.03 -0.02 -0.17
0.21 0.27 -0.18 -0.03 -0.54 0.08 -0.47 -0.04 -0.58
0.01 0.49 0.23 0.03 0.59 -0.39 -0.29 0.25 -0.23
0.04 0.62 0.22 0 -0.07 0.11 0.16 -0.68 0.23
0.03 0.45 0.14 -0.01 -0.3 0.28 0.34 0.68 0.18
Table  B.3: Matrix W - representing the first component 
3.34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 2.54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 2.35 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1.64 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1.31 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.85 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.56 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.36 
Table  B.4: Matrix S - representing the transformation component 
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0.2 0.61 0.46 0.54 0.28 0 0.01 0.02 0.08 
-0.06 0.17 -0.13 -0.23 0.11 0.19 0.44 0.62 0.53 
0.11 -0.5 0.21 0.57 -0.51 0.1 0.19 0.25 0.08 
-0.95 -0.03 0.04 0.27 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.03 
0.05 -0.21 0.38 -0.21 0.33 0.39 0.35 0.15 -0.6 
-0.08 -0.26 0.72 -0.37 0.03 -0.3 -0.21 0 0.36 
0.18 -0.43 -0.24 0.26 0.67 -0.34 -0.15 0.25 0.04 
-0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.45 -0.76 0.45 -0.07 
-0.06 0.24 0.02 -0.08 -0.26 -0.62 0.02 0.52 -0.45 
Table  B.5: Matrix P - representing the last component 
The matrix represented in table B.4 is described as the scaling matrix and it is critical 
to reproducing the original with a lower rank.  A central feature of that matrix is that the 
values are getting smaller from the left to the right, which implies that when one ignores 
the columns to the right, then the factors ignored are those with a smaller effect on the 
total data.  It is this feature that renders the singular vector decomposition with its 
‘power’ by sorting the influence of factors in a decreasing fashion.  Reduction therefore 
ends up in removing the factors that have the lowest influence on the overall data.  Then 
if we wish to reduce the above matrix representation to two dimensions then 
redistributed, we do the following, reducing W to a two column matrix, and reducing S to 
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 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 m1 m2 m3 m4 
human 
-0.0235 -0.0916 0.2205 -0.6897 0.0954 0.0139 0.2524 -0.0213 -0.1111 
interface 
0.0251 -0.0703 0.1624 -0.6293 0.0707 -0.0072 0.1967 -0.0156 -0.0828 
computer 
0.2223 -0.0308 0.0374 -0.7646 0.0187 -0.0905 0.1006 -0.0029 -0.0237 
user 
0.3602 -0.0543 0.0708 -1.2738 0.0348 -0.1465 0.1749 -0.0057 -0.0436 
system 
0.1641 -0.2017 0.451 -2.0178 0.1976 -0.0587 0.5704 -0.043 -0.2319 
response 
0.3508 -0.0066 -0.0405 -0.8651 -0.0136 -0.1448 0.0422 0.005 0.0129 
time 
0.3508 -0.0066 -0.0405 -0.8651 -0.0136 -0.1448 0.0422 0.005 0.0129 
EPS 
-0.0165 -0.1206 0.288 -0.9412 0.1248 0.0123 0.3333 -0.0278 -0.1455 
survey 
0.5586 0.0745 -0.2657 -0.6869 -0.1089 -0.2344 -0.1686 0.0273 0.1225 
trees 
0.7659 0.2096 -0.6186 -0.0691 -0.2597 -0.3263 -0.5292 0.0619 0.2967 
graph 
0.9873 0.2597 -0.7727 -0.1742 -0.324 -0.4201 -0.6531 0.0774 0.3699 
minors 
0.7173 0.1883 -0.5605 -0.1295 -0.235 -0.3052 -0.4735 0.0561 0.2683 
Table  B.6: Resulting matrix when the shaded areas in the paper are multiplied 
Oddly enough, Landauer, Foltz and Laham (1998) gave the following matrix as a 
result: 
 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 m1 m2 m3 m4 
human 0.1637 0.4007 0.3743 0.4611 0.175 -0.0531 -0.1156 -0.1585 -0.0893 
interface 0.1443 0.3773 0.3304 0.4016 0.1675 -0.0338 -0.0716 -0.0969 -0.0408 
computer 0.1542 0.5062 0.3555 0.4095 0.2356 0.0193 0.0527 0.079 0.118 
user 0.2581 0.8409 0.5947 0.6864 0.3908 0.029 0.0804 0.1212 0.1877 
system 0.4534 1.2305 1.0394 1.2536 0.551 -0.082 -0.1686 -0.225 -0.0578 
response 0.1636 0.5976 0.3785 0.4227 0.2832 0.0531 0.132 0.1913 0.2202 
time 0.1636 0.5976 0.3785 0.4227 0.2832 0.0531 0.132 0.1913 0.2202 
EPS 0.2217 0.5508 0.5071 0.6229 0.2414 -0.0676 -0.1464 -0.2004 -0.1083 
survey 0.0991 0.5444 0.2335 0.221 0.2718 0.1303 0.3088 0.4392 0.4196 
trees -0.068 0.232 -0.1464 -0.2682 0.1463 0.2365 0.548 0.7723 0.6623 
graph -0.0678 0.3492 -0.1433 -0.2901 0.2106 0.2992 0.6942 0.979 0.8453 
minors -0.0485 0.2554 -0.1025 -0.2088 0.1538 0.2172 0.5039 0.7107 0.6138 
Table  B.7: Resulting data when the two first rows in matrix P are selected and multiplied 
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These results in fact, emerge when one takes the first two rows of the last matrix 
instead of the first two columns as is highlighted in the paper.  Additionally, in classical 
Singular Vector Decomposition, the multiplication is as follows: X = W*S*P’ indicating 
that the last matrix is transposed or columns turned into rows and vice versa in the 
multiplication process.  The results given in the paper arise from taking the first two rows 
and not applying any transpose to the data in the last matrix.  However, since the power 
of the model has been demonstrated time and again throughout various publications, this 
may just be an error in reporting the example.   
Therefore, this method of obtaining an approximation of the data is claimed to 
remove enough noise from the data to attribute proper descriptors of word meaning 
through the values that relate that word to its adjacent words.  The ideal target 
dimensionality is also given as 300 dimensions.   
Altering a single value in the original matrix, results in a change of a large group of 
cells in the resulting matrix.  Results show a high degree of correlation between the 
predictions made by the model and human behavior.  It also seems to have the ability of 
extracting a vector representation that is capable of assessing the “semantic” distances 
between words in a contextual space.   The semantic space LSA uses to represent vectors, 
is a “world of words” where each word has a location based on the distance its meaning is 
from other words.  This distance is estimated without any regard to where the word 
appeared in the sentence or as Landauer and Dumais (1997) described, it treats contexts 
as “bags of words”.  So it should not be surprising to find that the LSA model detects the 
following two sentences identical in meaning. 
Mark killed the tiger    vs    The tiger killed Mark 
It should be clearly evident that the meaning understood by the reader of the first 
sentence in the case of Mark killing the Tiger is extremely different from that the Tiger 
killed Mark as the death of a human is never equated with the death of a vicious animal.   
This should be enough to emphasize the importance of word order in meaning, 
although the roles are not particularly clear at this stage.  This importance was identified 
by Wiemer-Hastings (2000) to further investigate the effects of the neglected syntactical 
information in a sentence and to attempt to incorporate it into the LSA framework.  He 
separated the sentences into atomic clauses or propositions and then segmented them by 
hand to break them into strings composed of subject noun phrase, verb and object noun 
phrase.  Antecedents were used to resolve pronouns and conjunctions were dealt with by 
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distributing the arguments.  Then he attempted to evaluate the similarity of this 
presentation using a variety of measures.  Results showed that the best approach to 
combine the similarities of the sentence parts is non-linear and even that was not as close 
to human judgment as LSA.  Wiemer-Hastings and Zipitria (2001) then went on to a 
further test, incorporating syntax through two methods.  The first was to tag the words 
used for the training corpus at 100, 200, 300 and 400 dimensions but this did not produce 
any favorable results.  Then they tried a structured LSA or SLSA where they broke up 
sentences into parts as was shown above and used that as training material to find results 
that correlate slightly better than LSA, which does not pay any attention to sentence 
structure.   
To sum up, although LSA offers itself as a computationally powerful model that extracts 
its knowledge from a large encyclopaedia, it does not take word order into consideration.   
 




A Brief Review of Tensor Mathematics 
Unfortunately, the name tensor seems to be constantly linked with Riemann geometry 
and the theory of Relativity.  This strong relationship seems to invoke an impression that 
whatever is linked to this type of mathematics must be “incomprehensible”.  The truth of 
the matter lies in the fact that any topic that is regarded from the outside, seems to be 
“incomprehensible”, so the best way to understand tensors is to visit some of the tensor 
representations that we have in our world.  We can begin by visiting a beautiful Swiss 
Alpine mountain, for example, that can be seen from the top of another mountain.  What 
one can see is represented in three dimensions, length, breadth and breathtaking height.  
The view itself allows one to see the valleys and the trees of various heights and colours.  
If this were captured in a matrix, then would it suffice to describe each point in that space 
just in terms of its height?  Obviously not, the whole setting has to be retained keeping 
the length, breadth as well as height.  This representation retains the height of each level 
of land from the top of the mountain relative to each other point so plateaus can be easily 
identified.  This, is a tensor of the lowest rank! 
We shall not endeavour here to go any higher in rank than that, as there does not seem to 
be any need to do so, but it is worth mentioning that the sky is the limit for anyone who 
wishes to incorporate more information into a description that this physical world offers.  
It is from this flexibility that tensors gained their widely renowned reputation of being 
complex. 
Now in order to start with a mathematical description of a tensor that makes it more 
comprehensible, it could be compared to its peers in the math world.  In a scalar field, a 
single number describes a point, while in an n-dimensional vector field, n-numbers are 
needed to describe a point.  In a tensor field n-squared numbers are used to describe a 
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point or n-cubed numbers, etc.
In other words, our tensor representations would be in the form of matrices because they 
add only one rank to vectors.  This rank is utilized to describe word order in the sentence, 
therefore if we have the words below described in 6 dimensional vector space in table C.1 
then a tensor representation of that sentence can be seen in table C.2 where the whole 
sentence is described by a matrix. 
Vector 1 THE 0.99 0.78 1.00 0.80 0.96 0.85 
 
Vector 2 FLAG 0.29 0.17 0.31 0.27 0.32 0.19 
Vector 3 FLIES 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 
Vector 4 HIGH 0.45 0.33 0.46 0.33 0.45 0.40 
Table  C.1: Four words are shown, each described in 6-dimensional vector space 
Tensor 1: THE FLAG FLIES HIGH 
0.99 0.78 1.00 0.80 0.96 0.85 
0.29 0.17 0.31 0.27 0.32 0.19 
0.26 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 
0.45 0.33 0.46 0.33 0.45 0.40 
Table  C.2: The matrix as a whole describes the sentence maintaining the order of the 
words 
C.1   Tensor Subtraction  
The origins of the numbers will be explained in the following section.  For now, one 
can go a little deeper in some tensor mathematics.  Tensors are basically constructs that 
obey certain transformations, allowing them to interact in a world that may seem strange 
to some.  What would it mean to subtract one tensor from another?  If our tensor is 
represented by a mountain, then it should be similar to subtracting a mountain from 
another, taking into account the locations of hills and valleys.  One could imagine two 
hollow mountains and the process of making one semi-invisible and passing it through 
the matter of the other in order to identify a representation for the “difference” between 
the two tensors.  In a vector world, this difference would be a third vector, so it should 
not be surprising that in a tensor world, the difference would be a tensor.   
 
 




An equation for this follows: 
 
 
The subscripts shown are those related to the tensor based neural network that will be 
explained shortly.  Basically, what the summations are doing is to deduct each element 
belonging to U from its corresponding element belonging to T.  Therefore from the point 
of view of calculations it is quite straightforward to carry out that formula 
computationally while it is at the same time powerful in that it is capable of subtracting 
two tensor based representations from each other. It should be clear by now, that the 
imagined view of a mountain is in fact more complex than one would think.  Two of the 
dimensions are in fact a “flat” representation of a multi-dimensional vector world, which 
one assumes to be “flat” as a base to the mountain in order to add height to that mountain.  
Consequently, one may say that the base of the mountain is a world as complex as the 
one described by LSA while the added dimension is orthogonal to that world. 
The tensor functions that are necessary for the model also include two main operations: 
estimating the magnitude of a tensor and calculating the dot product of a tensor. 
C.2   Tensor Magnitude  
Yet again the mathematics of estimating the magnitude of a tensor is far simpler to 
understand than the power of the operation.  The formula is shown below: 
 
 
Let us now contrast this formula with the one that measures the magnitude of a vector 
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result in a scalar value.  An example of this formula is as follows: 
 
 
Mathematically, this is easy to calculate but explaining it is a very different proposition.  
When it comes to vectors, the dot product of two vectors represents a good measure of 
orthogonality.  If we get the dot product of two vectors with indices of (1,0) and (0,1) 
then it will be a zero because one vector lies on the positive side of the x axis while the 
other on the positive side of the y axis.  This behaviour is repeated no matter where the 
vectors are in the representation so long as they are perfectly orthogonal to each other.  In 
other words, even when we are talking about a complex tensor world, then orthogonality 
is detected.  If a zero does not result, then the resulting number reflects the magnitude of 
the projection of one vector along the other.  I will not attempt to explain this in terms of 
tensors for reasons that should be clear with regards to the complexity in hand.  The 
point, however, should be clear, that this measure is extremely sensitive to direction. 
Although discussing tensor mathematics is a great deal of fun, we should not over 
indulge ourselves in this wonderful world that exceeds imagination and go on to the 
competitive based architecture where these three operations will be of critical importance. 




A Brief Description of Competitive 
Architectures  
D.1   How Competitive Architectures Work  
In a simple competitive architecture, input patterns are presented to the network during a 
training phase.  The weight vector is then adjusted to be able to differentiate between the 
vectors that are highly dissimilar and to group the ones that are highly similar. 
 
Figure  D.1: A Competition Based Architecture 
The process is clarified in figure D.1; as each input is presented to the network 
through its input neurons, a selected weight wins if it is the closest weight vector to that 
input.  This weight is then adjusted in order to include the pattern into a classification that 
covers that area of space that the input is closest to.  In a strange sense, this is a measure 
of how close vectors are to each other as is shown below in a simplification of how 
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An example of this process can be exhibited through the classification process of the 
following six vectors (Hagan, Demuth, Beale, 1996). 
 
The competitive network offered to classify these has three neurons and therefore has 




Making the total weight vector 
                                               
 
 
If we present the second input pattern to the network, it starts by estimating the 
distance between each of its weight vectors and that input pattern.  Although there are 
several different ways of performing this comparison, the way shown here is the one 
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The closest weight is therefore weight 2 which is on the second row so its weight will be 
adjusted according to the following equation and here we assume the learning rate to be 
α = 0.5.  This is larger than the learning factor used in the model to show a clearer 
change in the example.  The model itself has a learning rate of 0.3. 





 to pattern two than its 
patterns are presented 
repeatedly to the network, the weight swings like a pendulum until it arrives at a stable 
point at the centre of the region it covers.  In this way, the different weights divide to 
cover different regions of the search space. 
D.2   A Tensor Based Competitive Architecture  
Since the basic competition based architecture has been clearly outlined above, this 
section will concentrate on differences between that architecture and a tensor based one.  
The first clear difference is that of dimensionality, which we can see if we review our 
examples of mountains.  In a vector based architecture the network compares vectors 
represented in multi-dimensional space and moves the weights in that number of 
dimensions.  So on paper our arrows can move around to isolate different regions of 
classification as necessary.  On the other hand, in a tensor based architecture, we add a 
dimension orthogonal to the paper drawing our imaginary mountains and then weights 
also have to be represented by “mountains” that separate these mountains into different 
classifications.  Although it is difficult to imagine, this is what happens to a multi-
dimensional vector space that is in a strange sense considered “flat” when the extra 
dimension is added through the tensor representation. 
The main complications that arise after jumping from vectors to tensors is that the lack 
of visualization makes it more difficult to properly comprehend the full workings of that 
world.  However, one must not forget that the weight values here are tensors and 
therefore complex constructs are required to break up the world into different “zones” 
that would contain the various classifications. 
  0.7071 
          =                       + 0.5                        -                           = 
Now if one compares the new weight, it is clearly closer
previous values were.  If this process is repeated as all different 





  0.4516 
  0.8439 
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Therefore the tensor formulae described above go into this code in order to perform all 
the main operations necessary for the network.  This requires a little bit of juggling 
during the design phase of this architecture a main reason being that the weight matrix W 
for example will become three dimensional rather than two dimensional as shown above.  
This in turn requires some decisions to be made as to the arrangement of the two 
dimensional matrices of weights with respect to their order in that weight matrix.  Yet 
again, it takes another decision of how to make an effective multiplication considering 
that in the classical case each transpose of a weight is multiplied by the input pattern. 
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